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Abstract 
 
This dissertation traces the human rights engagement of the ecumenical movement through its most 
important institutional embodiment, the World Council of Churches (WCC). In doing so, it 
contributes to the historiography on human rights, on the WCC, and on religious internationalism.  
The first part of the dissertation argues that from the 1940s to the 1960s, the WCC’s human 
rights engagement was strongly focused on religious freedom and extended well beyond the United 
Nations. Scholarship on the WCC had addressed its advocacy against curtailment of religious freedom 
communist states in some detail, a story that this dissertation retraces in relation to recent work on 
human rights, using the case of the Soviet Union. But the ecumenical movement also saw two other 
major opponents, Islam (especially in the context of decolonization) and political Roman Catholicism, 
which led it to lobby and campaign for religious freedom in countries including Indonesia, Nigeria, 
and Spain. 
The second part of the dissertation considers the expansion of the WCC’s human rights 
agenda. Over the course of the 1960s, the cause of antiracism invited piecemeal expansion of the 
WCC’s human rights agenda. Only in the early 1970s, however, did the WCC develop a radically new 
conception of human rights, shaped above all by the need to respond to military dictatorships in Latin 
America. It sought to develop a conception of human rights that could be effective in addressing not 
only questions of political repression but also the structural causes underlying it.  
Whereas the historiography on human rights has thus far focused on secular liberals and 
conservative Catholics, this dissertation brings into view the transnational activities of the 
predominantly Protestant ecumenical movement. The WCC’s human rights engagement, which 
refracted but also impacted on the Cold War, decolonization, and secularization, represented an 
important strand of postwar internationalism. 
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Introduction: human rights, Christianity, 
and the ecumenical movement 
Introduction 
Gathered in Amsterdam from 22 August to 4 September 1948, the 351 delegates to the 
founding Assembly of the World Council of Churches (WCC) contemplated what role Christianity 
ought to play in what seemed like a broken world. Much of Europe still lay in ruins after the Second 
World War. The use of the atom bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided an ominous sign of what 
a Third might hold. The onset of tensions between the former Allies, the United States and Britain on 
the one hand, the Soviet Union on the other, meant that such a war was already becoming imaginable. 
In this context, the Assembly discerned a spiritual crisis. Its Section IV, on ‘The Church and the 
International Disorder’, concluded that ‘[e]xhaustion and disillusionment have combined with spiritual 
apathy to produce a moral vacuum which will be filled, either by Christian faith or by despair or even 
hatred. Men are asking in fear and dismay what the future holds.’1 But the establishment of the WCC 
offered hope: ‘a fellowship is being developed which rises above those barriers of race, colour, class 
and nation that now set men against each other in conflict’.2 One major way in which this Christian 
fellowship could contribute to peace and reconciliation was by calling for the protection of human 
rights, a concept that had made it into the foundations of the recently established United Nations. 
Lobbying by churches associated with the WCC had contributed to this outcome, and at the time of 
the Amsterdam Assembly, the drafting of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
was entering its final stages.3 The WCC was therefore umbilically connected to the postwar rise of 
human rights – but its engagement with the concept was shaped by distinctly Christian concerns. 
The WCC had its roots before the Second World War. The decision to establish the 
organization had already been made at the seminal World Conference on Church, Community and 
State, held at Oxford from 12 to 26 July 1937, but the outbreak of war had meant that only a germinal 
                                                 
1 W.A. Visser ‘t Hooft, ed., The First Assembly of the World Council of Churches: The Official Report (London: SCM Press, 1949) 
88. 
2 Ibid., 88. 
3 John Nurser, For All Peoples and All Nations: The Ecumenical Church and Human Rights (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2005). 
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organization, headquartered in Geneva, existed until 1948. Building on a series of conferences 
organized during the first half of the twentieth century, the WCC represented the most important 
institutional embodiment of the ecumenical movement. This predominantly Protestant network 
sought to manifest the unity of Christianity – in ecumenists’ view, this essential unity was given by 
God – in both doctrine and social action. The two principal organizations of the interwar ecumenical 
movement which came together in the WCC represented these two aspects: the World Conference of 
Faith and Order, and the Universal Christian Council of Life and Work had in the interwar decades 
provided a platform for churches of different denominations. The WCC was also closely linked to a 
third strand of ecumenism, the International Missionary Council (IMC), which represented the 
missionary movement and would be integrated into the WCC in 1961.4 With 147 different churches 
represented at the Amsterdam Assembly, from 44 countries, though almost all Protestant and from 
the West, the newly established WCC boasted a constituency that numbered in the many dozens of 
millions.5 It attracted clergy and laypeople of significant religious and social stature, enabling it to exert 
influence in both the spiritual and political realms. As the Dutch ecumenist and jurist Baron F.M. van 
Asbeck wrote in preparation for the Amsterdam Assembly, ‘[t]he ecumenical leaven should 
revolutionize the international world’.6 
Thus, the Amsterdam Assembly’s Section IV called on churches to support the adoption of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its development into an enforceable ‘International 
Bill of Rights’. The churches were also urged to ‘press for freedom of speech and expression, of 
association and assembly, the rights of the family, of freedom from arbitrary arrest, as well as those 
other rights which the true freedom of man requires’. Moreover, the churches should ‘support a fuller 
realisation of human freedom through social legislation’, ‘protest against the expulsion of minorities’, 
and ‘oppose enforced segregation on grounds of race and colour’.7 Finally, the Assembly appealed for 
support of ‘other conventions on human rights, such as those on Genocide and Freedom of 
Information and the Press’.8 But this laundry list of postwar concerns remained superficial in 
                                                 
4 For an excellent historical overview, see Justin Reynolds, ‘Against the World: International Protestantism and the 
Ecumenical Movement between Secularization and Politics’ (PhD dissertation: Columbia University, 2016). 
5 Thomas E. Fitzgerald, The Ecumenical Movement: An Introductory History (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004) 109. 
6 Quoted in James C. Kennedy, ‘Protestant Ecclesiastical Internationals’, in Abigail Green and Vincent Viaene, eds., 
Religious Internationals in the Modern World: Globalization and Faith Communities since 1750 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012) 292-318, on 296. 
7 Visser ‘t Hooft, ed., The First Assembly, 93-94. On the work of Section IV, see inter alia Matti Peiponen, Ecumenical Action 
in World Politics: The Creation of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), 1945-1949 (Helsinki: Luther-
Agricola-Society, 2012) 291-292. 
8 Visser ‘t Hooft, ed., The First Assembly, 96. 
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comparison to the subject on which the Assembly went so far as to adopt an entire separate text: ‘A 
Declaration on Religious Liberty’. 
This Declaration called for attention to religious freedom as an international concern: ‘An 
essential element in a good international order is freedom of religion. This is an implication of the 
Christian faith and of the world-wide nature of Christianity.’ It also made clear that the WCC grounded 
religious and other human rights in a conception of personal, natural rights, meant as a bulwark against 
state encroachment: ‘The nature and destiny of man by virtue of his creation, redemption and calling, 
and man’s activities in family, state and culture establish limits beyond which the government cannot 
with impunity go.’ Consequently, the Declaration enumerated four sets of rights: 
‘1. Every person has the right to determine his own faith and creed. (…) 
2. Every person has the right to express his religious beliefs in worship, teaching and practice, and 
to proclaim the implications of his beliefs for relationships in a social or political community. (…) 
3. Every person has the right to associate with others and to organise with them for religious 
purposes. (…) 
4. Every religious organisation, formed or maintained by action in accordance with the rights of 
individual persons, has the right to determine its policies and practices for the accomplishment of 
its chosen purposes.’9 
Shortly after the Amsterdam Assembly, the IMC also adopted this Declaration, enshrining it as the 
basis for both church and missionary advocacy of religious liberty in the postwar decades. A few 
months later, on 10 December 1948, the United Nations adopted its Universal Declaration, which 
included a provision on religious freedom that had been shaped according to ecumenical desiderata. 
Its Article 18 read:  
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom 
to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public 
or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.’10 
This statement provided the ecumenical movement with a vital secular instrument for promoting its 
conception of religious freedom. The representative body of both WCC and IMC, the Commission 
of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), set about this task, in collaboration with its contacts 
around the world. 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 97-99 (emphasis omitted). 
10 Linde Lindkvist, ‘The Politics of Article 18: Religious Liberty in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, Humanity, 
4, 3 (2014) 429-447, on 429. 
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Taking this milestone in the history of human rights and the ecumenical movement as its 
starting point, this dissertation seeks to answer the question of how the WCC’s human rights 
engagement developed from the 1940s to the 1970s. Its thesis is that while the WCC’s advocacy of 
human rights was marked by continuity from the 1940s to the 1960s, in the 1970s it adopted a radically 
different stance from the one outlined above. This shift entailed at least four significant changes. The 
WCC initially focused heavily on religious freedom, above all that of its member churches and 
coreligionists, whereas its approach to human rights in the 1970s was capacious, emphatically 
including social, economic, and collective rights. Its initial insistence on a natural law understanding 
of rights, which stressed universality, was replaced by a more contextualist view. Furthermore, whereas 
in the 1940s, the WCC saw human rights primarily as a secular instrument, in the 1970s it sought to 
integrate the concept more fully it into its theological thinking. And finally, whereas its representatives 
in the 1940s were wedded to a strategy of elite lobbying of governments, international institutions, 
and religious leaders, the WCC in the 1970s offered direct support to groups working for ‘liberation’. 
By providing the most extensive archival examination yet of both phases in the WCC’s human rights 
engagement, the dissertation situates it as an important strand in the postwar history of human rights 
and (religious) internationalism. 
The dissertation aims to make contributions to three historiographical subfields. First among 
these is the historiography on human rights. While in recent years the genealogy of human rights in 
the twentieth century has been debated vociferously, most notably in response to Samuel Moyn’s The 
Last Utopia (2010), historians have tended to focus on the role of states and secular nongovernmental 
organizations. Religious actors have only recently begun to receive greater attention, but much of this 
has been devoted to Catholics, often in the context of the late 1930s to 1940s.11 The fragmentation of 
non-Catholic Christianity can help explain the absence of overarching accounts of Protestant human 
rights engagement. Studying the WCC, however, allows a unique window into transnational 
Protestantism. Insofar as the WCC and the wider ecumenical movement has been studied, scholars 
have mostly left unexamined the development of their human rights engagement from the 1940s 
onward. As this dissertation illustrates, in the realm of religious freedom, the ecumenical movement 
was in fact highly active. Moreover, recent scholarship has tended to focus either on the 1940s or the 
                                                 
11 An excellent recent ‘Special Forum on Christianity and Rights’, in the Journal of the History of Ideas, 79, 3 (2018), has 
given a renewed impetus to the study of Christian human rights, across the late eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century, 
but most contributions focus on Catholics. I briefly engage with several of the articles in chapter 3 and the conclusions. 
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1970s, while studies tracing continuities and discontinuities across the postwar decades are relatively 
scarce.  
Although excellent work on the ecumenical movement has recently been carried out, the 
historiography on the WCC still lacks an authoritative account. Much of the literature on the subject 
is made up of official histories and the accounts of participants, which, although often useful or 
insightful, have tended to lack critical distance or a basis in published and especially in unpublished 
sources.12 While the WCC’s human rights engagement has been the focus of a number of studies, 
these have focused on a limited number of episodes, and with hardly any attention paid to the 1950s 
and 1960s, or to human rights beyond the question of Eastern Europe. This dissertation thus makes 
an important contribution chronologically as well as thematically, and in so doing aims to broaden the 
future agenda for studies of the WCC. Furthermore, the dissertation’s extensive use of archival 
materials relating to a variety of cases gives it both greater width and depth than most previous 
accounts. In applying categories of analysis derived from the historiography on human rights, and that 
of international history more broadly, it also seeks to connect the WCC’s history (and the existing 
scholarship on the subject) to wider historiographical debates than a church historical or theological 
focus allows for. 
Thirdly, the dissertation is also a contribution to the history of (religious) internationalism and 
transnational nongovernmental organizations. The history of such movements and organizations has 
received increasing attention in recent years.13 As an ecclesiastical organization with member churches 
and a network across borders, the WCC sat in the grey area between the ‘international’ and the 
‘transnational’ (while at the same time, the importance of the ‘national’ or even the ‘local’ should not 
be overlooked). The WCC has often been studied by church historians as primarily ‘a sphere for 
contacts, exchanges, and communication’, but as Elisabeth Engel, James C. Kennedy, and Justin 
Reynolds have recently argued, the ecumenical movement also furnished ‘specific expressions of 
                                                 
12 E.g. Ruth Rouse and Stephen Charles Neill, eds., A History of the Ecumenical Movement, vol. 1: 1517-1948 (Geneva: World 
Council of Churches, 1993; 1st edn. 1954); Harold E. Fey, ed., The Ecumenical Advance: A History of the Ecumenical Movement, 
vol. 2: 1948-1968 (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1993; 1st edn. 1970); John Briggs, Mercy Amba Oduyoye, and 
George Tsetsis, eds., A History of the Ecumenical Movement, vol. 3: 1968-2000 (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 2004); 
Darril Hudson, The World Council of Churches in International Affairs (Leighton Buzzard: The Faith Press [for the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs], 1977); Darril Hudson, The Ecumenical Movement in World Affairs (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson [for the London School of Economics & Political Science], 1969); Ans J. van der Bent, Christian Response in a 
World of Crisis: A Brief History of the WCC’s Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (Geneva: WCC, 1986). 
13 E.g. Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, eds., Internationalisms: A Twentieth-Century History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017); Jessica Reinisch, ‘Introduction: Agents of Internationalism’, Contemporary European History, 25, 2 (2016) 195-
205. 
15 
 
power that shaped colonial politics, decolonization movements, international regimes of aid and 
development, and human rights institutions’.14 At the same time, they stress its distinctly Christian 
nature, which represented an important departure in Christian ideology:  
‘Through the ecumenical movement, nineteenth-century ideologies of expansion by conversion 
gave way to a new universalist ideology, in which Christianity would conquer not territory but the 
centrifugal forces that lay at the root of the modern, secular temper: nationalism, class struggle, 
sectarian conflict, and racism.’15  
Thus, the WCC straddled the border between the religious and the secular, influencing the framing of 
postwar international order in ways just now being recognized.  
The remainder of this introduction discusses the historiography relevant to the dissertation, 
starting with a brief survey of the recent historiography on human rights and the place of religion in 
it. It then presents overviews of the historiography pertaining to the ecumenical movement and human 
rights in the 1940s and 1970s, respectively. The final section lays out the dissertation’s structure, before 
dealing with methodological considerations, including the limitations of the study and a note on 
sources. 
 
The recent historiography on human rights and the absence of religion 
The burgeoning field of human rights history has reached a size and complexity where no 
historiographical summary can do it full justice. What can be said is that at the heart of most recent 
works is a commitment to historicizing human rights, in response to earlier accounts, which tended 
to approach the subject ahistorically.16 In a much-quoted 2004 essay, several years ahead of the current 
surge in interest, Kenneth Cmiel called for historians to attend ‘to the nuances of political language in 
different cultural settings’ in studying human rights and to recover the ‘grime of past politics’.17 In 
2009, Jan Eckel put forward his approach of the history of human rights as discontinuous, polycentric, 
and concerned with changes in both the form and content of the concept.18 Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann 
                                                 
14 Elisabeth Engel, James Kennedy, and Justin Reynolds, ‘Editorial – the Theory and Practice of Ecumenism: Christian 
Global Governance and the Search for World Order, 1900-80’, Journal of Global History, 13, 2 (2018) 157-164, on 160. 
15 Ibid., 159. 
16 Aim has most often been taken at two ‘early’ historical studies: Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human 
Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998) and Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). 
17 Kenneth Cmiel, ‘The Recent History of Human Rights’, The American Historical Review, 109, 1 (2004) 117-135, quote on 
120-1. 
18 Jan Eckel, ‘Utopie der Moral, Kalkül der Macht. Menschenrechte in der globalen Politik seit 1945’, Archiv für 
Sozialgeschichte, 49 (2009) 437-484, on 439. 
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pleaded for a genealogical approach to human rights, which would avoid taking an a priori stance on 
their moral value and instead trace the different ways in which the concept was used and given meaning 
by different actors at different times.19 In the most influential intervention, Samuel Moyn, in his book 
The Last Utopia (2010), argued that ‘human rights have to be treated as a human cause, rather than one 
with the long-term inevitability and moral self-evidence that common sense assumes’.20 An overview 
by Barbara Keys and Roland Burke echoes this ambition, as they conceive of human rights history 
‘not as a linear and unitary narrative of progress in the face of resistance but rather as a series of 
discontinuities, intersections, and appropriations in which the scope and content of the term itself was 
always an area of contestation’.21 Earlier inquiries into natural rights, which in Brian Tierney’s view are 
synonymous with human rights, have focused on discovering the deep historical roots of human 
rights.22 Scholars working in this vein have identified antecedents or ‘origins’ of human rights in 
Enlightenment thought and the revolutions of the late eighteenth century, the Protestant reformation, 
medieval canon law, classical Stoicism, and elsewhere.23 While not denying the existence of such 
antecedents, the recent literature has instead focused on tracing the changing meaning of the concept 
of human rights in the context of more recent history. 
The focus in the recent debate has been on the twentieth century, and particularly on the 
period of the 1940s to the 1970s. Whereas established narratives had foregrounded the 1940s as the 
site of a human rights ‘revolution’, owing above all to the creation of the United Nations and its 
promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)24, Moyn, Eckel, and others argued 
                                                 
19 Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, ‘Introduction: Genealogies of Human Rights’, in ibid., ed., Human Rights in the Twentieth Century 
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20 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2010) 9. 
21 Barbara Keys and Roland Burke, ‘Human rights’, in Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde, eds., The Oxford Handbook 
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22 Brian Tierney, ‘The Idea of Natural Rights – Origins and Persistence’, Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, 
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that in fact, a decisive ‘breakthrough’ of human rights only occurred in the 1970s.25 In Moyn’s view, 
what was most significant about this was that it entailed the rise of a form of ‘antipolitics’, minimalist 
and focused on a limited set of civil and political rights, rather than radical in its commitments, as 
opposed to earlier ‘utopias’ such as reform socialism. Amnesty International and concern for 
dissidents and opposition figures in Eastern Europe and Latin America galvanized activists who 
desired to transcend the Cold War and opposed state authoritarianism. This movement could only 
come about, Moyn argued, as more radical ones receded. Noting in passing the significance of 
Christianity in the 1940s, Moyn wrote that in the 1970s, religion was far less important: 
‘Without gainsaying the relevance of Christian forces even in the 1970s, what matters in the long 
view is that they had much less of a propriety claim on human rights than in the 1940s, when 
Christianity counted so much in both defining and marginalizing the idea. The world had changed 
since then. Progressive Christianity, both Catholic and Protestant, had exploded around the world 
without clear connection to human rights.’26  
While historiographical debate at first focused on identifying competing ‘breakthrough’ 
moments, as Moyn has subsequently written, the question of chronology served ‘merely as a proxy 
for assessing what sociohistorical conditions made the contemporary enterprise of international 
human rights imaginable and plausible’, specifically with respect to ‘the content of norms’, their 
‘geographical zone of application’, and the ‘prominence and believability of human rights as a language 
of political ideology, maneuvering, and struggle’.27 In line with this, over time, the historiography has 
begun to move beyond the focus on identifying ‘breakthrough’ moments in a single overarching 
history of ‘human rights’. A recent assessment by Burke and Jensen concludes that instead, scholarship 
is shifting ‘toward a constellation of “human rights histories”, with complementarity of global, regional 
and thematic accounts’.28 Indeed, in response to a challenge by Hoffmann, who argued for the 1990s 
as the real ‘breakthrough’ era, Moyn has written that this innovation might be ‘the last interesting 
                                                 
25 Moyn, The Last Utopia; Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn, eds., The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s (Philadelphia: 
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move available in the game of human rights history, at least until the rules are changed in ways no one 
currently anticipates’.29  
But this evaluation belies the ways in which the field has, through its increasing diversity, not 
only widened but connected to other areas of inquiry. For instance, while the scholarship still focuses 
heavily on Western, especially American, actors, it has expanded geographically and linguistically.30 A 
particularly pronounced challenge in this respect has come from scholars working on decolonization. 
While anticolonial movements were excluded by Moyn from the genealogy of human rights in its 
1970s guise, scholars such as Roland Burke, Meredith Terretta, Steven Jensen, Fabian Klose, and 
Daniel Maul, have demonstrated the agency of actors from the global South during the process of 
decolonization.31 Moreover, as Mark Philip Bradley’s recent work has demonstrated, new 
methodological approaches, drawing inspiration from sources such as literary theory, can throw new 
light even on a field as well-worn as human rights and the United States.32 
A theme that initially received scant attention in the recent historiography was that of 
religion.33 As Moyn recognized in The Last Utopia, in the existing work on human rights and non-
governmental organizations, it ‘seems rather clear that blinders continue to exclude the early, striking, 
and persisting relevance of religious groups among NGOs generally’.34 Several factors help explain 
this. David A. Hollinger has noted that, in the American context at least, the literature on ‘ecumenical 
Protestantism’ has remained ‘fewer in number, narrower in scope, and lower in professional visibility’ 
compared to that on ‘evangelical Protestantism’, which became dominant in American life from the 
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1960s and 1970s on.35 Since it was ecumenical Protestants who were most likely to endorse human 
rights or internationalist ideals more generally, it seems plausible that this has been a significant factor, 
especially considering the fact that the literature on the history of human rights has emanated to a 
large extent from the United States.  
Furthermore, the ascription to human rights of a ‘secular’ character is an obvious reason. For 
example, Petra Goedde, in her otherwise insightful account of cultural globalization after 1945, has 
written that ‘[i]n many ways the postwar rise of human rights in the international arena became a 
secular religion of sorts for rational Enlightenment thinkers across the world.’36 Goedde’s phrasing 
calls to mind Stephen Hopgood’s characterization of Amnesty International, the paragon of human 
rights advocacy from the 1970s onward, as ‘culturally and by inclination Christian but allied to 
universal rights that were successful precisely because of their secularity’.37 But the question of the 
‘secularity’ of human rights is a complex one, and certainly not reducible to the assumption that the 
postwar decline in religious adherence, institutions, and authority meant that religion exerted no 
influence on the postwar trajectory of human rights.38 The answer must, rather, take into account the 
continuing role of religious actors in public and international affairs, including their positioning in 
relationship to the mutable dividing line between the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular’.39  
Historians have tended to omit religious organizations from analyses of (international) ‘civil 
society’ or ‘non-governmental organizations’, categories of actors that often played a crucial role in 
the field of human rights. In his agenda-setting book on international organizations and 
internationalism more widely, Global Community (2002), the historian Akira Iriye excluded ‘religious 
institutions’ as such from his category of ‘non-governmental organizations’ – a distinction he himself 
recognized as ‘tenuous’, but found necessary as otherwise ‘at this stage of scholarship’, the work would 
become ‘unmanageable’.40 Iriye’s choice of the word ‘non-governmental organizations’ suggests a 
more narrowly technical approach, yet this term came into use through the United Nations system, 
which from the outset gave the CCIA consultative status as just such an organization. With good 
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36 Petra Goedde, ‘Global Cultures’, in Akira Iriye, ed., Global Interdependence: The World after 1945 (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013) 537-678, on 650. 
37 Stephen Hopgood, Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006) 60. 
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reason, then, Iriye’s position has been critiqued by James C. Kennedy and the editors of a recent 
volume on religious internationalism as reflecting ‘the Enlightenment origins of the term “civil 
society” and its inherently Western bias’, which have led to an undue separation of religion and civil 
society.41 Kennedy admits that churches do not meet certain frequently used criteria for qualifying as 
‘civil society’, notably the fact that membership from childhood and the inward, spiritual orientation 
of churches are at odds with notions of ‘a voluntaristic, secular civil society’.42 Yet he argues that 
excluding international federations of churches like the WCC from the category of ‘non-governmental 
organizations’, ‘might strike some Christian ecumenists as missing the heart of their international 
presence and the deeper purpose of their humanitarian effort’.43 Indeed, as this dissertation aims to 
show, it would miss an influential current of distinctly Christian human rights advocacy, which through 
the WCC tapped into a global ecumenical network. Fortunately, in recent years scholarship on the 
history of human rights has begun to give increasing attention to religion, including specific 
contributions on ecumenism. The next section discusses how some of this most recent literature has 
begun to evaluate the role of Catholics, Protestants, and the ecumenical movement. 
 
Human rights, Christianity, and the ecumenical movement, 1937-1948 
Among historians, there has been a recent surge in interest in the relationship between 
Christianity and human rights, focused on the 1930s and 1940s. Historians have evaluated the political 
valence of the ecumenical movement and its conception of human rights in very different ways. 
Broadly speaking, the literature on the ecumenical movement has fallen into two camps: accounts that 
focus on the ‘conservative’ nature of ecumenical human rights, distinct from and even hostile to 
secular liberalism, and those that stress ‘liberal’ contributions, which cast the turn to human rights as 
part of Protestantism’s coming to term with a secularizing and diverse world.44 The former are the 
focus of Moyn in his Christian Human Rights, in which he argues, writing about both Catholics and 
Protestants, that not only the ‘history of Christian human rights in the 1940s is the major part of the 
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history of human rights generally at the time’, but also, provocatively, that ‘Christian human rights 
were part and parcel of a reformulation of conservatism in the name of a vision of moral constraint, 
not human emancipation or individual liberation’.45 With regard to ecumenical Protestants, Moyn 
focuses much of his attention on the German historian Gerhard Ritter, an enthusiastic participant at 
the WCC’s founding assembly but a conservative Lutheran (though he acknowledges the exceptional 
nature of Ritter’s support for human rights, since most Lutherans regarded it with suspicion).46 More 
importantly, Moyn argues that ‘religious freedom became an international human right’, and the 
principal one in the eyes of ecumenists, not because they acquiesced to ‘political secularism’ but 
because they sought to resist it, above all its aggressive manifestation in the Soviet Union. ‘[M]issionary 
proselytizing’ provided another reason.47 Moyn, following the work of Marco Duranti has argued that 
the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), though primarily the work of Catholics, deployed 
religious freedom ‘as a crucial tool to stave secularism off’.48 Such arguments are consonant with 
assessments that have stressed how the WCC leaned towards the emergent Western ‘camp’ in the early 
Cold War.49 
On the other hand, there are those historians who have emphasized the ‘liberal’ impetus 
behind the ecumenical movement’s turn to human rights, especially through its American participants. 
Andrew Preston has stressed that American liberal mainline Protestants, who were heavily involved 
in the ecumenical movement, ‘campaigned against the anti-communist direction of American foreign 
policy and in favour of decolonisation, nuclear arms control, and global social justice’, as well as human 
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rights.50 Their international engagement through both the Federal (later National) Council of Churches 
and the WCC was rooted in the Social Gospel, including its manifestation in the missionary 
movement, as well as ‘Wilsonian internationalism and a belief in international organisation’.51 Michael 
G. Thompson’s account of interwar American ecumenism  and the 1937 Oxford conference has also 
highlighted opposition to empire, racism, and ‘idolatrous’ nationalism.52 Building on the work of David 
Hollinger, Gene Zubovich has shown that human rights also featured prominently in the domestic 
politics of American liberal Protestants in the mid-1940s, as they deployed the concept in the cause 
of desegregation and social justice.53 Zubovich has emphasized how the rise of the Soviet Union did 
not merely cause apprehension but also ‘acted as a mirror to the parochialism of American 
Protestantism, moving them further in their aspiration to discard their cultural baggage and emerge as 
a yet more universal force on behalf of social justice in the world’.54 These works align with an 
understanding of the WCC as an organization that sought primarily to transcend the Cold War or even 
to transform it.55 
As this variety of viewpoints suggests, more work is still needed on how to situate the 
perspective of ecumenical Protestants, especially in Europe: as Paul Hanebrink has recently written, 
recent works such as Reynolds’, rather than furnishing a definitive answer, ‘reveal how much work 
remains to be done to situate Protestantism in the history of transwar Europe’.56 The bifurcation in 
the literature described above can in part be explained from its focus on either European Christians 
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or American Protestants, respectively.57 A number of recent works, however, has sought an 
explanation for the ecumenical movement’s ideological inchoateness in its underlying commitment to 
combating ‘secularism’. According to Reynolds, ‘anti-secularism’ translated ‘the international conflicts 
that threatened Christian unity into a religious problem: man’s search for self-sufficiency and denial 
of his responsibility to God’.58 As he writes, ‘[b]y encompassing liberal individualism and its apparent 
opposites of Nazism and Communism under the rubric of a coherent enemy, ecumenists sought to 
consolidate Christian unity in a decade of political polarization that threatened once again to alienate 
the Germans from their co-religionists in other countries.’59 Udi Greenberg has extended this analysis 
of the ecumenical movement’s antisecularism to the missionary movement, connecting it with calls 
for decolonization and European integration.60  
In their attempts to articulate a Christian conception of man that could withstand the challenge 
of secularism, ecumenists drew on aspects of liberalism but integrated these into a conception of 
personalism. Terence Renaud has written that at the 1937 Oxford conference, ecumenists adopted 
what came to be called the ‘Oxford Doctrine of Man’, which rooted rights in ‘the single right of 
personal self-fulfilment through acknowledgement of the Word of God’.61 As Renaud writes: ‘By 
conceptualizing “the existence of man as person as existence in community”, the churches interpreted 
the relationship between the individual and the collective as mutually constitutive.’62 Crucially, Renaud 
distinguishes Protestant from Catholic personalism: ‘[a]lthough Protestant personalism described 
humans as neighbours who shared in a common partnership with God, it said little about the sort of 
communal rights and duties that lay at the core of Catholic personalism’. Instead, ecumenists ‘called 
for a universal community of faith that would recognize no distinctions based on nation, race, or 
class’.63 This, coupled with their decision to establish the WCC, in Renaud’s view provided ‘the two 
main ingredients of any human rights regime: a universalist commitment to defending individual 
human beings and a global institutional framework for enacting that commitment’.64 In other words, 
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compared to Catholics, Protestant human rights was rooted in a more global vision, while it was still 
more communitarian than secular liberalism. 
Although Renaud’s account describes how transwar Protestant thought fulfilled the 
intellectual conditions of possibility for the WCC to come to its support of human rights, it leaves 
open the question how the concept figured in the organization’s practice. Church and missionary 
leaders in various countries could attach their own understanding to human rights, as their specific 
theological and political contexts required. An important case in this respect is that of the West 
Germans, who in Brandon Bloch’s view stood apart from the ‘mainstream of Christian human rights 
thinking in the 1940s’, as Barthian and conservative Lutheran Germans shared ‘a theological 
orientation toward the pervasiveness of human sin and the divine origins of law’. This led their 
representatives to ‘criticize the theological foundations of the ecumenical movement and to draw on 
alternative conceptions of human rights in their attacks on denazification and war crimes trials’.65 
While such Germans could participate in the WCC, such usage of human rights represented a 
discourse very different from that developed by Anglo-American ecumenists. Though such uses of 
the term were not the driving force behind the adoption of human rights by the WCC, they illustrate 
how the concept’s ambiguity and malleability allowed different parts of its constituency to endow the 
term with different meanings.  
Pamela Slotte has written that in the immediate postwar years, for the churches, ‘a human 
rights vocabulary was not the predominant way of framing religious and, more precisely, ethical 
concerns’. While ‘freedom of conscience and religious liberty were on the agenda, especially for 
Protestant missionary societies and minority churches’, there was no ‘official explicit human rights 
work on the part of the world churches amounting to more than single-issue activism, such as efforts 
to secure religious liberty in the context of missionary work’.66 Although the Amsterdam Assembly’s 
Section IV treated human rights at some length, as discussed above, Slotte notes that the conference’s 
‘Message’ did not use the term.67 Slotte writes that nevertheless, ‘for some within the ecumenical 
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movement, human rights became the term for voicing some of those same concerns [of the churches] 
in the international arena’. Her account, being theological in nature, does not go into detail as to the 
form this took, other than to gesture at a focus on individual rights in opposition to the totalitarian 
potential of the state.68 While it is tempting to link the ideal of the ‘responsible society’, the ordering 
principle of the Amsterdam Assembly, to its endorsement of human rights, it should be noted that 
this principle in itself made no reference to human rights. Though the two concepts shared elective 
affinities, the ‘responsible society’ was domestic in focus, whereas human rights were conceived of as 
a matter of international affairs.69 Attempts at internationalizing the ‘responsible society’ would only 
gain traction in the 1960s, with talk of an ‘international responsible society’. Meanwhile, the 
articulation of an ‘international ethos’ foundered.70  
The WCC itself only developed a focused and sustained policy with respect to the one issue 
the churches could agree about with unity of purpose: religious freedom.71 Human rights as a 
component for world order remained a more abstract and ambiguous ideal, but it served as an 
important vehicle for the advancement of religious freedom. As John Stuart has written, already in 
1942, American Protestants, organized into the Joint Committee on Religious Liberty, decided that 
‘[t]he best means of securing religious liberty (…) would be through an international charter of human 
rights, within which protection could be accorded to religion and conscience’.72 Similarly, Matti 
Peiponen has explained the CCIA’s commitment to human rights not only from concern for 
international order but also from the American churches’ reasoning that ‘the only politically possible 
way to forward religious liberty was to place it firmly and ineradicably in the context of other human 
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rights and then campaign for human rights in their entirety’.73 Concern for postwar order was 
secondary to this, especially as the viability of the UN as a guarantor of international peace was soon 
called into question by the onset of the Cold War. Ecumenical expressions of support for the 
‘International Bill of Rights’ at the 1948 Amsterdam Assembly, insofar as they reflected widespread 
support, are best understood in the context of the postwar moment’s high hopes for the development 
of international governance, which would prove short-lived.74 Thus, while human rights language 
would occasionally crop up in a number of different areas of the WCC’s work, primarily in relationship 
to the United Nations, the CCIA’s work for ‘human rights and religious liberty’ in practice most often 
meant ‘religious liberty (as a human right)’. 
With respect to religious freedom, Linde Lindkvist has recently described how O. Frederick 
Nolde, as a non-governmental consultant at the drafting of the Universal Declaration, worked with 
fellow ecumenist and drafter Charles Malik, the Lebanese Ambassador to the UN and to the US, to 
shape the secular language of the Universal Declaration, especially its Article 18, in such a way as to 
promote a Christian agenda. The outcome was a text that distinguished between inward freedom of 
conscience on the one hand and outward manifestations of religion on the other; that included an 
explicit freedom to change one’s religion or belief; and that focused, despite a reference to manifesting 
one’s religion ‘in community with others’, on individual rights. The latter point ran counter to 
ecumenical objectives, which had envisioned greater room for corporate rights, to better protect the 
rights of churches. But the former two represented achievements of the ecumenists’ lobby, which was 
based on the concern that mere freedom of ‘worship’ would enable regimes hostile to religion to 
curtail religious freedom, and the specifically missionary worry that in Islamic countries, missionary 
activity would be hampered by prohibitions of conversion.75 The Universal Declaration’s Article 18 
thus became the cornerstone of religious liberty advocacy by ecumenists and others.76  
Ecumenists’ adjusting their ambitions to fit what was possible at the UN meant that the 
framework of human rights had changed their promotion of religious liberty: rather than advocate for 
privileges and protections for Christians, ecumenists now committed themselves to universal, 
individual rights. As Katharina Kunter has written, this ‘meant a new challenge for the churches in 
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Europe, as hitherto they had rejected an individual-oriented, secular understanding of human rights 
as anti-church and individualistic’.77 The Amsterdam Assembly’s ‘Declaration on Religious Liberty’ 
reflected the change, in its far greater emphasis on individuals rather than churches, compared to the 
statements developed at earlier ecumenical conferences at Oxford in 1937 and Madras in 1938.78 But 
at the same time, ecumenists had succeeded in influencing the meaning of postwar human rights to 
better suit their purposes. Lindkvist has thus aptly written that to Nolde, UN human rights were ‘both 
a reflection of Christian moral teachings and a mechanism that could be wielded for the sake of 
guarding Christian interests’.79 
 
The WCC and human rights in the 1970s 
Little work has been done on the WCC’s engagement with human rights in the 1950s and 
1960s, while the 1970s have been the subject of intense scrutiny.80 The lone overview of the entire 
period, by the political scientist Karsten Lehmann, focuses on the CCIA’s position as a conduit 
between the WCC and the UN. The most significant specific activity he describes during the 1950s 
and 1960s is the CCIA’s response to the UN’s Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious 
Rights and Practices (carried out under its rapporteur Arcot Krishnaswami), where the CCIA sought 
to protect an expansive interpretation of Article 18. As to the other two areas of activity Lehmann 
describes, namely attempts at formulating an ‘international ethos’ and developing a theological basis 
for religious freedom, the CCIA was either ineffectual (in the former case) or obstructionist (in the 
latter).81 In Lehmann’s view, only ‘[f]rom the mid-1960s onwards, a new generation of WCC officers 
increased the effort to mainstream human rights inside the WCC, accompanied by [a] redefining of 
the CCIA’. This process was initiated through a 1967 conference in The Hague, which reconstituted 
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the CCIA by bringing it more closely into the fold of the WCC, the 1968 Uppsala Assembly, at which 
the CCIA’s agenda-setting power on international affairs was sharply reduced in comparison to earlier 
assemblies, and the retirement of all but one of the CCIA’s longtime officers around 1968. The CCIA’s 
new officers then initiated a process of redefining human rights, which, according to Lehmann, 
expanded its activities beyond the UN, and made the WCC ‘as a whole’ an actor in the realm of human 
rights. Overall, Lehmann writes, the CCIA’s development was one ‘from diplomats of the churches 
to proponents of human rights’.82 Lehmann’s focus on the relationship between the WCC and the 
UN, however, means that he does not deal with the many other areas of the CCIA’s involvement.  
The lion’s share of writings on the WCC’s human rights engagement have been evaluations of 
its conduct in relation to Eastern Europe, particularly with regard to religious freedom in the 1970s. 
With the entry of several major Orthodox churches, most notably the Russian Orthodox Church, into 
the WCC in 1961, the organization significantly expanded its geographical and denominational 
representation, but at the price of intense disagreement over how to handle relations with churches 
that were subject to state control. In the 1970s, against the background of increasing attention to 
human rights in the Eastern bloc, these tensions came to a head, most notoriously at the 1975 Nairobi 
Assembly, when the Russian Orthodox layman Lev Regelson and the priest Gleb Yakunin sent a letter 
to the WCC’s General Secretary, Philip Potter, calling for the WCC to make religious liberty ‘the 
central theme of Christian ecumenism’. Against this background, the Assembly’s discussion on the 
Helsinki Final Act, which had been adopted a few months prior, became highly charged, but the WCC 
was ‘unable to come to a clear position or critical reflection on its own attitude towards the question 
of religious freedom in the socialist states’.83 The issue remained a highly divisive one in subsequent 
years. 
Two of the most vociferously critical archivally-based accounts of the WCC’s course were 
produced by the theologian Armin Boyens and, more recently, the historian Hedwig Richter. Boyens’ 
book-length study, informed by his experience as a participant in the WCC at the time, approved of 
what he viewed as the founding ‘generation’ of the WCC’s clear-eyed and realistic approach to dealing 
with churches in the Eastern bloc. In stark contrast, Boyens characterized the new ‘generation’ that 
came to dominate the WCC from the late 1960s onward as naïve or disingenuous in their emphasis 
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on ‘silent diplomacy’ and their willingness to place trust in their Eastern church interlocutors.84 
Similarly to Boyens, Richter’s shorter account argues that the priority of the WCC’s new leadership 
was not the fate of Christians under socialism but projects such as the Programme to Combat Racism, 
which played into the foreign policy priorities of socialist states.85  
These and related charges were the subject of much debate within the ecumenical movement 
and beyond. Boyens’ work, for instance, which Christian Albers rightly characterizes as ‘in part 
tendentious’, prompted a book-length point-by-point rebuttal from a former WCC leader, Hans-
Joachim Held.86 More balanced accounts, most importantly by Katharina Kunter, acknowledged 
shortcomings in the WCC’s approach to Eastern Europe, not only with respect to churchmen but 
also to dissident movements more generally, while taking more seriously the motivations of its leaders 
in avoiding public criticism.87 Kunter’s work, in particular, has subsequently drawn attention to the 
process of ‘globalization’ the WCC was undergoing at the time, not least through the rise of non-
Western member churches, which elevated the concerns of Christians from the ‘Third World’ on the 
ecumenical agenda. In addition, together with Annegreth Schilling, Kunter has argued that the WCC 
became ‘politicized’, taking forthright stances on an increasing number of issues.88 
Drawing on this historiographical insight in his analysis of the WCC’s human rights 
engagement from 1966 to 1975, Albers has criticized accounts such as those of Boyens and Richter 
for reducing the WCC’s engagement with the Third World to a ‘colorless foil’. Their suggestion, writes 
Albers, is that the turn to human rights in the Third World meant turning away from the ‘actual’ 
human rights issues in the East.89 Albers instead takes the WCC’s newfound engagement with the 
global South as central to its development of an ‘integral’ approach to human rights. Whereas the 
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CCIA had focused in its first two decades on religious freedom, its new leaders, the Argentinian 
Leopoldo J. Niilus and the American Dwain C. Epps, led an expansion of its work beyond civil and 
political rights to include social, economic, and collective rights. In distinction to Moyn’s thesis of the 
1970s ‘breakthrough’ of human rights, Albers argues that unlike actors in the ‘secular realm’, the 
WCC’s approach ‘blended together’ civil and political rights with ‘anticolonial’ conceptions, ‘in the 
overarching motive of the establishment of a better world’. He also writes that ‘[i]n a globalized WCC’, 
human rights allowed non-Western Christians to ‘see eye to eye’ with Western ecumenists by 
articulating concerns in a common language.90 In Albers’ view, this process constituted ‘an important 
contribution to the question of the universality of human rights’.91 The expansion of the frame of 
analysis to a global one thus allows for a more balanced analysis of the WCC’s human rights 
engagement in the 1970s, an approach that I expand on. 
Whereas Albers’ account deals with the WCC’s overall development, Patrick William Kelly 
has made an important contribution as to the most important area of its human rights engagement 
during these years: Latin America. Kelly calls attention to the WCC as an ‘underappreciated actor’ with 
regard to ‘the interplay of local and transnational factors’ in response to the 1973 military coup in 
Chile.92 He has argued that ‘violence in Brazil and Chile in the 1970s provoked a local, regional, and 
transnational embrace of human rights ideology by Christian activists around the world’, and that 
‘religious activists from Latin America and abroad were among the primary agents in the construction 
of novel forms of transnational activism’.93 In his view, ‘action’ preceded ‘ideas’: ‘[i]n striving to save 
lives and end suffering in Brazil and Chile, Christians developed a praxis of human rights that had 
never existed before’.94 Kelly’s overarching narrative, however, is one of the narrowing of responses 
to the violence of Latin American dictatorships, as ‘the politics of emergency’ caused ‘solidarity 
activism’ to decline in favor of human rights activism in the mode of Amnesty International, with its 
depoliticized and minimalist mandate.95 Kelly’s thesis, which aligns with that of Moyn’s The Last Utopia, 
does not easily map onto the WCC’s continued anticolonial trajectory as described by Albers. This 
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raises the question as to how the more ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ elements in the WCC’s human 
rights engagement interacted – a question with implications for the wider historiography on human 
rights.96 
Structure and methodology 
While the literature focused on the period until 1948 has yielded much insight about the 
motivations behind the advent of ecumenical human rights talk, especially at the declaratory level, 
there is hardly any significant work on the practice of its human rights engagement from the 1940s to 
the 1960s. To what extent did the WCC’s human rights advocacy extend beyond religious freedom? 
Based on the above discussion and the archives of the CCIA, this dissertation’s point of departure is 
that human rights in practice served primarily as a framework within which to embed the specific issue 
of religious freedom. ‘Associated’ human rights such as freedom of expression or association entered 
ecumenical discourse in the course of such advocacy, but rarely as issues in themselves, the CCIA’s 
general support for the development of United Nations human rights instruments notwithstanding.97 
A major question this raises is: to what extent was the WCC’s advocacy of religious freedom defined 
by its framing as a human right? As the first part of the dissertation shows, its work took different 
forms in different contexts, and with this, the role human rights language played varied. The WCC 
tended towards a conciliatory approach, in which public denunciation was a last resort, and its 
approach to dialogue went well beyond merely legalistic appeals. In its lobbying, however, it frequently 
invoked the Universal Declaration’s Article 18 and related rights. The universal scope of human rights 
played an important role in promoting ecumenical interests and establishing common ground while 
avoiding the appearance of lobbying for specifically Christian interests. 
A key question on which the dissertation seeks to advance the state of scholarship is: in which 
areas were ecumenists most active in promoting their conception of religious freedom? As Lindkvist 
has pointed out, the widely influential 1945 study by the American ecumenist Searle M. Bates, Religious 
Liberty, showed what he and the American Joint Committee on Religious Liberty ‘took to be the three 
greatest and most acute challenges to religious freedom on the world stage: Soviet Russia, Fascist 
Spain, and the “Moslem Countries”’.98 This corresponded to the three enemies identified by the IMC’s 
                                                 
96 Ibid., 96. 
97 Nolde’s own later accounting of the CCIA’s activities also bears this out: O. Frederick Nolde, Free and Equal: Human 
Rights in Ecumenical Perspective (Geneva: WCC, 1968). While the title refers to human rights, the examples the book provides 
almost exclusively relate to religious freedom. 
98 Lindkvist, Religious Freedom, 72. 
32 
 
1947 Whitby conference: ‘militant communism, resurgent Islam, and political Roman Catholicism’.99 
The same priorities were reflected in the WCC’s deliberations at the end of the 1940s: while its Central 
Committee in 1949 adopted a statement denouncing curtailment of religious freedom in countries 
under Soviet control, a number of delegates successfully argued for widening the Central Committee’s 
concern to ‘serious situations where restrictions were imposed by dominant religious majorities’. The 
CCIA was tasked with executing a study on this subject, and in consultation with the WCC’s Executive 
Committee, it was decided ‘to limit the present phase of the investigation to areas where Roman 
Catholicism or Islam represent a dominant force’.100 The resultant ‘Study on Religious Freedom in 
Face of Dominant Forces’ (1950) would shape ecumenical thought on the subject in the following 
years, signaling a concern for religious freedom that went well beyond its curtailment by communist 
governments, in no small part due to the influence of the missionary movement. The first part of the 
dissertation follows this threefold distinction: the first chapter deals with the Soviet Union, the second 
with decolonizing Indonesia and Northern Nigeria, and the third with Franco’s Spain. The selection 
of these cases stems from their priority among the many countries the ecumenical movement dealt 
with, though other significant cases remain to be studied. 
The first chapter retraces the relatively familiar story of the WCC’s establishment of relations 
with the Russian Orthodox Church and the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, and 
its simultaneous efforts at advocating for religious liberty in the Soviet Union. Reconsidering this story 
through the lens of the recent historiography on human rights, I argue that the changing context of 
religious and political dissent left the WCC in the 1970s out of step with the ‘breakthrough’ of human 
rights. Already from the 1960s on, its dependence on church leaders, rather than dissidents, as 
interlocutors predisposed it to an institutional perspective that favored attempts at dialogue over 
denunciation. At the same time, changing views on the nature of Cold War détente and the meaning 
of human rights led the CCIA’s leadership to deprioritize religious freedom in the Soviet Union. 
The second chapter begins by outlining the WCC’s reserved approach to the right to self-
determination, in the context of decolonization. It then goes on to argue that the primary way in which 
the language of human rights featured in the ecumenical response to anticolonialism and 
decolonization was with respect to religious freedom, namely that of Christian missionaries and of 
Christian minorities. The chapter demonstrates this through the cases of Indonesia, during its 
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revolution against Dutch colonial rule, and Nigeria in the late 1950s, where the ecumenical movement 
was particularly concerned with Northern Nigeria, which was majority Muslim. The ecumenical 
movement worked to insert provisions for religious freedom into these countries’ postcolonial 
constitutions, modeled on the Universal Declaration’s Article 18 and informed by ecumenical 
statements on religious freedom. 
The third chapter takes as its case study Spain under Franco, where the discrimination against 
the country’s tiny Protestant minorities prompted sustained international attention, including from the 
ecumenical movement. The CCIA used its ties to the foreign policy establishments of especially the 
United States and Britain to pressure the Spanish regime, to which end it invoked the language of 
human rights. At the same time, the WCC developed ties with Spanish Protestants, the Spanish 
government, and with Catholics outside Spain in its attempts to liberalize the country’s approach to 
religious freedom. Because of the Christian nature of the regime and the church hierarchy, ecumenical 
attempts at dialogue depended more on religious than secular articulations of religious freedom. The 
developments of the Second Vatican Council ultimately proved crucial in pushing Spain towards 
change, and by the end of the 1960s the enmity between the Vatican and the WCC on the question of 
religious freedom had been replaced by cooperation. 
The second part of the dissertation contrasts the WCC’s early advocacy of religious freedom 
with the radically different conception of human rights it developed in the early 1970s. The dissertation 
thus emphasizes the discontinuity between the earlier and the latter period, arguing against a phasic 
narrative in favor of one of rupture. It focuses on three key areas of the WCC’s international activities 
at this time: antiracism, Latin America, and the CCIA-led process of rethinking human rights that 
culminated in 1974-1975.  
The fourth chapter traces the relationship between the WCC’s discourses of antiracism and 
human rights, with specific attention to apartheid in South Africa. This serves as a limiting case as to 
the importance of human rights language beyond the issue of religious freedom. The chapter argues 
that despite rhetorical linkages in the WCC’s early days, questions of ‘race relations’ and human rights 
by and large remained separate. In the mid-1960s, the American civil rights movement and the 
development of increasingly strong positions on racism at the UN spurred the WCC to connect its 
antiracism to its commitment to human rights. But human rights discourse was marginal to the WCC’s 
Programme to Combat Racism, established in 1969, which focused on structural, especially economic, 
factors. Suspicion of the liberal orientation of human rights meant that human rights could only serve 
as an auxiliary to ecumenical antiracism in the 1970s. 
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Chapter five turns to Latin America, where the rise of military dictatorships created the 
crucible within which the WCC dramatically widened its human rights agenda and practices. This 
development got underway from about 1970 but was intensified greatly by the 1973 coup in Chile, to 
which the WCC responded by establishing a task force that would grow into its Human Rights 
Resources Office for Latin America. While Latin American liberation theologians were initially 
indifferent or suspicious towards the concept of human rights, ecumenical meetings helped to 
convince them of not only its pragmatic utility but its value as a moral principle. Social, economic, and 
collective rights were integrated into the ecumenical conception of human rights not so much in a 
legalistic as in a moralistic way, to generate outrage and pressure for structural change. Such usage also 
allowed for the creative refashioning of rights as tools that emphasized popular agency, particularly 
on the part of Latin Americans who sought to ‘conscienticize’ the continent’s poor and oppressed. 
The final chapter follows the CCIA’s parallel attempt at articulating a newly ‘integral’ 
conception of human rights, which guided its activities in subsequent decades. This process, initiated 
in 1971, culminated at the 1974 St. Pölten consultation on ‘Human Rights and Christian 
Responsibility’, the outcome of which was elevated to the WCC’s official stance at the 1975 Nairobi 
Assembly. The WCC’s new conception of human rights was capacious in including a wide range of 
rights, emphatically including social, economic, and collective rights. It was rooted in liberation 
theology, and consequently was less individualist and more communitarian in nature; Marxist and 
anticolonial influences focused it on collective and structural issues of domestic as well as international 
politics. While not abandoning its efforts at promoting human rights through international lobbying, 
the CCIA positioned itself as a clearing-house that supported national and local mobilization. The 
chapter considers different interpretations of this development and emphasizes how the CCIA sought 
to use the legitimacy of the concept of human rights to broaden the political commitments of the 
WCC’s constituency to include issues such as the New International Economic Order. 
A number of caveats and qualifications are in order, especially given the dissertation’s 
chronological, geographical, and intellectual scope. Perhaps the most important limitation of the study 
is the relatively little attention it gives to theology. Other authors have dealt with this aspect in greater 
depth, including with regard to the CCIA (Peiponen with regard to its founding, Albers with regard 
to the 1970s). Peiponen’s account in particular, however, shows the pragmatic nature of the CCIA’s 
work; as he writes, there were no clear ‘common theological denominators’ between the most 
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important ecumenists driving its work.101 While the development of the ecumenical positions 
described above required theological innovation, once established, these bases for the CCIA’s work 
remained relatively stable (a ‘Statement on Religious Liberty’ adopted by the 1961 New Delhi 
Assembly elaborated it, but without signifying significant discontinuity) until the 1970s. Given the lack 
of literature on the CCIA’s activities over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, this dissertation focuses 
on the practice of ecumenical human rights engagement, rather than theological discussions. 
While this dissertation’s six chapters address the most important elements of the WCC’s 
human rights engagement, there remains scope for further work on the role of human rights language. 
In particular, there remains room for further work on the CCIA’s activities at the UN, notably in the 
areas of refugees, women’s rights, children’s rights, and racial discrimination. Efforts were undertaken 
in each of these areas, but Nolde’s overview as well as a survey of the CCIA’s archives suggests that 
these were a relatively minor aspect of its human rights engagement when compared with religious 
liberty (while not denying that they were significant interests in their own right).102 With respect to 
refugees, G. Daniel Cohen has shown that with respect to Palestinian refugees, at least, the WCC 
sought to adhere to a ‘humanitarian’ stance, but as the above-cited work by Bloch hints at, the story 
seems to have been different with respect to German expellees.103 As to women’s rights, it seems that 
the WCC’s work on women’s rights was largely severed from its discourse on human rights, similarly 
to the dynamics at the United Nations, until the early 1970s.104 The subject was not so much taken up 
by the CCIA, whose officers were all male, but by the WCC’s Department on Co-operation of Men 
and Women in Church and Society (to use one of this body’s changing names). While women such as 
Kathleen Bliss, Sarah Chakko, Madeleine Barot, Takeda Cho, and later on Cynthia Wedel, Rena 
Karefa-Smart, and Annie Jiagge played important roles, for instance heading this Department or 
serving as presidents of the WCC, the participation of women in the WCC remained exceedingly low 
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until the 1970s and 1980s. Only at this point did women’s rights (or sexism) rise to prominence on 
the WCC’s agenda.105 Research in all of the above-mentioned areas would have to determine to what 
extent these issues should be considered part of the CCIA’s human rights agenda, given the distinct 
features of each (with regard to racial discrimination, some of these are discussed in chapter 4). 
An area which would also benefit from further work is the question of the ‘Europeanization’ 
of human rights, mentioned above: how was the ecumenical movement situated with respect to the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the rise of Christian Democracy? Despite the leading 
role of Catholics in these matters, Protestants played a role – but there are good reasons to think it is 
not central to at least the story of the WCC’s human rights engagement. While Zeilstra has claimed 
that in the view of the British Council of Churches in 1950, ‘[a] common observance of human rights 
was considered to be an essential prerequisite’ for European unity, he also notes that at the Amsterdam 
Assembly, ‘[t]he idea of the responsible society and the ecumenical efforts to support human rights 
were not joined with a call to unite Europe’, and the Committee on the Christian Responsibility for 
European Co-operation focused on military and economic aspects.106 The WCC’s distance from the 
European Convention on Human Rights might be explained from the fact that while ecumenists 
engaged with the nascent project of European integration, concerns that it would contribute to 
ideological divisions militated against embracing what was essentially a statement of Western 
European values against the Eastern bloc.107 Lucian Leustean, whose work has dealt with this question, 
cites a 1954 ecumenical pamphlet that illustrates this well: ‘The European Community is being created 
not in response to any desire for a crusade, but in response to a desire for peace. It is not to be 
identified with any ideology.’108 For the same reason, the WCC’s General Secretary, W.A. Visser ‘t 
Hooft, argued in 1952 that European values should not be ‘defended’ because the attempt to do so 
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would cause them to evaporate.109 Into the 1960s, when it began to speak more often and 
appreciatively of the European Convention, the CCIA prioritized universal over regional norms, based 
on its commitment to the United Nations and the concept of an all-encompassing ‘international 
ethos’.110 The WCC’s approach of developing a ‘third way’ sat at cross-purposes with those promoting 
the European Convention as an anticommunist manifesto for the defense of a ‘Christian Europe’. 
Since the CCIA, as the WCC and IMC’s representative body on the issue of human rights, 
played the leading role in most instances, the main sets of archival materials I have relied on are the 
CCIA’s Executive Committee files, its subject files on human rights and religious liberty, its country 
files, and other documents. This is complemented by the published materials of the CCIA and the 
WCC, such as the records of the latter’s assemblies and Central Committee meetings. In many places, 
however, I have followed the story into the archives of other bodies, including the WCC’s General 
Secretariat, its Secretariat on Religious Liberty, the Joint Working Group, the Commission of Inter-
Church Aid, Refugee and World Service, the Programme to Combat Racism, and the Human Rights 
Resources Office for Latin America. Occasional use is also made of the archives of the IMC, as well 
as of materials obtained during a brief foray into the archives of the National Council of Churches in 
the US. For chapter 3, I have also drawn on the files of Dutch missionary organizations, and in a few 
places use is made of the archives of the Council of Churches in the Netherlands and those of Justice 
and Peace Netherlands (a vestige of this research’s original intention of including a case study on the 
Netherlands). It should be noted that the CCIA’s archives are in the process of being catalogued (by 
its former officer Dwain C. Epps). In order to prevent archival references from becoming outdated 
due to minor adjustments in the ordering of documents, I have adopted not the document-specific 
referencing used in the inventory but folder- or box-level numberings as appropriate. Since the country 
files are at present entirely unprocessed, I have provided exact references on where documents from 
these files are located. 
Given this source-base, centered on the WCC and especially the CCIA, this dissertation does 
not independently investigate the viewpoints of the WCC’s member churches or other interlocutors, 
including governments, non-governmental organizations, and intergovernmental organizations. The 
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task of including the perspective of these interlocutors more fully is one left to future studies. This 
would, among other things, allow for a better estimation of the impact of the WCC’s work in each of 
the cases studied here. While the possible influence of the WCC is hinted at throughout, it should be 
stated clearly that the object of this study is the ecumenical movement’s human rights engagement 
itself, as an aspect of the wider history of human rights and religious internationalism. 
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1. Between dialogue and denunciation: the 
World Council of Churches, religious 
freedom, and human rights in the Soviet 
Union from the 1940s to the 1970s 
‘Though deprived of all material strength, it [the church] is always victorious in sacrifice.’111 – 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, 1972 
‘[I]nfrequently do those in the West who would like to help take the trouble to find out what it is, 
in fact, which does help’.112 – Dwain C. Epps (in notes for a speech by Philip Potter), 1976 
Introduction 
The founding of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1948 coincided with the onset of 
the Cold War. The WCC sought to remain aloof from the intensifying conflict between the wartime 
allies, and thus rebuffed the attempt by an envoy sent by President Truman, Myron C. Taylor, to enlist 
it in a spiritual alliance against communism. This distinguished the WCC’s position from that of Pope 
Pius XII, who had reciprocated Truman’s overtures by announcing that, in the historian Dianne 
Kirby’s words, ‘there could be no compromise with an avowed enemy of God’, namely the Soviet 
Union.113 The rhetoric adopted by the Amsterdam Assembly’s section on ‘The Church and the 
International Disorder’ showed how the WCC attempted to preserve its neutrality. The section’s 
report concluded that  
‘The greatest threat to peace to-day comes from the division into the world into mutually suspicious 
and antagonistic blocs. This threat is all the greater because national tensions are confused by the 
clash of economic and political systems. Christianity cannot be equated with any of these.’114 
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At the same time, the WCC was aware of the violations of religious freedom that were occurring as 
Eastern Europe was ‘Sovietized’, and it was mindful – despite the temporary relaxation in religious 
persecution in the Soviet Union during the wartime years – of the fate of the churches under Stalin. 
Under the chairmanship of the Anglican Bishop George Bell of Chichester, the WCC’s Central 
Committee issued statements critical of ‘totalitarian’ communism, especially with regard to religious 
freedom, and in support of the 1950 intervention in Korea under United Nations auspices.115 Yet the 
WCC’s inclusion of Eastern European Christians who sympathized with or supported communism, 
and its desire to expand the ecumenical fellowship, held strongly by its General Secretary, the Dutch 
theologian W.A. Visser ‘t Hooft, would lead it to soften its stance over time, and to decouple criticism 
on religious liberty from that of communism as a system.116 While an initial courtship from 1945 to 
1948 had failed, by the time of the 1954 Evanston Assembly, the WCC was on a path toward 
integrating the Russian Orthodox Church – an undertaking that would have momentous implications 
for its approach to religious liberty and human rights.  
This chapter connects the history of ecumenical advocacy of religious liberty to the recent 
historiography on human rights and dissidence in the Soviet Union. The Soviet ‘dissident’ movement, 
though it had roots in the 1950s, took shape during the second half of the 1960s. Its gradual turn to 
human rights could be seen in events such as the 5 December 1965 demonstration on Pushkin Square 
against the closed trial of two writers; the 1968 establishment of the Chronicle of Current Events, and the 
1969 founding of the Initiative Group on Human Rights in the USSR.117 Most of the literature, 
however, has focused on the role of (often Jewish) intelligentsia, and, insofar it has taken up the 
question of religious freedom, on the question of Jewish emigration.118 The role of Christians, their 
relationship to the state, and their demands for religious freedom, have often been left to a separate 
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body of literature.119 As this chapter shows, there were important differences in the trajectories of 
political and religious dissidence, but the two converged and were interrelated in many ways. The 
chapter traces the activities of the WCC and its internationally representative body, the Commission 
of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA), in relation to this story. 
With respect to the ecumenical movement’s activities, the period of the 1940s to the 1970s 
has hardly been studied as a whole, let alone with regard to human rights.120 While the chapter draws 
on the available literature on this subject, it does not attempt to provide a comprehensive account of 
the ecumenical movement’s engagement with Christians in the Soviet Union. Rather, using the 
archives of the WCC, complemented by published source materials on Soviet dissent, it focuses 
specifically to how human rights discourse featured in its promotion of religious liberty (there is 
important work to be done in determining the impact of the WCC’s interventions, but this is also 
beyond the scope of this chapter). It should be noted at the outset that the WCC was not the only 
Protestant actor of its kind, the most important counterparts being the Baptist World Alliance and the 
Lutheran World Federation (and to a lesser extent the European Baptist Federation and the World 
Alliance of Reformed Churches), as well as the WCC’s close partner, the Conference of European 
Churches (CEC).121 But the WCC was the largest among these actors, and the most important 
representative of the ecumenical movement. The chapter deals with the two religious groups most 
important to the WCC, the Russian Orthodox and Russian Baptists. These two confessions – the 
former by far the biggest and historically most significant in the USSR – were most relevant to the 
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WCC’s work.122 The analysis thus leaves out other major groups such as Jews, Old Believers, Roman 
Catholics, Lutherans, and of course the second-largest religious group in the USSR, Muslims, all of 
which featured only marginally. 
The Russian Orthodox Church from antagonist to member church 
The most salient feature about the WCC’s engagement for religious liberty in the USSR derived 
from its organizational nature: as a fellowship of member churches, the WCC sought, above all, to 
develop relations on the ecclesiastical level. This meant engaging with religious institutions whose 
views the WCC had to give appropriate weight to – to go against a member church could risk fragile 
and painstakingly established ecumenical bonds. While this did not mean that the WCC would never 
be critical of member churches, it predisposed it towards the viewpoint of ecclesiastical leaders. In 
cases where these leaders were at odds with individual clergy or believers, as would be the case in the 
USSR, the WCC thus faced diplomatically difficult situations. This was particularly so in the case of 
the Russian Orthodox Church and the Baptist Union, which faced sharp restrictions to their freedom 
and state encroachment on their decision-making.  
Nadezda and Elena Beliakova have recently analyzed the development of relations between 
the Soviet state and the Russian Orthodox Church using the concept of ‘Sovietization’, to describe 
the state’s influence over the church hierarchy on one hand and its curtailment of Russian Orthodoxy 
on the other hand. The Russian Orthodox Church, reestablished in 1943, was controlled by the state 
through the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs, which would be renamed the Council on 
Religious Affairs (CRA) in 1965. The Russian Orthodox Church itself had a Department of Foreign 
Church Relations, which would become the main interlocutor in ecumenical contacts. From 1960 to 
1972 it was led by Metropolitan Nikodim, a young clergyman who had risen remarkably rapidly 
through the hierarchy, replacing his predecessor, who was shunted aside for critiquing state religious 
policy. Nikodim, who would in 1975 become one of the WCC’s presidents, has remained a 
controversial and to some extent inscrutable figure, not least owing to his sudden death from a heart 
attack in 1978, during an audience with the Pope. Christopher Andrew has written that Nikodim was 
an agent of the KGB, like many in the Orthodox hierarchy, but also that a CRA report from 1974 
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identified his loyalty to the state as falling into a middle category of those who cooperated but sought 
to further church interests at the same time.123 Beliakova and Beliakova have argued that Nikodim 
avoided direct conflict with the state because he believed that while complying with the state’s 
demands, he could ultimately force ‘those in power to see the use of the existence of the Orthodox 
Church in sociopolitical life’.124  
However, based on research in the archives of the CRA (those of the Russian Orthodox 
Church being unavailable), Nadezda Belyakova and Beglov Aleksej have argued that the interests of 
state and church diverged from early on: ‘the Church made its priority inter-Orthodox connections’, 
while the state prioritized creating ‘a positive image of the Soviet state and the peacemaking efforts of 
the Russian Orthodox Church’, including (under Khrushchev and Brezhnev) projecting an image of 
unfettered religious freedom in the USSR.125 Nikodim’s acquiescent attitude towards the state, as well 
as that of other church leaders, would lead to private and, later, public criticism by Orthodox believers. 
(It should be noted that even before Nikodim’s ascendancy, not all Orthodox Christians acquiesced 
in the centralization of the Church: a movement of ‘True Orthodox’, also known as the ‘catacomb 
church’, preferred an underground, illegal existence. This loosely organized network exerted a 
formative influence on many later religious dissidents.) 
Such open dissent was not present from the start. In the 1950s, there was no Russian 
Orthodox dissent to speak of, nor were there official links between the WCC and the Russian 
Orthodox Church. Though the high point of religious freedom in the Soviet Union had been the mid-
1940s, when Stalin needed the support of religious communities for domestic and international 
purposes, the postwar years and the initial years after Stalin’s death had seen a relatively benign policy 
on religion – in sharp contrast to the antireligious campaigns of the 1930s, which had brought 
Christianity in the USSR to its knees. Jane Ellis has written that it was only with Khrushchev’s renewed 
antireligious campaign, which started around 1958 and lasted until his downfall in 1964, that Russian 
Orthodox Church members began to voice opinions contrary to the Moscow Patriarchate’s line, and 
even then, ‘their existence was not noticed abroad until many years after that’.126  
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A few years earlier, the WCC had undertaken renewed overtures towards the Russian 
Orthodox Church, beginning at its 1954 Evanston Assembly. There were fences to be mended: in 
1948, the Russian Orthodox Church had denounced the WCC as Western-aligned. From 1948 to 
1950, the WCC had made statements that did indeed lean towards the foreign policy stance of the 
emergent Western bloc, and issued relatively strong denunciations of communism (though still shy of 
the Vatican’s position). These included articulations of religious freedom as a human right, connected 
to civil and political rights. The WCC’s 1949 Chichester meeting had issued a statement on religious 
liberty in Eastern Europe; in 1950 the WCC had issued a statement on religious liberty and a study on 
‘Religious liberty in face of dominant forces’, including prominent attention to communism; and the 
WCC’s 1950 Toronto statement had expressed support for the UN intervention in Korea.127 But in a 
series of exploratory exchanges and meetings during the second half of the 1950s, the WCC sought 
to improve relations with the Russian Orthodox Church. Meanwhile, the attitude of the Russian 
Orthodox Church had also changed: it was eager to develop international contacts, and now found 
itself supported in this by the state, which sought to use such contacts to its own benefit. The WCC, 
for its part, realized that the entry of the Russian Orthodox and other Eastern Churches would lead 
to political problems because of state interference, but saw its membership as integral to the 
ecumenical fellowship and nurtured the hope that it might lead to improvements in the area of 
religious liberty.128 
During exploratory contacts, religious freedom was discussed. On 21 February 1955, 
Metropolitan Nikolai responded to the Evanston Assembly’s general statement on the issue of 
religious liberty by taking to the offense, criticizing ‘state churches, i.e. the ruling churches, [which] 
persecute people of other faiths with the help of state authority’ (a jab at the Roman Catholic Church). 
Nikodim explained, reflecting official doctrine, that in the USSR, ‘the unhindered activity of the 
churches is limited by the law that at the same time excludes any intervention in the life of the Church 
from outside’. Responding in April 1955, the WCC sent a letter to the Moscow Patriarchate with the 
purpose of inviting the Russian Orthodox Church to meet. The letter included, among more 
prominently placed questions of peace and ecumenical fellowship, a paragraph on religious liberty. It 
framed the issue in religious terms: ‘In view of our conception of man and his relation to God, we 
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recognize that religious liberty (to which you already refer in your letter) is the fundamental freedom.’ 
But the letter continued by expressing concern at religious persecution in general terms, without 
singling out the USSR, and ended by providing a more detailed definition of religious liberty. In doing 
so, it used the exact language of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration, though without reference to 
it (and omitting the wording on freedom to change one’s religion, indicating that this was not the 
WCC’s concern in the Soviet case). The WCC’s leaders wrote that ‘[o]n this matter also we feel that 
frank conversation is necessary.’129  
Such exchanges served as the most important way for the WCC to address religious liberty in 
the USSR, while it sought to avoid uttering public criticism. The WCC’s leadership was sensitive early 
on to the risks inherent in openly criticizing religious liberty in the USSR. In 1951, discussing the 
possibility of initiating dialogue with the Russian Orthodox Church, the WCC’s General Secretary, the 
Dutchman W.A. Visser ‘t Hooft, wrote to Bishop George Bell of Chichester, then chairman of the 
WCC’s Central Committee, about the need to avoid antagonizing the Soviet authorities: ‘one of the 
main reasons against a public debate with Moscow is certainly that such a debate would almost 
certainly force the Churches behind the iron curtain to choose between Moscow and the World 
Council’.130 Writing about religious persecution in 1949, the CCIA’s British chairman, Kenneth G. 
Grubb, recognized the utility of the Universal Declaration, but worried about the ‘futility of 
remonstrances when once persecution has been openly declared’, as in Eastern Europe.131 Such 
concerns remained throughout the decade. In a 1960 exchange about how best to aid the Russian 
Baptists of the AUCECB, the important American CCIA staff member Richard M. Fagley wrote that 
‘[p]ublic references in the West are regarded as likely to do more harm than good. The same 
consideration applies to church delegations from the West – whether they help or hurt the situation 
depends on what they say on their return.’132 
National church delegations to the USSR, which visited with increasing frequency during the 
mid- to late-1950s ‘thaw’ in East-West relations on, could go further in their criticism. An important 
example was a 1956 deputation of the American ecumenical body, the National Council of the 
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Churches of Christ in the United States of America (NCCCUSA), the WCC’s most important 
constituent. During the official meetings, NCCCUSA leader Walter Van Kirk strongly came out in 
defense of human rights, echoing postwar rhetoric about international order: ‘Our churches believe 
that the establishment of a just and durable peace cannot be fully achieved apart from the 
establishment and safeguarding of human rights. Among the Christian requirements of world order is 
a recognition of the dignity of the human person as the image of God, and the granting to all men of 
the rights and liberties compatible with this conception of human worth.’133 Later on, an American 
bishop explained how American churches took part in civil society and criticized the government – 
the ‘churches have a prophetic function, a responsibility, when needed, to be the conscience of the 
nation’ – and the Soviet churchmen set out why their church did not have the ambition to do more 
than ‘the saving of souls – through worship, preaching, confessing and visiting homes’. The deputation 
could thus only conclude that ‘no agreement had been reached as to what constitutes “the mission” 
of the churches’.134 Meetings with the CRA persuaded the Americans that ‘church and state have 
reached at least a temporary accommodation’. Yet they also stressed that in many ways churches were 
curtailed, ‘most severe[ly]’ in the realm of education, but also in terms of publishing literature, and 
more generally in any area beyond that of ‘worship’.135 Reiterating their conception of human rights 
in a joint communiqué, the American deputation showed itself willing to speak out publicly in favor 
of human rights, in a way that set out general principles but implied clear criticism of the Soviet 
Union’s record. 
As a set of WCC-Orthodox meetings progressed towards an Orthodox application for 
membership, religious liberty remained part of discussions, but the improvement of relations was the 
overriding priority. A 3-18 December 1959 visit by the WCC to Moscow, for instance, ‘was not 
designed to deal with political or international problems but had as its specific purpose the promotion 
of better understanding’. Nolde’s summary of the WCC’s expressed positions indicated that the 
delegation had met with both church and state officials. Disarmament and decolonization were 
discussed, and the WCC delegation touched on religious and other civil and political liberties in this 
connection: ‘If the churches are to play their responsible part, they must be free to advance their views 
before action is taken by governments and equally free to criticize any government when its actions 
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threaten peace, justice, and freedom.’ Moreover, ‘churches and individual Christians’ required ‘access 
to objective and reliable information’. But insofar as such ‘political or international problems’ came 
up over the course of the visit, ‘there was no intention or effort to secure agreement on them’. Rather, 
‘[i]n face of the historical situation, agreements should not be pressed but should be encouraged to 
emerge as a result of growing mutual understanding and confidence’.136  
Reporting on the same visit, Visser ‘t Hooft noted how difficult it was to acquire reliable 
information on the state of churches in the Soviet Union and indicated how fruitless attempts at 
dialogue with officials seemed. On the administration of churches, he reported that there was great 
latitude for ‘arbitrary action’ because of decentralization, ‘a disadvantage for the churches, because the 
local official is generally more difficult to deal with than the central Church Affairs Administration in 
Moscow’. In conversation with a CRA official, who asked him for his opinion on the Soviet separation 
of church and state, Visser ‘t Hooft responded that he ‘could only regret strongly that the separation 
of Church and State was not carried out fully’, by removing the prohibition of ‘catechism, youth 
associations or Sunday school’. He ‘only asked that the Christians would have exactly the same 
freedom of propaganda that the anti-religious people had’. The official responded that they had 
‘different convictions’ and directed the conversation toward more anodyne subjects.137 Such seemed 
to be the general pattern: Soviet officials would not enter into a dialogue that would have permitted 
WCC representatives to really argue with their position. 
On the position of the Russian Orthodox Church vis-à-vis the Soviet state, Visser ‘t Hooft 
wrote at the time that  
‘[i]t remains a tremendous fact that the Russian Orthodox Church exists and that is not all for it is 
also important that the church has not become a syncretistic body such as were the [Nazi-aligned] 
Deutsche Christen in the National-socialist period in Germany. One does not get the impression 
that any attempt is made to create a synthesis between Christianity and Marxist ideology.’  
In this sense he could appreciate the Soviet ‘separation of state and church’. Yet Visser ‘t Hooft also 
noted that the Orthodox churchmen had come to accept the limits placed on it as a fact of life, for 
the time being at least. For instance, when asked about evangelization, ‘they would say that the Church 
itself is the evangelistic fact’. Thus, Visser ‘t Hooft concluded, ‘the Church is a worshipping church, a 
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conserving church and a waiting church, but not an outgoing church’.138 This only stoked Visser ‘t 
Hooft’s eagerness to extend the ecumenical fellowship to the Russian Orthodox Church, which might 
rekindle a flame in it. From the perspective of the WCC’s promotion of religious liberty, however, it 
meant that only little engagement from the Orthodox Church itself could be expected. Should the 
WCC then take the lead in criticizing the state, or prodding the Orthodox Church into stronger 
opposition? The WCC’s answer to this was negative: the leaders of the Orthodox Church, as the 
WCC’s (prospective) brothers in the ecumenical fellowship, should be allowed to indicate – insofar as 
possible – what best served their needs.  
On 4 November 1960, Nikodim announced that he would initiate the necessary steps towards 
a Russian Orthodox Church application for WCC membership by the next year. A somewhat 
bewildered Visser ‘t Hooft and a colleague suggested that this might be overly quick, and 1962 or 1963 
might allow them to prepare the WCC’s constituency for this major step, but Nikodim insisted that 
‘the time has come now’.139 As the WCC worked with the Russian Orthodox Church to prepare for 
admission at the WCC’s New Delhi Assembly at the end of 1961, church-state relations and religious 
liberty became areas in which leaders of both were concerned resistance to Russian Orthodox Church 
admission might arise. As a joint meeting noted, the ‘main point on which public attention is likely to 
be focussed (…) is likely to be the contention that the Russian church leaders and delegates to the 
W.C.C. meetings do not represent the church but the Soviet Government’. As to religious freedom in 
the USSR, the meeting committed itself to defending the position that ‘living Christian churches exist 
in the Communist countries’, an ambiguous statement, but perhaps one that best captured the 
ambivalence the WCC leadership itself harbored: the churches in the Soviet Union were repressed and 
to a degree controlled by the state’s pressure, but precisely for this reason they were to be supported.140 
This imperative was also borne out by a short memorandum dated 11 October 1961, in which 
the WCC’s staff member and advisor Alexander de Weymarn compiled a few general observations 
indicating the repression of Khrushchev’s anti-religious campaign, such as the closing of churches, 
monasteries, and seminaries. In de Weymarn’s view, ‘these developments strengthen the case for 
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accepting the Russian application’. Within the Russian Orthodox Church there were ‘compromisers 
and collaborators’ as well as ‘believers and resisters’, and the latter should be given ‘all the help we 
can’. This would become ‘extremely difficult if not completely impossible’ without official contacts, 
though these contacts should be supplemented by cautiously publicizing religious repression and by 
asking ‘the churches to pray for the Christians in Russia’.141 Based on this rationale, the WCC’s 
leadership defended the Russian Orthodox Church’s entry, and successfully shepherded its application 
for membership through the New Delhi Assembly. This then also led the Baptist Union, formally the 
All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists (AUCECB), to apply the next year, which would 
be accepted in 1963. Its Secretary, Jacob Zhidkov, told visiting American ecumenists that the reason 
for not applying earlier had to do with the AUCECB’s links to the Southern Baptists in America, who 
spurned the WCC. The Russian Orthodox Church’s membership, however, tipped the scales in favor 
of developing a closer relationship with the WCC.142 Thus, the WCC had entered a new period, in 
which both the state-recognized Russian Orthodox and Baptist churches were members. Soon after, 
as is discussed in the next section, religious dissent rose to the surface and became internationally 
known. This meant that besides its meetings with Russian church leaders, the WCC would now have 
to decide how to respond to the appeals of religious dissidents.143 
The rise of Russian Orthodox and Baptist Dissidence 
Russian Orthodox Christians 
The Russian Orthodox Church was, despite the arbitrary nature of Soviet legality, in 
continuous dialogue with the state in terms of law, because Soviet laws on religion circumscribed the 
space for its existence yet could also be used to contest state encroachment.144 The WCC’s attempts 
at exerting pressure referenced Soviet legislation as well, but often added references to international 
standards such as the Universal Declaration. At the same time, the CCIA was careful not to cross into 
outright denunciation, preferring to articulate its concerns diplomatically and as inquiries about reports 
it had received (though it did not have clear-cut policy on when to respond and when not). For 
                                                 
141 WCCA CCIA Country Files/Europe/USSR 1948-65/USSR 1955-6, A. de Weymarn, ‘On the church situation in the 
U.S.S.R.’, 11 October 1961, 2 [note that the letter is signed only ‘W.’, but a handwritten note suggests this indicated de 
Weymarn]. 
142 R.H. Edwin Espy to Visser ‘t Hooft, 19 December 1961, WCCA GS 42.4.074/3. 
143 The 1964 Odessa meeting of the WCC Executive Committee was perhaps the most important exception to this. 
144 See e.g. Tatiana A. Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev 
Years (Armonk, NY, 2002) 144. 
50 
 
example, in 1962 and 1963, the WCC responded to threats to two Russian Orthodox monasteries. At 
the Monastery of St. Job at Pochaev, near Lutzk, in the Western Ukraine, monks were reportedly 
intimidated and coerced into abandoning their home, and visitors threatened to discourage them from 
returning. On 28 December 1962, Nolde wrote a letter to Luka Y. Kizya, head of the Permanent 
Mission of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the UN, in which he outlined some of the 
allegations of government action ‘against the believers and the monks’ (though Nolde noted that the 
CCIA did not believe that it was the government’s intention to close the monastery). Nolde mentioned 
the WCC as well as the UN, but restricted himself to a request to Kizya to ‘ascertain for us whether 
or not these allegations are correct’, and if so, to work towards ‘measures to ameliorate it’.145 This 
intervention seemed to be effective, at least to a degree: the monastery was ultimately allowed to 
remain open, with some thirty monks remaining.146 
As Khrushchev’s antireligious campaign wore on, Orthodox dissent grew, and it developed 
links to the secular intelligentsia that was the source of an emergent dissident movement at the same 
time. A key moment in the rise of Orthodox dissent was the November-December 1965 set of open 
letters by Nikolai Eshliman and Gleb Yakunin, both Orthodox priests. The letters – addressed to the 
Patriarch and to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, respectively, but sent to all 
Moscow bishops – protested the steps taken during Khrushchev’s antireligious campaign to 
strengthen the state’s control over the Church. In particular, the writers decried the 1961 synodal 
decree, which had established so-called Councils of Twenty to govern parishes, with the effect of 
extending lay influence over churches. These lay Councils were easily subject to state infiltration and 
pressure, leaving clergy in a vulnerable position. The response to the letters came from the Church 
itself: the Patriarch asked the authors to rescind their criticism, and when they refused to do so, 
suspended them from the priesthood.147  
According to Nickolas Lupinin, the Eshliman and Yakunin letters ‘had enormous impact. 
Many from the secular intelligentsia responded favourably and some were even motivated to 
convert’.148 Perhaps the most important personal link between the nascent dissident movement and 
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Orthodox advocates for religious freedom at this time was Anatoli Levitin, who wrote under the 
pseudonym of A. Krasnov. An Orthodox layman, Levitin was, according to Bourdeaux, ‘the most 
outspoken opponent of the campaign against the church during the later Khrushchev period’, and a 
vigorous supporter of Eshliman and Yakunin. This, and his chastising of the Orthodox hierarchy for 
its lack of resistance to the state, earned him a ‘severe attack’ by the Soviet antireligious journal Nauka 
i Religia in 1966, which only raised his profile still further.149 Levitin’s signature on the Initiative Group 
on Human Rights in the USSR’s 20 May 1969 petition to the UN identified him as a ‘religious writer’, 
the only obviously religious affiliation among the signatories and supporters.150 Soon after, Levitin was 
detained for eleven months. In 1971, the Chronicle of Current Events reported that he had again been 
arrested and tried. Sakharov was allowed to attend the trial, and Yakunin was among the witnesses for 
the defense.151 Levitin was imprisoned again until 1974, after which he emigrated.152 
One of Levitin’s publications was entitled ‘Freedom of Belief and of Atheism: Face to Face’, 
which reported on an alleged 21 May 1965 meeting between the author and ‘representatives of anti-
religious opinion in a room of the Zhdanov District Executive Committee on Taganka Square’, 
including ‘two important officials of the KGB’. According to the text, an individual named Chertikhin, 
‘head of the Political Publishing House’, had accused Levitin of writing ‘that the Declaration on 
Human Rights adopted by the delegates of Eisenhower and Churchill is the basis of socialism’, which 
Levitin had denied having written. Someone called Romanov, ‘deputy director of the House of 
Atheism’, had pressed Levitin by quoting from a letter he had written to Nikodim: ‘“It is necessary to 
publish the Declaration widely, to bring all legislation into correspondence with it and to structure all 
daily activities according to it. That is the basis of socialist democracy.”’ Levitin had replied by asking, 
rhetorically, ‘What democracy can actually be meant when the most important document setting out 
the principles to have been signed and ratified has not only not been put into practice, but has not 
even been published?’ The discussion had then shifted to the Soviet constitution.153 Nevertheless, if 
Levitin’s account was accurate in reflecting his references to human rights, these came remarkably 
early – ahead of the late-1960s efflorescence of such language in the dissident movement. 
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A milestone in the convergence between Christianity and the intelligentsia came with 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s 1972 publication of a so-called ‘Lenten Letter’ to the head of the Russian 
Orthodox Church, Patriarch Pimen. As Vladislav Zubok has written, Solzhenitsyn was an ‘Orthodox 
believer and a conservative Russian nationalist’, but at the same time his work commanded the 
admiration of even the mostly liberal, outward-looking intelligentsia.154 In the letter to Pimen, 
Solzhenitsyn sharply reproached the Orthodox hierarchy for submitting to the state, particularly in 
matters such as education, baptism, and the shortage of churches. The right way, Solzhenitsyn claimed, 
would be for the church to ‘sacrifice. Though deprived of all material strength, it is always victorious in 
sacrifice.’ A reply by an Orthodox priest, Father Sergi Zheludkov, illustrated the hierarchy’s position: it 
should ‘try somehow to accept the system and for the present [make] use of those opportunities that 
are permitted’.155 
Though Zheludkov’s response could be read as merely a cynical defense of the Church’s 
adaptation to the regime, Ellis has argued that the debate around the letter also showed the range of 
Orthodox views on the proper course of action for the church vis-à-vis the state. She suggests that 
the underlying conflict was ‘between those who believed’, as Zheludkov did, ‘that the church must be 
preserved as an institution and those who believed’, like Solzhenitsyn, ‘that the church was above all 
a metaphysical body’.156 A third position, articulated by the layman Felix Karelin, sided with 
Solzhenitsyn’s criticism but drew from this not the conclusion that the church should speak out, but, 
in Ellis’ words, rather that it should refrain ‘from action, negating self in order to serve as the 
instrument of God’. In Ellis’ view, Karelin’s position was the one more in line with ‘the mainstream 
of traditional Orthodox thought’.157  
The WCC’s response to Solzhenitsyn’s letter showed it balancing between the need to respect 
the priorities of the institutional church (thus tending towards Zheludkov’s position), and the 
opportunity to use the letter as an opening to raise issues of religious freedom. Shortly after the letter 
was sent, Visser ‘t Hooft visited the USSR and met with Metropolitan Alexis, Metropolitan Nikodim, 
and the CRA’s Makartsev. The former WCC General Secretary, now honorary president, expressed 
his understanding for the Russian Orthodox Church’s critical reception of Solzhenitsyn’s letter. 
Solzhenitsyn ‘seemed not to understand the real dilemma in which the church leaders in Russia found 
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themselves’. But, Visser ‘t Hooft continued, coming to his real point, ‘he had raised a number of 
concrete issues which had to be discussed openly, such as the closing of churches, the registration of 
baptisms, religious instruction of young people, etc.’. Alexis responded by denouncing Solzhenitsyn 
as ‘not a loyal Orthodox Christian’ and disputed the information he had provided about the church in 
the Soviet Union. Visser ‘t Hooft pressed him on a few points, without much success, but noted that 
at the end of the conversation, Alexis had seemed eager for him to speak to Makartsev, ‘[s]o he seemed 
after all to think that my approach could be significant for the Orthodox Church’.158  
Meeting with Makartsev, Visser ‘t Hooft explained that he was glad, ten years on, that the 
Russian Orthodox Church had joined the WCC, but he registered his ‘regret’ that since 1961, ‘not 
more progress had been made toward full religious freedom in Russia’. Moreover, Solzhenitsyn’s letter 
and the onset of discussions on European security and cooperation meant that this question was now 
not only an ecclesiastical but ‘also and preeminently a political matter’. Western church leaders would, 
if they were to take a ‘constructive’ position in these discussions, require ‘real facts proving that the 
Russian government moved towards greater freedom in its own policies’. In response, Makartsev 
launched into an attack on Solzhenitsyn and a defense of religious freedom policy in the USSR.159 
Nevertheless, Visser ‘t Hooft came away from his visit with the conclusion that Solzhenitsyn’s letter, 
though potentially liable to invite a response by the state against the Russian Orthodox Church, could 
be valuable if Western Christians ‘use it as an opportunity to enter into frank discussion with 
government officials and Christians of Russia and to ask concrete questions about the real obstacles 
which the churches in Russia meet in the fulfilling of their mission’.160 Thus, the WCC did not merely 
acquiesce in the Russian Orthodox Church’s position along the lines laid out by Zheludkov, but took 
a more proactively critical stance. 
When Solzhenitsyn was expelled from the USSR in 1974, similar exchanges to the one around 
the Lenten letter erupted. The WCC protested the expulsion, lauding Solzhenitsyn’s ‘courageous stand 
for human freedom through his concern to help his people face the realities of the past’.161 But in 
Moscow, the Orthodox Archpriest Vsevolod Shpiller took aim at Solzhenitsyn, stating in an interview 
with the Novosti Press Agency that Solzhenitsyn could not be considered a Christian writer, because 
he had a ‘“conception of the world, of man, and of life primarily through the prism of the evil in it – 
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no, this is not a Christian outlook”’.162 Was this the hierarchy lashing out, through an intermediary, at 
its most public critic? Shpiller himself was not uncritically loyal to the Orthodox hierarchy: he had 
himself petitioned Metropolitan Nikodim in 1965, protesting the 1961 exclusion of parish priests from 
the Councils of Twenty as ‘an uncanonical act’, though in a more restrained manner than Yakunin and 
Eshliman.163 Ellis has analyzed the dispute in terms of the traditional Orthodox conception of 
‘churchliness’, and the related concept of ‘concilarity’ [sic], which did ‘not demand that the gifts and 
talents of the individual be suppressed, but that they may be exercised only after he has undergone 
the kenotic experience of denying self and surrendering himself to the collective mind of the church’.164 
From this perspective, Shpiller’s position seems to accord most closely with Karelin’s as described 
above, in emphasizing the prudence the church should exercise as to when to enter the political realm, 
whereas Yakunin and Eshliman were closer to Solzhenitsyn’s position, in valuing sacrificial Christian 
witness over the integrity of the Church as an institution. From the perspective of Yakunin and 
Eshliman, though, Shpiller’s decision to speak out against Solzhenitsyn, rather than keep silent, had 
served the interests of the state.165   
To those Orthodox who prioritized the institutional integrity of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, it was precisely dissidents like Yakunin and Eshliman who acted irresponsibly. An important 
representative of this viewpoint was Archpriest Vitali Borovoi, the principal Orthodox staff member 
at the WCC. In 1967, when Blake asked Borovoi to ascertain the credibility of a number of Christian 
appeals coming from the USSR, Borovoi produced a lengthy memorandum in which he showed 
himself skeptical of their truthfulness. He alleged – based on unnamed sources – that the 1965 
Eshliman-Yakunin letters had in fact been written by Levitin and a certain Felix Korelin, both laymen, 
whose character Borovoi called into question. Borovoi wrote that in fact, Eshliman and Yakunin had 
themselves realized that their letter had violated custom and canon law and thus given offense, ‘and 
following the advice of many of their true friends intended to be reconciled with the Patriarch and to 
ask his forgiveness for the way they had acted’. Moreover, their punishment (suspension from 
priesthood) had been conspicuously light. Yet pressure from ‘the group behind them’, such as Levitin 
and Korelin, had persuaded them to send a letter to the Patriarch, Holy Synod, and Council of Bishops, 
appealing their suspension, and this appeal ‘was published abroad in many newspapers and was sent 
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by Archbishop Anthony [the European Exarch of the Orthodox Church in London] to the World 
Council of Churches’.166 Borovoi’s analysis gained in authority from his recognition that most 
allegations about the state of religion in Soviet society were accurate: he did not play down the threat 
the churches faced. Rather, Borovoi argued that appeals such as those written by Levitin could serve 
the interests of the state, because it wanted ‘to stimulate rivalry and accusations within the Church and 
to create divisions and schisms and to be in the position of “judge” and “supporter” of this’. Borovoi 
had in mind here the history of the ‘Living Church’ schism of 1922-1946 (of which, he wrote, Levitin 
had been part), which the state had quickly exploited for its purposes.167 Thus, Borovoi’s advice 
militated against supporting appeals such as Eshliman’s and Yakunin’s and emphasized the importance 
of preserving the unity of the Russian Orthodox Church. The conflicting viewpoints the WCC 
received from Borovoi and other Orthodox sources made it difficult to take a strong position either 
way, inviting a cautious approach by the WCC. 
 
Baptists 
Baptists in the Soviet Union were forced to register their congregations with the state-
recognized All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists (AUCECB), which many refused to 
do, creating an illegal subset of Baptist congregations. In response to two 1960 documents published 
by the All-Union Council, which sought to regulate church life, including church-state relations, 
reform-minded Baptists began putting pressure on the Council. They created the Organizing 
Committee for an All-Union Congress of Evangelical Baptists, leading them to become known as 
Initsiativniki. The organization of such a congress had hitherto been denied by the authorities. In 
response to their pressure, on 15 October 1963, an All-Union Council congress was held, an attempt 
by the government to defuse the reform Baptists’ demands and prevent a schism.168 Yet the 
independent Baptists refused to recognize the congress and instead established the Council of 
Churches of the Evangelical Christian Baptists (CCECB), in September 1965.169 By the mid-1960s 
more than half of all Baptists had joined this officially unrecognized Council, though numbers would 
decline sharply over time.170 Moreover, in February 1964, reform Baptists had established the Council 
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of Baptist Prisoners’ Relatives, which not only drew families of prisoners into a network and gathered 
information but also petitioned the state for the prisoners’ release.171 According to Walter Sawatsky, 
1966 was the year of most severe repression of the Initsiativniki, with 128 arrests, including 21 key 
leaders, bringing the total number of prisoners to 202. But Baptist dissidence kept growing. In 1970 
the Council of Baptist Prisoners’ Relatives launched a Bulletin disseminated as samizdat, and the 
CCECB even established its own publishing house, printing ‘Bibles and other literature’.172 
A key moment in Baptist dissidence was a 14 April 1965 open letter to Brezhnev by Gennadi 
Kryuchkov and Georgi Vins, both Baptist pastors, who served as president and secretary, respectively, 
of the dissident Organizing Committee. The letter prominently appealed to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights as a standard the Soviet constitution should adhere to. The authors provided an 
overview of Soviet constitutional history on the point of religion, and quoted paragraph 124 of the 
Soviet constitution: ‘In order to guarantee freedom of conscience for all citizens, the church in the 
USSR has been separated from the state and the school from the church. The freedom to hold 
religious services and the freedom of anti-religious propaganda is acknowledged to all citizens.’ This 
formulation, the authors charged, ‘does not correspond to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the U.N. on 10 December 1948, and signed by the 
governments of the world, including ours’ (a common misconception – the USSR had in fact abstained 
from the vote). The letter went on to quote Articles 18 and 19 in full, and continued to point out that 
paragraph 124 ‘does not even correspond to the convention, “Concerning the struggle against 
discrimination in the field of education”, adopted by the U.N. in 1960’ (the convention was in fact 
not adopted by the UN but by UNESCO), because it allowed for anti-religious propaganda but not 
religious propaganda. Furthermore, it did not protect the right of parents to ‘guarantee the religious 
and moral upbringing of their children in accordance with their own convictions’ (as the text quoted 
the convention’s Article 5, which it stated had become ‘effective in the USSR on 1 November 1962’).173 
Thus, like Levitin’s 1965 letter to Nikodim, but in a much more emphatic way, the Kryuchkov-Vins 
letter to Brezhnev showed an awareness, if patchy, of international human rights documents and a 
willingness to use (supposed) Soviet acceptance of these documents to press for constitutional reform. 
Like Levitin’s letter, it came just ahead of the upswing in human rights language of the late 1960s. 
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Several other important petitions followed. In 1967, reform Baptists appealed to the UN and 
to Soviet authorities, describing the curtailment of religious freedom and the imprisonment of 
Baptists, of whom over 200 were named. When the appeal was passed on to the WCC by Western 
sources (and made public), Blake wrote to Ilia Ivanov, President of the AUCECB, to say that ‘we 
receive here many questions about it. It would be of great help if you could let us know how this letter 
is to be evaluated.’ Blake went on to write that he deplored the ‘break’ within the Baptist Union and 
offered the WCC’s help in bringing the reform Baptists and the AUCECB towards restored unity.174 
A few days later, Micheli sent a letter to the CRA’s Makartsev, in which he raised the issue and asked 
for Makartsev’s response to the allegations. Micheli made clear what the WCC’s position was: 
‘While the concern of the World Council of Churches embraces the unity of its member churches, 
our primary purpose in addressing you relates to the question of religious liberty as a fundamental 
human right enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’  
According to Micheli, Makartsev himself had recently, ‘in conversation with Dr. Eugene Carson Blake 
(…) expressed approval of our statements [on religious liberty]’. Micheli pointed out that the 
allegations ran counter to ‘the general policy you have explained to us’, and coupled his request for 
Makartsev ‘to interpret the present situation for us’ with the statement that ‘we stand ready to take 
such steps as may be appropriate’.175 
 Rather than acknowledge the dissidents’ demands, the AUCECB launched an attack on them. 
In December 1967, the leaders of the AUCECB, Ivanov and Alexander V. Karev, wrote an open letter 
to their ‘Dear Christian Friends’ – including if not specifically intended for the WCC – in which it 
sought to dispel the notion of a serious split among the Russian Baptists as the product of ‘rumours, 
spread by the [sic] people entirely unacquainted with the actual situation’. According to the AUCECB, 
the Initsiavniki had proven themselves unreasonable at every turn, and had rejected ‘the loyalty of our 
Union to the laws of the Soviet State on religion, as a retreat from God’. Moreover, ‘they also blame 
our Union for the association with the World Council of Churches’; the letter quoted the Initsiativniki 
(without providing a source) as describing the WCC, ‘“that unites all religious trends”’ as the ‘“Babylon 
of our days – the mother of harlots and abominations of the earth”’. The AUCECB also downplayed 
religious persecution in the Soviet Union, arguing that ‘People are not prosecuted in our country for 
their religious convictions, but to our deep regret, some brothers and sisters have been made 
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answerable for non-observance of the laws on religion and for breach of the public order’. According 
to Ivanov and Karev, the Initsiativniki were an ephemeral phenomenon, who had achieved 
‘insignificant’ results, and would ultimately vanish while the AUCECB would keep steadily ‘moving 
forward’.176 Similar points were made by Michael Zhidkov on a weeklong visit to Britain, not long 
after the above letter was sent (Zhidkov was a son of the AUCECB’s Jacob Zhidkov, who had died 
in 1966). The Baptist Ernest Payne, one of the WCC’s six presidents, and Dr. Ronald Goulding, the 
Associate Secretary of the Baptist World Alliance, who spoke with him, were ‘disposed to accept 
Michael’s comments’, which included the assessment that ‘protests from outside and attempts to 
engage in or incite illegal activities inside can only have unfortunate consequences’.177 These efforts by 
the AUCECB at undermining the cause of the dissident Baptists did not put an end to the WCC’s 
voicing concern, but it did likely blunt its advocacy on their behalf. A lack of direct connections to 
dissident Baptists reinforced the WCC’s proximity to the AUCECB’s viewpoint. John Arnold, of the 
British Council of Churches, would later recall that in 1969, the WCC sent a ‘small team’, including 
himself, to the USSR in order to make contact with the Initsiativniki, but this effort failed, implying 
that such direct connections did not exist at the time.178 
In 1970, Blake wrote Ivanov again, to inquire, inter alia, about a petition by ‘1,453 Christian 
mothers’, which had been addressed to Brezhnev in March. Like the previous appeals, the petition 
combined criticism of the constitution with appeal to human rights texts, referencing many articles of 
the Universal Declaration. Copies of the petition had also been sent to numerous other Soviet 
‘officials, organizations and journals’, including the AUCECB and the Council of Relatives of Baptist 
Prisoners.179 The WCC had obtained a copy, as had other sources in the West, and Blake’s letter noted 
that the WCC had received ‘many questions concerning this letter and, as we should like to answer 
them in the appropriate way, we should be grateful if you would let us have your interpretation of the 
facts’.180 Unlike the previous occasion, in 1967, however, there is no record of the CCIA interceding 
with the CRA, meaning that the matter was kept confined to dialogue between the WCC and its 
member church, the AUCECB. No reply from the latter is present, either. 
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The WCC’s activity on behalf of reform Baptists contrasted with that of Amnesty 
International, then on the cusp of gaining widespread authority. In 1969, Amnesty campaigned on 
behalf of Grigori Ivanovich Zemlyanko, a Russian reform Baptist who had been sentenced to four 
years in a labor camp. Amnesty’s group in Westminster wrote to the WCC, by way of the British 
Council of Churches, to request a statement in support of Zemlyanko. It noted that the Baptist World 
Alliance was undertaking representations about the plight of Baptists in general and with specific 
attention to the case of Zemlyanko.181 Hugh Wilcox, the secretary of the British Council of Churches’ 
Department of International Affairs, who forwarded Amnesty’s letter, wrote that he was ‘of course 
extremely sympathetic to Amnesty’, but ‘it seems to me it would be difficult for either the World or 
British Council of Churches to take up a position on individual cases’; he asked if there was ‘a CCIA 
line on this’.182  
The CCIA’s Alan Booth replied, suggesting Wilcox obtain the opinions of Payne and Sir John 
Lawrence, a former diplomat to the USSR. The divergence between the views of these two illustrated 
the two roads the WCC could take. Payne’s opinion should be given the most weight, Booth wrote, 
since – after serving, until 1967, as General Secretary of the Baptist Union of Great Britain – Payne 
had been appointed as one of the six presidents of the WCC in 1968. According to Booth, Payne 
generally took ‘the view that one should be cautious in public intervention on behalf of the Baptists 
in Russia, who have an extreme wing which is in itself unreasonable in its demands’. Lawrence’s view, 
on the other hand, would be that ‘Dr. Payne is too much of an ecclesiastical bureaucrat and too ready 
to listen to the Baptist “establishment” in Russia’. (Lawrence would go on to become chairman of 
Keston College in 1969, an organization discussed further below.) Booth’s own feeling was that ‘I 
doubt the value of a purely demonstrative “message” from the W.C.C. or the B.C.C. while at the same 
time I don’t like to slap down Amnesty International’. Thus, ‘[s]ubject to Payne’s approval’, Booth 
proposed the British Council of Churches inform Amnesty that it and the WCC were ‘fully aware of 
the situation, and are trying to handle it within our own community and in the best way we know, and 
that we wish Amnesty International well in their concern for such cases’.183 The archival file does not 
contain any action subsequently taken. The exchange shows how the WCC’s brand of ‘quiet 
diplomacy’, primarily at the ecclesiastical level, with great weight given to the views of its member 
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churches as opposed to individuals or dissident groups, was at odds with the approach of Amnesty, 
which sought to publicly address persecution, with an exclusive focus on individual cases. 
Dissidents, dialogue, and détente 
Over the course of 1966-1970, the WCC and CCIA went through a major shift in leadership, 
in which many of the Western men who had been with the organization from its early days – even 
from its beginning – were replaced by a more ethnically, geographically, and denominationally diverse 
group of leaders (diversity in terms of gender was slower in coming). This reflected a sea change in 
the organization’s constituency, largely as a result of decolonization, in a similar way as the UN’s 
membership had changed. As in the UN, this brought changes in political outlook, including what has 
been described as a more ‘politicized’ approach, and a desire to draw attention to not only tensions 
between East and West, but between the global North and South (more commonly at the time referred 
to as the Third World).184 The high tide of détente in the early 1970s suggested that the moment for 
such a reorientation had come, as did the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement and demands for a New 
International Economic Order. Amid such tectonic shifts in international relations, what became of 
the WCC’s concern for religious liberty in the USSR?  
By the early 1970s, religious and political dissidence in the USSR increasingly overlapped. A 
good illustration of this was the statement issued by the dissident Yevgeni Barabanov on 15 September 
1973, addressing the press in Solzhenitsyn’s apartment. His own flat had been searched by the KGB, 
during which many of his human rights-related materials had been confiscated, and after which he 
had been interrogated. Barabanov admitted to having sent many such texts to the West but defended 
his right to do so. He referenced the Universal Declaration and explained that ‘I was guided not only 
by my rights of free spiritual orientation, but also by the demands of Christian duty and conscience, 
for I am convinced that genuine spiritual values cannot be created in a closed atmosphere where there 
is disinformation’. Barabanov’s appeal was transmitted to the West, where it galvanized a campaign 
for his case.185 Ellis also writes that by 1974, it was becoming clear that the Moscow Patriarchate ‘was 
not going to change, and exhortations addressed to it dwindled with the passing years’.186 This did not 
mean the end of Christian activism, quite the contrary: efforts to appeal to the West seem only to have 
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intensified, which likely meant a closer connection to human rights language. The Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) provided a major impulse in this regard. The most 
important religious dissident group, the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers’ Rights in 
the USSR, founded by ‘three Russian Orthodox Christians’ at the end of 1976, would by the mid-
1980s succeed in sending over 1,300 pages of samizdat documents to the West.187 
The perception of collaboration with the state by church hierarchies united secular and 
religious dissidents against figures such as Nikodim. A telling example is provided by the scientist 
Valery Chalidze, whose 1973 overview of the dissident movement included a brief section on religion, 
in the section on ‘minorities’. Chalidze showed empathy for the ‘tyranny’ the Russian Orthodox 
Church faced, which meant it struggled simply ‘to exist’. He wrote that he understood that ‘it is natural 
that church officials sometimes render unto Caesar excessively’, although ‘my own ethic is different’. 
But Chalidze then went on to criticize ‘the instances of church hierarchs’ making common cause with 
Caesar in persecuting or deceiving believers’, as he accused Nikodim of having done in the case of 
Boris Talantov (a mathematics teacher and friend of Levitin, who in 1969 had been sentenced to two 
years in a labor camp for his advocacy of religious freedom, where he had died).188 Thus, Nikodim 
figured as an enemy of the dissident movement rather than an ally in fraught circumstances, as the 
WCC was inclined to see him. 
As more and more information became available on religious repression and human rights, 
and grassroots human rights activism became a major current in Western social movements, the WCC 
came under pressure to act publicly, too. Small research institutes such as Keston College, based in 
Oxford, England (established in 1969), Glaube in der 2. Welt, based near Zürich, Switzerland (founded 
in 1972), and the Inter-Academical Institute for Missiological and Ecumenical Research, in Utrecht, 
the Netherlands (established in 1970), provided information that implied action to help Eastern 
European and Soviet religious and other dissidents was imperative. Mark Hurst has written a history 
of Michael Bourdeaux and his organization, Keston College, in which he emphasizes the importance 
of the group’s academic credentials while calling attention to its ‘activist’ nature.189 In its expertise-
based activism, it was in many ways similar to Amnesty International, which Bourdeaux developed 
good relations with. A major difference, however, was that Keston College focused exclusively on the 
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Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It was less independent from international politics, as illustrated 
vividly by Margaret Thatcher’s embrace of the organization in 1984.190 Bourdeaux would clash publicly 
with the WCC in the same year, after which relations with Keston College were ‘acrimonious’, 
according to Hurst.191  
A good illustration of the fault lines between such organizations and the WCC was an incident 
relating to Solzhenitsyn’s 1974 expulsion. The New York-based Research Center for Religion & 
Human Rights in Closed Societies, which now published Religion in Communist Dominated Areas 
(previously run out of the NCCCUSA’s International Department), responded to the expulsion in a 
28 March 1974 ‘Resolution on Human Rights’. Its directors wrote that they ‘concur in the need for 
détente in international relations, but see it as impossible when Soviet and other totalitarian 
governments refuse to honor the basic human rights of their own citizens.’ The statement went so far 
as to warn of ‘such disasters as followed Munich’, and asserted that ‘we in the Free World must 
intensify our struggle to support freedom and justice, everywhere, for all individuals and nations; and 
we steadfastly refuse to condone any selectivity or discrimination of a religious, racial, national or 
political character’.192 The Center’s Executive Director, Rev. Blahoslav S. Hrubý, made a statement 
suggesting that Solzhenitsyn be permitted to attend the WCC’s St. Pölten consultation on human 
rights and its Nairobi Assembly.193 In response, a member of the WCC Executive Committee, David 
E. Johnson, wrote a letter, passed to the press, in which he called Hrubý’s proposal ‘“irresponsible”’, 
because it would focus undue and sensationalized attention on Solzhenitsyn.194 The leaders of the 
Center took umbrage at this, writing to the WCC that ‘vigorous and constant action to help secure 
basic human rights for persecuted groups’ was ‘in accord with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights’ as well as ‘with the teachings of Jesus, who told us that every man is brother to every other 
man’.195 These statements from the Center showed a form of activist witness that was alien to the 
WCC’s approach in its willingness to issue full-throated denunciations. To the WCC, the Center’s 
approach likely smacked of self-righteousness, which was opposite to the ecumenical movement’s 
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spirit of self-criticism and dialogue. The CCIA’s new Director, the Argentinian-Estonian lawyer and 
exile Leopoldo J. Niilus, filed it in a special folder marked ‘selective indignation’.196 
Controversy over the WCC’s position on human rights became most acute when the 
Orthodox layman Lev Regelson and the priest Yakunin sent a letter to the WCC’s General Secretary, 
Philip Potter, in 1975, on the eve of the Nairobi Assembly. While Potter did not allow the letter into 
the Assembly’s formal proceedings, long excerpts were published in the conference periodical Target, 
on 25 November 1975. The authors criticized the WCC’s lack of public protest in the face of religious 
persecution in the Eastern bloc, with the exception of its recent appeal on behalf of Georgi Vins. 
(Because Vins was the general secretary of the CCECB, in January 1975, the WCC had sent a letter to 
the Soviet prosecutor during his trial.) The Regelson-Yakunin letter called for the WCC to make 
religious liberty ‘the central theme of Christian ecumenism’, and in fact proposed that ‘the doubts 
about the spiritual quality of the ecumenical movement may be banished only if confession of the 
Cross in the original sense of the Gospel – as trials and tribulations for the sake of Christ’s Name – 
become the basis for Christian unity’.197 With this call in the background, the Assembly’s discussion 
on the Helsinki Final Act, which had been adopted a few months prior, became highly charged.  
As Katharina Kunter has written, during the Assembly the WCC was basically ‘unable to come 
to a clear position or critical reflection on its own attitude towards the question of religious freedom 
in the socialist states’.198 Differences of opinion as to whether to take a more outspoken course of 
action prevailed, and the Assembly’s resolution on the Helsinki Final Act contained only toned-down 
phrases on religious freedom in the USSR. An open hearing on the evening of 8 December 1975, at 
which the precarious position of the Russian churches had been discussed in relative openness, had 
contributed to this outcome, by persuading critics such as the General Secretary of the Dutch 
Reformed Church, Albert van den Heuvel, of the need for ‘consultation’ and ‘fraternal debate’.199 
According to Kunter, after Nairobi, religious freedom in relation to the Helsinki Final Act was 
essentially ‘delegated’ to the CCIA and subsequently the CEC.200  
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Yakunin and Regelson followed up their letter to the Nairobi Assembly on 6 March 1976, by 
writing again to Potter. Unlike the first letter (as far as Target’s excerpts showed), this time the pair 
drew heavily on the language of human rights, presumably in response to Nairobi’s attention to the 
subject and especially its commitment to an international church program to take up the Helsinki Final 
Act. Yakunin and Regelson called for support of religious dissidents and denounced official Soviet 
attempts at explaining away the problem of religious freedom in the USSR.201 The WCC’s leadership 
had a different policy in mind than the confrontational one proposed by Regelson and Yakunin, 
however. Kunter has written that the WCC – or at least a preponderance of its leaders – remained 
convinced that public denunciations would, generally speaking, do more harm than good and thus 
restricted itself by and large to ‘silent diplomacy’.202 The WCC was criticized for this, but the CCIA 
defended its position. In notes prepared for a speech by Potter in Philadelphia, Epps wrote that 
without denying the problem, ‘we must say that infrequently do those in the West who would like to 
help take the trouble to find out what it is, in fact, which does help’.203  
At the same time, such defensive responses signaled that the CCIA’s leadership was 
preoccupied with other issues, to which it considered the insistence on religious freedom in the East 
a distraction as well as a sign of a blinkered and self-righteous approach to the WCC’s role in 
international affairs. As detailed in chapters 5 and 6, during these years, Epps, Niilus and their 
colleagues pursued a rethinking of the WCC’s human rights policy that broadened its scope beyond 
religious liberty to concerns of social justice. The Marxist inflection of the liberation theology that 
underlay this development should not be confused for support for Soviet-style state socialism. The 
stagnation of Soviet communism was itself a target of the New Left, which the CCIA’s leaders had 
more in common with than the traditional left.204 But the anti-imperial impetus behind much of the 
WCC’s activism at this time meant that the organization was highly outspoken in criticizing the West, 
sympathetic to dialogue between Christianity and socialism, and – in part due to the growing 
representation of Eastern churchmen – decreasingly critical of communism.205 Moreover, as part of 
this reorientation, churches were encouraged to focus on human rights violations in their own 
                                                 
201 ‘Lev Regelson and Gleb Yakunin write to Dr. Philip Potter’, in J.A. Hebly, Michael Bourdeaux, and Eugen Voss, eds., 
Religious Liberty in the Soviet Union: WCC and USSR: A Post-Nairobi Documentation (West Wickham: Keston College, 1976) 40-
53, quote on 41. 
202 Kunter, Die Kirchen, 234. 
203 Epps to Potter, 15 April 1976, 3, WCCA CCIA 428.15.3.4. 
204 For a critical discussion of the distinction as applicable in Latin America in particular, see Jeffrey L. Gould, ‘Solidarity 
under Siege. The Latin American Left, 1968’, American Historical Review, 114, 2 (2009) 348-375. 
205 Kunter and Schilling, ‘“Der Christ”’, 62-63. 
65 
 
countries. The CCIA could not provide a satisfying answer, however, as to how to deal with cases in 
which churches were precluded from raising such questions in the first place, other than to say that 
protests and denunciations should be undertaken ‘with sensitivity where people are liable to suffer as 
a result’.206 The trust it continued to place in church hierarchs like Nikodim meant that such protests 
were unlikely to take place. 
In 1980, Epps explained the WCC’s work on human rights in relation to Eastern Europe to 
an American ecumenist. In Epps’ view, denunciations of communism as inherently inimical to human 
rights had  only contributed to the hostility of Eastern European states to their countries’ churches, 
whereas the WCC’s new policy had contributed to a climate in which state-church relations had 
improved – he gave the examples of Hungary, Poland, the GDR, and the USSR – and international 
connections had been strengthened.207 In the same year, his colleague Erich Weingärtner wrote to a 
Dutch ecumenist that the CSCE was ‘endangered in part by the fact that the human rights issue is 
frequently employed as a political weapon rather than sought after as a common goal to be achieved.’ 
As Weingärtner wrote, ‘it is our conviction that the most urgent task facing us is the overall reduction 
in tensions, which is the only method that has been proven to be effective in the improvement of the 
human rights situation in Eastern and Western Europe and in the broadening of possibilities of life 
and work of our member churches in these countries.’208 The CCIA thus displayed faith in détente 
and dialogue over confrontation by dissidents. 
Though an evaluation of the merits of these claims goes beyond the scope of this paper, it 
would seem that Epps’ and Weingärtner’s assessments did not recognize the crackdown on religious 
(and other) dissent in the USSR from 1976 to 1982, which peaked around the very time they wrote. 
Ellis’ assessment was that at the end of this period, ‘more than a decade of public dissent had resulted 
in no change whatever in the situation of the church’.209 The – largely unanticipated – demise of 
communism at the turn of the decade, on the other hand, has led historians to emphasize the 
importance of those actors which voiced public criticism of human rights in Eastern Europe and the 
USSR.210 As Kunter has written, the churches could not be considered to have been great supporters 
of the dissidents who responded to the CSCE by demanding their governments respect human 
                                                 
206 CCIA, Human Rights and Christian Responsibility: Report of the Consultation St. Pölten, Austria, 21-26 October 1974 (Geneva, 
October 1975) 7. 
207 Epps to Rev. Grover Hartman, 25 November 1980, 3-4, WCCA CCIA 428.15.3.4. 
208 Weingärtner to H.A.M. Fiolet, WCCA CCIA 428.16.4.50. 
209 Quoted in Lupinin, ‘The Russian Orthodox Church’, on 30. 
210 E.g. Snyder, Human Rights Activism. 
66 
 
rights.211 At the same time, historians such as Benjamin Nathans have cautioned against assuming too 
readily that a ‘Helsinki effect’ brought down communism and ended the Cold War.212 
Conclusions 
Contrary to the anticommunist approach of actors like the Vatican or the American 
government, the ecumenical movement sought to establish dialogue with both churches and the 
authorities in the USSR. While, from 1948 to 1950, the WCC elaborated a conception of religious 
liberty that was embedded in the framework of postwar human rights, it toned down its critique of 
communism as it sought to avoid taking sides in the Cold War and pursued membership for the 
Russian Orthodox Church. Though human rights language featured as part of the preparatory 
discussions, the Universal Declaration was used not so much as a rhetorical cudgel as an impartial, 
technical standard by which to evaluate domestic legislation. The desire to widen the ecumenical 
fellowship was given overriding priority, which dovetailed with fears of harming Russian churches by 
issuing criticism, rather than helping them. It should be noted that the WCC was by no means alone 
in taking a cautious stance at this time. According to David Foglesong, ‘From the late 1950s through 
the early 1970s, many Protestant leaders in North America felt that it was better to keep silent about 
the persecution of believers in the USSR.’213 And according to Preston, even religious liberty 
promotion as part of American foreign policy was at a low ebb from 1963 (a year marked by the 
outbreak of Buddhist protests in Vietnam, which placed the Kennedy administration in an awkward 
position, and by the onset of a thaw in Soviet-American relations) until the mid-1970s, when actors 
outside the Nixon administration, such as Senator Henry Jackson, precipitated a return of religious 
liberty to foreign policy.214 
As Christian protests against the leadership of the Russian Orthodox and Baptist churches 
gained in force, converging with the dissident movement’s embrace of human rights from the second 
half of the 1960s, the WCC’s commitment to ecclesiastical relations meant it was increasingly out of 
step with the times. It responded to a number of public appeals, chiefly through its ecclesiastical 
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channels, and in doing so supported the cause of dissidents, amplifying their critiques of Soviet 
legislation and their references to human rights. But the WCC refused to join in the recasting of human 
rights as a language of public witness. In this sense, the WCC stood in opposition to the 1970s 
‘breakthrough’ of human rights as a language of grassroots public protest.215 The contrast with new 
organizations such as Keston College, which harnessed the publication of reliable information for the 
purposes of an activist agenda, made the WCC seem reticent or aloof at best, and complicit at worst. 
These problems were compounded by the organization’s widening of its human rights engagement, 
beyond religious liberty, to issues of social justice, which seemed to critical observers to align with 
socialist foreign policy objectives. As the success of Amnesty International during these years 
demonstrated, transcending the Cold War could be a highly popular cause. But Amnesty was 
ideologically committed to a minimalist form of liberalism, in its focus on individual civil and political 
rights, whereas the WCC came to see this approach as narrow and thus sought to transcend liberalism, 
too. While this new approach could convincingly be justified as a response to questions of social 
justice, especially in the Third World, the WCC’s concomitant reticence to support Soviet dissidents 
damaged its credibility as a truly global voice for human rights. 
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2. Self-determination, religious freedom, 
and Islam: ecumenical human rights 
engagement and decolonization in 
Indonesia and Nigeria 
‘In all predominantly Moslem States religious minorities today live in fear and trembling of what the 
future independence of their countries may mean for them.’216 – Memorandum prepared by ‘various 
missionary and religious authorities in the Middle East’, 1942 
‘The most effective defence of human rights and thus of religious freedom is to be found in the 
mind and will of the people as reflected in constitution, law courts, and practice. It follows that 
action to promote the observance of human rights, if it is to be meaningful, must be domestic.’217 – 
O. Frederick Nolde, 1961 
Introduction 
Because the World Council of Churches (WCC) included from the start non-Western churches, albeit 
a small minority, and because of its close linkage to the missionary movement, the politics of the 
ecumenical movement were closely tied to questions of empire and decolonization. In the mid-
twentieth century process of decolonization, both empire and struggles for self-determination could 
be justified with reference to human rights.218 Historical debate continues on the significance of both 
to the wider history of human rights in the twentieth century, with reference to the question of whether 
and when a ‘breakthrough’ of human rights occurred.219 One of the less-explored strands in this field 
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remains the history of postcolonial constitution-making.220 On this subject, Samuel Moyn has 
remarked that ‘the main forces at work in the slow shift toward explicit declarations in new 
constitutions were concerns about ethnic powersharing and settler property rights’.221 While 
recognizing the importance of these factors, this chapter focuses on another major reason such 
provisions came about: concern for religious liberty. Existing accounts of the insertion of bills of 
rights, modeled on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, into the constitutions of nations 
emerging from British empire have tended to view the subject from the perspective of the state, but 
non-governmental actors could exert important influences. This chapter shows how ecumenical 
Christians, missionaries in particular, were a major influence on postcolonial provisions for religious 
freedom and related rights. 
Historians continue to debate the relationship between mission and empire, with views ranging 
from a strong emphasis on their entanglement with imperial power and their role as ‘cultural 
imperialists’ to accounts stressing their fundamentally faith-driven and therefore transcendent agenda 
as well their critical attitude to colonial rule.222 Building on such scholarship, the ecumenical 
movement’s relationship to decolonization has received increasing attention in recent years, though 
much work remains to be done. Recent scholarship on American mainline Protestants has stressed 
their anti-imperialism.223 Andrew Preston, for example, has pointed to examples of prominent 
American missionaries who already before World War II ‘aligned themselves with anti-colonial and 
national self-determination’.224 The relationship between such criticism of imperialism, the religious 
freedom of missionaries, and the ecumenical embrace of human rights in the 1940s, is yet to be fully 
explored. In this respect, John Stuart has cautioned that ‘emphasis on Americans and on international 
ecumenism obscures important elements in mid-twentieth century human rights discourse, notably 
the extent to which British imperialism influenced the thoughts and actions of Protestant missionaries 
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and ecumenists’.225 According to Stuart, in discussions from the interwar period on, missionaries 
agreed with British officials in viewing ‘imperial and colonial rule rather than international declarations 
and conventions as the means by which indigenous peoples and religious minorities might best be 
protected’. Only by the late 1950s, ‘faced with increasing evidence of imperial misdemeanour and 
resort to violence, their attitude to empire became more questioning and more critical’.226 Postcolonial 
constitution-making blended the framework of imperial rule, with its state-centric enforcement, with 
international norms, the content of which it integrated. 
This chapter argues that the primary way in which the language of human rights featured in 
the ecumenical response to anticolonialism and decolonization was with respect to religious freedom, 
namely that of Christian missionaries and of Christian minorities. The most important locus of such 
human rights engagement was in majority Muslim countries, where decolonization seemed to 
Christians a potential death knell. As Linde Lindkvist has pointed out, the most important ecumenical 
study on religious freedom at the time, the American Searle M. Bates’ Religious Liberty: An Inquiry, 
identified ‘Moslem countries’ as one of the principal areas in which religious freedom was threatened. 
Its analysis ‘rested on the presupposition that the impediments facing these [missionary] organizations 
could be traced back to Islamic scripture’.227 To counter this threat, the Commission of the Churches 
on International Affairs (CCIA), representing both the churches of the WCC and the missionaries of 
the IMC, served as the nexus in a transnational effort to protect Christians in a wide range of majority 
Muslim countries: the Sudan, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, (northern) Nigeria, and elsewhere. 
The first section of this chapter sketches the general attitude of ecumenical churchmen 
towards decolonization and details the CCIA’s reservations with regard to the right to self-
determination. This analysis confirms that the WCC took an approach to decolonization that was 
critical of empire but at the same time gradualist and apprehensive of anticolonial nationalism – more 
in line with those of liberal imperial officials than the anticolonial actors seeking to liberate themselves 
from them.228 Moreover, the aid that churches provided to newly independent countries was viewed 
in terms of charity and technical assistance. The second, much larger, section, delves into the history 
                                                 
225 John Stuart, ‘Empire, Mission, Ecumenism, and Human Rights: “Religious Liberty” in Egypt, 1919-1956’, Church History, 
83, 1, (2014) 110-134, on 111. 
226 Ibid., 112. 
227 Linde Lindkvist, Religious Freedom and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017) 74. 
228 Cf. John Stuart, ‘“Speaking for the Unvoiced?” British Missionaries and Aspects of African Nationalism, 1949-1959’, 
in Brian Stanley and Alaine Low, eds., Missions, Nationalism, and the End of Empire (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans, 2003) 183-193, on 185. 
71 
 
of ecumenical religious liberty advocacy in the context of decolonization in majority Muslim countries. 
This section is divided into three parts: first, a general overview of the relationship between 
missionaries, religious freedom, and human rights; second, an account of Dutch missionary lobbying 
for constitutional religious liberty provisions during the Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949) and after; 
and third, the story of British missionaries’ efforts at securing such provisions in the Nigerian 
constitution. Both of these case studies show the importance of ecumenical formulations of religious 
liberty and human rights, as well as the variety of actors involved in what was an emphatically 
transnational undertaking, yet one aimed primarily at securing religious freedom within newly-
established states. 
 
The WCC, the churches, and decolonization 
The WCC remained a largely Western and Western-oriented organization until the 1960s, as 
Katharina Kunter and Annegreth Schilling have argued, but they note that the missionary movement 
embarked on a process of ‘globalization’ earlier on.229 Indeed, contacts with the non-Western world 
were of course part and parcel of the missionary enterprise, and the International Missionary Council, 
founded in 1921 and led by the British missionary leader Joseph H. Oldham, served as an early vector 
for missionary ecumenism. It is important, for this reason, to keep in mind the distinction between 
churches in the West on one hand, and missionaries and churches in the non-Western world on the 
other. Still, the leading ecumenist Paul Abrecht had to acknowledge in the official history of the 
ecumenical movement in 1970 that it ‘discovered the urgent problems of the nations of Africa, Asia, 
Latin America, and the Middle East only after the process of radical decolonization was well under 
way’.230 Moreover, this statement omitted the complicity of Western churches and missionaries in 
colonialism in the first place. Christianity had played a key role in legitimizing the European ‘civilizing 
mission’, and missionary activities had benefited from and supported imperial state power. While 
ecumenical leaders such as Joseph Oldham and Hendrik Kraemer had developed an increasingly 
critical attitude towards imperial rule, the WCC’s member churches tended to take a more conservative 
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stance.231 Most ecumenical social thought on the needs of decolonizing nations was cast in the 
language of charity or that of technical assistance. It should thus be no surprise that rights language, 
especially in the mode of anticolonial nationalism, was peripheral to the WCC’s engagement with 
questions of decolonization. This section discusses the CCIA’s stance on these issues, particularly on 
the right to self-determination – soon established by anticolonial actors as the essential precondition 
for all other rights – and the attitude of the churches, whose position mattered greatly for their 
influence in imperial metropoles, whereas the role of missionaries in discussed in the next section. 
The WCC’s 1948 Amsterdam Assembly set itself against colonialism and called for progress 
towards ‘self-government for subject peoples’, but this fell short of endorsing ‘self-determination’, let 
alone a right thereto.232 Similarly, one of the CCIA’s official aims, set out in 1946, was ‘to assist in 
“acceptance by all nations of the obligation to promote to the utmost the well-being of dependent 
peoples including their advance toward self-government and the development of their political 
institutions”’.233 In a 1956 review of ecumenical statements on self-determination, CCIA officer 
Richard Fagley’s first quotation of a reference to a (right to) ‘self-determination’ came from the 27-30 
December 1952 Ecumenical Study Conference for East Asia, held at Lucknow, India, which used the 
term with respect to East Asia. The first embrace of the term by the WCC as a whole was at the 1954 
Evanston Assembly, which endorsed the ‘legitimate right of the self-determination of peoples’, while 
again qualifying it by reference to the ‘obligation (…) to promote the educational, economic, social, 
and political advancement of dependent peoples, that they may be enabled to play their full part in the 
international community’.234 The ecumenical refusal to recognize self-determination as an absolute 
right distinguished it from the Third World bloc that would enshrine it in the draft UN Covenants in 
the early 1950s.235  
In the 1950s, the WCC began to systematically study what it referred to as ‘areas of rapid social 
change in Asia, Africa and Latin America’. Apart from self-determination, the Lucknow Study 
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Conference proposed ‘radical reform of land tenure systems, planned economic development (…) 
and new policies by western [sic] nations in support of political and economic change in Asia’.236 This 
agenda for ‘social justice’ was not only informed by ‘concern for our brothers for whom Christ died’, 
but also by the ‘obligation for the colonial powers to see that national liberation is achieved in a 
democratic framework, without the movement falling into the hands of Communism’.237 At its 
subsequent meeting, the Central Committee promulgated a letter to churches around the world, 
sketching the dimensions of the issue in wider terms: 
‘The struggle for and attainment of national independence, the break-up of the old village structure 
of society and the attempt to build up a society based on industrial techniques, the challenge to old 
customs and traditions through new conceptions of fundamental rights, the transformation in the 
status of women and the pattern of the family, all these indicate the vast dimension of the 
revolution’.238 
Following on from this, in 1955, the working committee of the Department on Church and 
Society initiated a major study entitled ‘The Common Christian Responsibility Toward Areas of Rapid 
Social Change’, which lasted until 1961. Its chairman, the Dutch agricultural economist and senior 
World Bank official Dr. Egbert de Vries, stated that the ‘focal point of the study will be the idea of 
responsible emancipation’. The study would have ‘four main areas of concern’: ‘(1) responsible citizenship; 
(2) village and rural life; (3) the problems of urbanization; (4) the impact of foreign enterprise and 
international assistance’.239 The concept of ‘responsible emancipation’ transposed personalist thinking 
on the relationship between man and community, articulated at Amsterdam as the ‘responsible 
society’, to what at this time was becoming known as the Third World. ‘Responsible emancipation’ 
demanded ‘a concern for the freedom and dignity of the human personality and for the development 
of societies where man can find cultural and religious fulfilment’. ‘Responsible citizenship’, specifically, 
was concerned with the emergence of newly independent, democratic states. Such concepts played a 
central role in ecumenical thinking on how to ensure that ‘emancipation’ could be steered away from 
‘destructive’ paths and towards ‘creative’ ones.240 
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Within the WCC, there were voices which espoused relatively strong support for 
anticolonialism. At the Evanston Assembly, Charles Malik, in his final year as the Lebanese 
Ambassador to the UN and the US, forcefully spoke on the subject: 
‘Asia and Africa are rising. They desire the full enjoyment of their natural rights. (…) The great 
stirring for social justice, for the elimination of discrimination and misery, for the liberation of the 
eternally depressed and dispossessed, for conferring some dignity upon millions of human beings 
who are only human by name, all this certainly reflects the will of Christ.’241  
Yet a more technocratic and paternalistic approach predominated, as illustrated by a report on ‘rapid 
social development’ by Robert C. Mackie, head of the Division of Inter-Church Aid. Mackie quoted 
approvingly and at length from Charles Malik’s address to the Evanston Assembly, yet his response 
to Malik’s call revolved around providing emergency relief and economic aid to churches in Africa 
and Asia, so as to meet ‘human need’ – materially and spiritually. Political questions hardly figured – 
Mackie assiduously avoided any direct mention of colonialism and decolonization – except to note 
that minority Christian communities were often ‘standing by themselves in non-Christian, and not 
infrequently anti-Christian, environments’. As Mackie noted, ‘[t]he old political safeguards from 
colonial days, whatever be their value, have practically gone.’ He wrote that what he believed ‘Charles 
Malik meant us to see’ was that the churches stood before an opportunity ‘of rebuilding good 
relationships between the West on the one hand and Asia and Africa on the other’, much as a century 
earlier, David Livingstone had stood before such an opportunity and boldly grasped it. Thus, Mackie 
exulted, in his introduction: ‘How great was the moral power of this single-minded man [Livingstone] 
who opened up Africa for the outside world!’ Though Mackie acknowledged, euphemistically, that the 
‘influence of wealth and political power’ had led to a ‘crisis in relationships to-day between Africa and 
the western [sic] world’, he seemed to believe that this problem could be consigned to the past if the 
churches developed ‘a new form of response’.242  
The CCIA’s approach to decolonization reflected similar assumptions. As Nolde had to admit 
in retrospect, the CCIA moved slowly on decolonization. Because of disagreement among the WCC’s 
constituency on ‘the proper tempo and scope of the decolonization process’, Nolde wrote, the CCIA 
took ‘a rather cautious, quite possibly an over-cautious approach to most of the colonial issues’. 
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According to him, the CCIA attempted to preserve the ‘essentially non-political’ character of the work 
of churches and missions.243 This led it to adopt an approach aimed at avoiding confrontation or 
polarization, as was clear from the CCIA’s reporting in the 1950s, which defended its insistence on 
obtaining the ‘voluntary’ cooperation of colonial powers rather than risk ‘alienating’ them:  
‘the officers [of the CCIA] have deemed it advisable to exercise caution in regard to formal 
representations on substantive issues. One factor has been the increasing interjection of political 
issues, particularly in the Fourth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly [the Special Political and 
Decolonization Committee], in a manner which tends to alienate the governments administering 
dependent territories rather than to enlist their co-operation. (...) The C.C.I.A. has continued to 
follow the work of the U.N. agencies in this field, having in mind the objective of a voluntary rather 
than a coerced acceptance by all nations of their responsibilities for the well-being of dependent 
peoples.’244  
The CCIA argued that its own ability to act was limited, given how sensitive states were to international 
interventions in these matters. It therefore emphasized the importance of action by churches with 
respect to their national governments: ‘Expressions of worldwide Christian interest in these matters 
can serve as a highly important stimulus and corrective to one-sided points of view. But the main front 
for action is at the national level.’245 
In line with its depoliticized approach, the CCIA rejected the ‘tendency to make an absolute 
of self-determination apart from the other considerations which must figure in the responsible 
society’. Self-determination, as a collective right, was not cast as a human right, and could therefore 
easily be subjected to qualifications and caveats. This approach was in line with that of the colonial 
governments.246 One reason for this was the fear that, as the British CCIA commissioner S.A. 
Morrison put it in a discussion on Palestine in 1948, ‘[i]f every ethnic group of responsible size decided 
it wanted an independent state, the situation would be uncontrollable’.247 At a 1956 discussion of the 
CCIA Executive Committee, which intended to clarify the concept of self-determination, the 
participants distinguished between self-determination as a ‘principle’ and as a ‘concrete right’ that came 
into being under ‘certain conditions’, but failed to enunciate these to a significant degree.248  When the 
UN’s draft human rights covenant incorporated self-determination as its first substantive article from 
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1955 on, the CCIA grudgingly began to include it in enumerations of human rights, but its policy did 
not meaningfully change.249  
The CCIA and the churches it represented legitimated at least the temporary continuation of 
colonial rule by reference to nebulous criteria of the ‘fitness’ or ‘preparedness’ of the colonized for 
even limited forms of self-government. The CCIA’s reports make clear that such considerations played 
a decisive role in whether to apply self-determination as a right or as a principle. These criteria were 
explained using a number of factors. When the process of decolonization accelerated towards the end 
of the 1950s, the CCIA welcomed this but indicated its ‘concern over the need for progress in regard 
to the foundation of free and durable political institutions’.250 In 1960 the UN General Assembly 
adopted its ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, which 
emphatically drew on human rights and self-determination, and criticized considerations of 
‘”preparedness”’ as merely ‘”a pretext for delaying independence”’. This did not dissuade the CCIA 
from continuing to articulate concerns about ‘weaknesses in the preparation – economic, social, 
educational, political – for the exercise of self-determination’. In view of the many newly independent 
states facing such challenges, the CCIA stressed the need for a sharp increase in development aid: ‘It 
is clear that “decolonisation” is not more than a partial answer to the full well-being of peoples 
emerging from the dependent relationship.’251 Concerns for ‘preparedness’ were also put forward at 
the New Delhi Assembly’s Commission on CCIA, which did condemn ‘self-serving delay’ but pointed 
out that ‘problems exist where a people has not been sufficiently prepared to assume the 
responsibilities of political independence’.252 Such considerations made self-determination conditional 
on external and hazy criteria, thus blocking any immediate rights claims. In an exceptional move, in 
1954, the CCIA recognized ‘the right and fitness of the people of Cyprus to determine for themselves 
their future status’. Yet this exception did little more than to confirm the rule, and the fact that the 
Cypriot population was white, unlike most colonized populations, is suggestive of the importance of 
race in shaping the CCIA’s position.253 
Another major concern on the part of the CCIA was the implications that self-determination 
could have for the fragmentation of international society. In response to the 1960 UN Declaration 
cited above, which stated that ‘all peoples have the right to self-determination’, Fagley noted that 
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‘neither “peoples” nor “self-determination” is very precise’ and could mean many different things. He 
referred back to the 1956 CCIA Executive Committee paper and repeated its quotation from E.H. 
Carr's 1942 Conditions of Peace: ‘the urgent need now is to “alter, not the location, but the meaning of 
frontiers”’.254 In a memorandum on the trusteeship system, the South African CCIA commissioner 
Maurice Webb asked whether its pursuit of independence for trustee territories was really worth it – 
‘But is national independence an absolute good? Is it an end in itself? Or is the important thing the 
use that is made of it?’. He mused, ‘is the United Nations to end in nothing more than a greater 
fragmentation of the world?’255 
Meredith Terretta has stressed the importance of the UN trusteeship system to the postwar 
history of human rights, because trusteeship territories became were ‘sites where various 
internationalisms, including postwar human rights principles, converged’, and which ‘brought the 
contradictions between colonial powers’ discursive utterances of “civilizing mission” and the reality 
of their repressive style of governance into stark relief’.256 The system, which was established to 
oversee the decolonization of former League of Nations mandates that had formerly been 
administered by Axis powers, represented a small but significant portion of all colonized peoples. 
During its early years, the CCIA expressed support for the trusteeship system, and in 1949, it 
supported the reference of South West Africa’s legal status to the International Court of Justice, which 
the South African government sought to prevent.257 The CCIA’s 1950 study on religious liberty 
displayed confidence in the trusteeship system, asserting that ‘petitions submitted from non-self-
governing territories under the Trusteeship System receive careful consideration’.258 Early CCIA 
reports included words of appreciation for the Trusteeship Council’s  
‘insistence upon human rights and fundamental freedoms in these [non-self-governing] territories. 
(...) The fact that the Trusteeship Council seeks the improvement of conditions among people who 
are the concern of the missionary enterprise seems to demand for this area of international action 
far more attention than it has hitherto been accorded’.259  
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After a few years, however, this endorsement of the trusteeship system disappeared from the annual 
report. A possible explanation for this would be that the trusteeship system proved a disappointment, 
as colonial states effectively barred the application of human rights to colonial territories and 
maintained repressive policies.260 
 The question of the ecumenical movement’s response to colonial violence is one that goes 
beyond the scope of the present work, but it is clear that denunciations of such violence in terms of 
human rights were at most a minor part of the CCIA’s activities.261 Responding to the repressive 
policies of colonial governments towards anticolonial resistance, such as in Algeria or in Kenya, was 
left primarily to the churches of the imperial power in question. Such churches adhered to a range of 
opinions, and though the ecumenical movement represented churches that were more critical of 
empire than others, their criticism tended to be relatively muted.262 Given the emphasis on the national 
level as the proper one for dealing with decolonization, the CCIA was unlikely to go over the heads 
of its national constituents. For example, in the case of the Algerian War, a conflict which ‘prompted 
the first mass petitions to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva’, the WCC focused on the 
importance of dialogue as central to decolonization, while the CCIA called for ‘a just, peaceful and 
democratic settlement’, stopping well short of calling for self-determination.263 And while the CCIA 
was heavily involved in the case of Cyprus, working hard to salvage negotiations for independence as 
British forces met Cypriot insurgency with escalating violence, its reports did not reference Greece’s 
1956-1957 complaints to the European Court of Human Rights and its assertion of human rights 
violations and even crimes against humanity at the UN.264 When violence erupted in Cyprus in the 
years following its independence in 1960, on the other hand, the WCC Central Committee ‘called 
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upon all countries concerned to conform their actions to international standards of human rights in 
such manner as to command respect in the international community’.265 Though a gradual rise in the 
salience of human rights in the intervening years may help account for this change in discourse, it also 
suggests that ecumenists understood the language of human rights to be disruptive to ongoing 
negotiations for independence, regardless of simultaneously ongoing violence, on which they sought 
to avoid taking sides. Once independence had been established, however, the WCC deployed human 
rights language in defense of the state’s integrity. In this sense, human rights served as a tool to 
preserve order, not to upset it. 
 
Missionaries, postcolonial constitutions and Islam 
Compared to metropolitan churches, missionaries in dependent territories frequently sought 
to distance themselves from the imperial structures that had enabled much of their work in the first 
place.266 Given the close entanglement between mission, nation, and empire during the late-nineteenth 
century era of ‘high colonialism’, mid-twentieth century missionary critiques of empire were the 
outcome of a long trajectory.267 World War I had shaken missionaries’ confidence in Europe’s moral 
standing, as it had that of the extra-European world. As Stuart has noted, towards the war’s end, 
Protestant missionaries had begun to lobby for official recognition of the ‘supranationality’ of 
missions, in hopes of avoiding territorial restrictions on missionary work, arising from interstate strife. 
In subsequent years they also had also begun to encourage the indigenization of non-Western church 
leadership.268 During the interwar period, many ecumenists came to see imperialism as arising from 
nationalism, which the universal church was meant to restrain. Michael G. Thompson has shown how 
the 1937 Oxford conference made this connection.269 The International Missionary Council (IMC), 
founded in 1921 under the leadership of the British Joseph H. Oldham, led the way in softening 
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borders between missionaries (it would be integrated into the WCC in 1961) and loosening the 
connection between imperial power and Christian mission.  
Then, the Second World War delivered another crushing blow to European claims of 
civilizational and racial superiority, stimulating further reflection on the relationship between empire 
and mission. Udi Greenberg has argued that it was the desire of ecumenists like Malik and WCC 
General Secretary W. A. Visser ‘t Hooft to restore Europe’s Christian character that led them to 
believe that Christianity would have to extricate itself both from nationalism at home and imperialism 
abroad.270 As Gene Zubovich has argued, the confrontation with communism and its real and 
perceived appeal to colonized peoples, moreover, forced ecumenical Christians to come to terms with 
their ties to empire. If communism represented a threat because of its materialism, its promise of 
universal equality also forced Protestants to scrutinize their own connections to the racialized 
hierarchies inherent in imperial rule.271  
For missionaries, the imperative to disassociate themselves from empire became stronger as 
prospects for independence drew closer. If they were to have any hope of continuing their work in 
postcolonial societies they would have to redeem themselves from the affiliation with colonialism.272 
According to the missionary historian Adrian Hastings, the IMC and the WCC, as well as the Catholic 
Congregation de Propaganda Fide, were the most important bodies worldwide in cultivating a turn 
away from ‘missionary nationalism’.273 At the same time, missionaries by no means abandoned their 
work, which, beyond personal salvation, was understood to have implications for international order. 
As Charles W. Ranson, the Irish general secretary of the IMC, said at the CCIA’s 1949 symposium on 
international affairs, ‘the world is not likely to become more moral than it has been until it becomes 
more Christian than it is’.274 Thus, missionaries could be simultaneously chastened by the past while a 
strong sense of purpose drove them to begin rethinking mission for a postcolonial age.275 
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The missionary movement saw itself beset by threats. At its 1928 Jerusalem conference, the 
IMC had defined its principal opponent: ‘secularism’. ‘Secularism’ was understood as not merely 
‘neutrality’ towards the gospel but classified as a religion in its own right – a rejection of the church 
that led inexorably to ‘nihilism’ and ‘totalitarianism’.276 At its 1947 Whitby conference, the IMC built 
on this analysis and specified the three enemies against which secularism would leave the world 
defenseless: ‘militant communism, resurgent Islam, and political Roman Catholicism’.277 Each of these 
sought to impose a ‘totalitarian system’ on society, defined by the conference as one ‘which claims an 
absolute and unrestricted loyalty, regards difference of opinions as sedition, and refuses liberty of 
belief and practise to those who are not of one mind with itself’.278 Ecumenical Christians would have 
to respond to the ‘totalitarianism’ of its opponents with one of its own, but of a different, transcendent 
kind: ‘wholehearted loyalty to God in Christ’.279  
But this embrace of a higher loyalty did not mean that the IMC shunned secular instruments, 
on the contrary: at its September 1948 meeting, it welcomed the draft Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and called for it to be developed into an international ‘Bill of Rights’, while simultaneously 
adopting the ‘Declaration on Religious Liberty’ of the WCC’s Amsterdam Assembly a month earlier.280 
This was not the first time the IMC drew on the language of human rights: as Stuart has observed, 
missionaries had described religious liberty as a ‘human right’ as early as the 1928 Jerusalem 
conference. Yet at this time, they had still paired it with a second ‘human right’: ‘the maintenance by 
each nation of law and order for all within its bounds’.281 This second right stood in tension with the 
notion of international intervention in the name of human rights. It was only through the 1937 Oxford 
conference that religious freedom was connected with human rights as a principle of international 
order, as religious freedom was put forward as a condition for the legitimacy of states: ‘an essential 
element in a better international order is freedom of religion’.282 From there on, as Stuart writes, 
missionary concern for religious liberty ‘became part of a much larger cause – that of human rights’.283 
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Yet while the IMC, like the WCC, expressed support for ‘all the essential freedoms of man, whether 
personal, political or social’, its agenda would remain focused on religious freedom, where there 
existed a far greater consensus among its constituents than on questions related to other rights.284 
Armed with ecumenical articulations of religious liberty, cast in the idiom of human rights, the 
missionary movement sought to safeguard its position, and that of Christian minorities more generally, 
in decolonizing countries. In the post-war period, during which processes of decolonization 
accelerated, the CCIA assisted numerous constituents in lobbying for constitutional provisions in line 
with the Universal Declaration’s Article 18 and ecumenical statements on religious freedom. The 
CCIA distributed two documents widely to church leaders, one providing advice on how to lobby for 
religious freedom in constitutions and one providing an overview of recently adopted provisions.285 
In a 1961 article on religious liberty, Nolde argued that human rights could be most effectively 
protected through ‘the mind and will of the people as reflected in constitutions, law, courts, and 
practice. It follows that action to promote the observance of human rights, if it is to be meaningful, 
must be domestic.’ He saw international action as complementary to this, especially ‘the very 
knowledge that the eyes of the world are upon the local scene and that world public opinion is 
increasingly ready to condemn or to commend’.286 This was in line with the CCIA’s established views. 
In its 1950 study on dominant religions, the CCIA had written that in ‘almost all’ cases of religious 
discrimination, the ‘problem is essentially a domestic one and direct interference by an outside 
interested party is often resented and may be harmful’. Nevertheless, an ‘international standard can 
have domestic effect when enough people within a given community endorse the standard or desire 
to avoid the international embarrassment which is experienced when domestic practice is out of 
line’.287 This did not mean that Nolde, who continued to work for the development of the UN 
Covenants on human rights, did not envision a future in which a more robust international 
enforcement system would exist. But in his view, writing in 1961, truly effective measures for 
international enforcement would only ‘be attainable in proportion to the achievement of an international 
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ethos’.288 While the CCIA had been tasked for years with developing ecumenical thought on such an 
‘ethos’, it never succeeded in producing significant results.289 And while ‘inter-governmental action’ 
could in some cases be helpful, Nolde recognized its present results were ‘quite meagre’.290 Thus, given 
the importance of the domestic sphere and the impotence of international instruments, the most 
promising approach was one that focused on anchoring religious freedom within a society rather than 
counting on international pressure for protection. 
Achieving this still required international activity, of course, and thus, in practice, the CCIA’s 
activity straddled the domestic and the international spheres. Through its activity in influencing 
constitutions, the ecumenical movement sought to inject its ideals directly into the groundwater of the 
domestic sphere. A key area of ecumenical concern for religious freedom was in majority Muslim 
societies in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.291 This section discusses two key cases in which 
ecumenical human rights discourse played a role in negotiating the future relationship between 
Muslims and Protestants in majority Muslim countries: Indonesia and Nigeria. Each represented a 
large Muslim population (in Indonesia’s case, the world’s largest). While in Indonesia, ecumenists’ 
initial success soon faced setbacks, the protections of religious freedom applied in Nigeria were 
emulated in numerous other countries emerging from British colonialism. 
 
Religious freedom and the Indonesian Revolution 
In late August 1945, the newly proclaimed Republican government in Jakarta adopted a 
constitution that had been drafted before the Japanese surrender, by the Japanese-established 
Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence. The constitution was ‘short and skeletal (…) 
more like notes for a constitution than a comprehensive basis for a new state’.292 The Committee had 
initially envisioned an obligation in the constitution’s preamble for Muslims to abide by Islamic law 
(part of the so-called Jakarta Charter) as well as the requirement that the head of state should be a 
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Muslim. According to M. C. Ricklefs, a warning from the Japanese Navy ‘that Christian Indonesians 
in its area would disapprove of any special role for Islam’ led nationalist leaders to abandon these 
proposals, though they would come back to haunt the government in the late 1950s.293 In Article 29, 
the constitution established the religious foundation of the state in language acceptable to both 
Christians and Muslims, and set out a provision for freedom of religion: ‘The State is based on the 
belief in the Divine Omnipotence. (…) The State guarantees the freedom of every resident to profess 
his own religion and to worship according to his religion and belief.’294 
Facing the prospect of independence, Christians in Indonesia were apprehensive about their 
future as a small and in many places tiny religious minority. As Hans van de Wal has described, at an 
August 1946 meeting on the future of mission in Indonesia, the sociologist and missionary pastor C. 
L. van Doorn argued that Dutch Christians should avoid taking a defensive posture. This would 
require them not to cloister themselves or to adopt an air of superiority but instead to join Indonesians 
‘“in the establishment of an Indonesian state, governed by the rule of law”, guided by the gospel’.295 
However, the second speaker, the missionary consul J. C. Hoekendijk, focused on the issue of religious 
freedom, on the basis of a memorandum drafted on his initiative by the ecumenical Contact Commissie 
Kerk en Zending (Church and Mission Contact Commission). This memorandum expressed worries 
about the possibility of Islamic pressure outside the main islands of Java and Sumatra. In his 
accompanying address, Hoekendijk cited historical examples from the Middle East in which Christians 
were relegated to second-class citizenship and gave an overview of ecumenical discussions on the issue 
of religious freedom.296 
The memorandum was sent to Lt. Governor-General H. J. van Mook, the head of the Dutch 
East Indies government. The churches and missionaries quoted as their point of departure the 1944 
San Francisco statement of the American Joint Committee on Religious Liberty (JCRL), a precursor 
to the Universal Declaration’s Article 18. They explicitly rejected the possibility of safeguarding 
religious freedom through a system of minority rights, because history had shown ‘that the 
maintenance of the rights of a minority in fact never rises above permitting the status quo to be 
maintained’, whereas religion contained a ‘dynamic element’, as revealed through its ‘missionary-
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expansionary character’.297 The letter then went on to invoke the UN Charter’s provisions for religious 
freedom, which the letter asserted went beyond freedom of worship to include observance, 
organization, and (missionary) activities, within the boundaries of the law. The Charter in fact merely 
mentioned religion in its non-discrimination clauses, but the UN’s involvement in the Dutch-
Indonesian conflict after January 1946 made it a salient point of reference. The authors also 
distinguished between a set of six rights that the church was due as a religious body, from the 
establishment of its own liturgy to the freedom to carry out philanthropic work, and five rights of 
individual believers, including the right to change one’s religion and to spread one’s faith through 
witness and education (stopping short of an explicit right to propagate or evangelize). The call to 
recognize the corporate rights of the church reflected the legacy of pre-war ecumenical statements on 
religious freedom, coming ahead of the Amsterdam Assembly’s greater emphasis on the individual 
believer in its ‘Declaration on Religious Liberty’. 
From 1-12 October 1946, the Dutch East-Indies government held a conference at which it 
solicited the views of minorities on their future in a federal Indonesia. The Dutch theologian J. Verkuyl 
made an appeal not only to religious freedom but to ‘human rights’, while referring to the UN Charter 
and the JCRL’s statement.298 According to Hoekendijk, as a result of Verkuyl’s efforts ‘the short 
Statement on Religious Liberty was officially adopted as a general directive’.299 In November, Verkuyl 
and Hoekendijk’s replacement, U.H. van Beyma, again petitioned the Dutch East-Indies government, 
this time more specifically to safeguard religious freedom in the future Indonesian constitution.300 
The efforts by Dutch missionaries seem to have turned from the Dutch to the Indonesians 
since, in the November 1946 Linggadjati Agreement, it was agreed that drafting the provisional 
constitution would be up to the Indonesians.301 Hoekendijk recollected that after an address on 
religious liberty that he had given at a missionary conference in Batavia in August 1946, a number of 
‘the Indonesians present took this address with them to Eastern Indonesia [with its substantial 
Christian populations] and accepted the statement with our interpretation’. He also wrote that ‘the 
memoranda prepared by our group found there [sic] way through under ground [sic] channels to 
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Djokja [Yogyakarta]’, the Republican capital. And Hoekendijk recounted, with pride, that he and 
colleagues including Verkuyl had successfully introduced the JCRL’s statement on religious liberty 
‘into one of the recommendations of an [unspecified] official political meeting’, a fact which they had 
then referenced to build further support. He also noted the particular utility of having an ecumenical 
statement to which they could refer: ‘We never gave it in Dutch and always pointed to the fact that 
this was not a Western, but an ecumenical principle.’302  
Between 1947 and 1949, the Netherlands undertook two major military offensives to quash 
the Republic of Indonesia, severely damaging the prospects of future bilateral relations and prompting 
international outrage. Dutch missionaries were more critical of these developments than the vast 
majority of churches in the Netherlands, leading to conflict with those who refused to acknowledge 
the legitimacy of Indonesians’ desire for full-fledged independence. At the same time, they continued 
their efforts to promote religious freedom in the federal constitution. In a 1949 memorandum, the 
ecumenical Raad voor de Zending [Missionary Council] quoted Searle Bates’ 1945 A Study of Religious 
Liberty – Hoekendijk, who had received a copy from the American missionary leader A. L. Warnshuis 
after a 1945 visit to New York, would later say it had been ‘our textbook’303 – which stated that 
Indonesia’s Muslims ‘are less fanatical than the more intense people of the Near East’. Yet while the 
Dutch missionaries agreed, they held that ‘throughout all of Islam there [is] visible a certain inclination, 
tendency, with regard to the way in which the community of Christ is approached’.304 Protestants saw 
a desire to enable government restriction of missionary activity in attempts by the Indonesian Muslim 
Party to preserve a legal provision known as article 177, which required the Governor-General to give 
missionaries permission to operate in a given area.305 Another indicator was a recent parliamentary 
session in the Negara Indonesia Timur, the Dutch-established ‘State of East Indonesia’, in which 
Muslims, joined by Bali Hindus, had passed a law that allowed the interdiction of missionary activity 
if it threatened ‘public order’.306 For the missionaries, abandoning evangelization was not an option, 
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because ‘this would mean the death of the church (…). So this freedom will have to be fought for 
continuously.’307   
The arsenal from which missionaries drew the weapons to fight for their conception of 
religious freedom was, as in 1946, largely provided by the ecumenical movement’s work on religious 
liberty, now expanded with the Amsterdam Assembly’s 1948 declaration, the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights, and a WCC document about ‘The Marxist Conception of Religious Liberty’ (the 
inclusion of this cautionary assessment reflected concerns that communism might become a major 
force in Indonesian politics). Most importantly, the Raad indicated its support for the religious 
freedom provisions suggested for the future Indonesian constitution by Verkuyl in his 1948 
dissertation.308 The memorandum claimed that Verkuyl’s proposal ‘certainly was a source of 
inspiration in [the constitution of the] N[egara].I[ndonesia].T[imur]’, the provisions of which were also 
provided in full. Verkuyl’s proposal included the freedom to evangelize and the right to change one’s 
religion. According to the Raad it was a ‘maximum elaboration of the the [sic] definition of San 
Francisco’. While its full adoption was considered unlikely, it was considered the ideal outcome for 
which to strive.309 
At the July 1949 Inter-Indonesian Conference in Yogyakarta and Batavia, the Republican and 
Federalist factions among the Indonesians worked out a provisional constitution, in which they 
decided to include the full text of the Universal Declaration’s Article 18.310 The Dutch accepted this 
draft without significant change at the Round Table Conference in October.311 Nolde observed that 
the 1949 constitution’s provisions on human rights were ‘encouraging’.312 This constitution lasted only 
a few months, as the federal state was overturned in favour of a unitary one, but it was the basis on 
which the 1950 provisional constitution was drafted.313  
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Yet while both the 1949 and 1950 constitutions included human rights provisions based on 
the Universal Declaration, the 1950 constitution was far less explicit regarding freedom of religion. 
While the 1949 constitution had copied the Universal Declaration’s Article 18, the 1950 constitution 
truncated the language to focus only on ‘inner’ freedom: ‘Everyone is entitled to freedom of religion, 
conscience, and thought.’ A separate provision, Article 43, maintained language from the 1949 
constitution on the religious nature of the state and religious freedom. The government claimed that 
the two articles combined sufficiently covered ‘the intention of’ the Universal Declaration’s Article 
18, in allowing for evangelization, the right to change one’s religion, and parental choice in religious 
education.314 Ecumenical Christians worried, however, that the freedom to ‘profess’ one’s religion and 
the only implicit recognition of the right to change one’s religion constituted a substantial reduction 
in the scope of the freedom to manifest religion in Indonesian society. Questioned in parliament, 
Prime Minister Mohammed Hatta explained that the article had been shortened because the previous 
formulation ‘could be interpreted as a kind of recommendation to change one’s religion’, as a church 
periodical reported; it added the supposition that Muslim pressure likely explained the change.315  
Religious freedom remained contested through the 1950s.316 Even before the constitutional 
change, Dutch ecumenists saw the newly established Ministry of Religion as ‘nothing but a Ministry 
for Moslem Interests’.317 When the process of formulating a permanent constitution began in the late 
1950s, Indonesian Christian representatives, both Protestant and Catholic, pushed for the insertion of 
the Universal Declaration’s Article 18.318 Indonesian Christian leaders such as Rev. W. J. Rumambi 
and J. C. T. Simorangkir, who were also leaders of the Indonesian Council of Churches (founded in 
1950), participated in the debates and called for the secular nature of the state to be maintained.319 
These debates became deadlocked, because Islamic representatives attempted to insert the Jakarta 
Charter’s phrase on Islamic law while others resisted this.320 Meanwhile, Sukarno proposed the 
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establishment of a governmental system termed ‘Guided Democracy’, and in 1957 he effectively 
suspended the constitution. On 5 July 1959 Sukarno reinstated the 1945 constitution by decree and 
stated that the Jakarta Charter did not form a legal part of the constitution, thus ensuring the secular 
character of the state.321 Yet the return to the 1945 constitution meant a further reduction in the 
constitutional protection of religious freedom and a blow to ecumenical aspirations (as well as a 
general slide into authoritarianism). 
  
Kenneth Grubb and religious freedom in Northern Nigeria 
Nigeria, and especially Northern Nigeria, was an important focus of the CCIA’s work in the 
1950s, because of the missionary and Christian minority interests there. While the country as a whole 
was characterized by significant religious diversity, including large Christian populations, the North 
was almost two-thirds Muslim, with most others ‘following their tribal beliefs and a small Christian 
minority’.322 The CCIA had a long-established connection with the churches through the Christian 
Council in Nigeria (founded in 1930). This section focuses on the role of the ecumenical movement 
in bringing about Nigeria’s 1959 bill of rights, which included provisions on religious liberty in line 
with ecumenical desiderata. Once the constitution had enshrined religious freedom, ecumenical 
leaders in independent Nigeria saw in these provisions a key instrument to preserve ‘the right to 
propagate our faith’ (at least until the military coup in 1966, which is beyond the scope of this 
chapter).323 
While constitution-making in Nigeria had a long history, with respect to human rights, it 
entered a new phase in the 1950s. In 1953, the Methodist Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of the 
Action Group, which represented Nigeria’s Western Region, had taken the initiative in crafting a bill 
of rights for Nigeria. A London-trained lawyer, as well as a teacher and trade union leader, Awolowo 
enlisted the support of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, which controlled the 
Eastern Region, led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. (It should be noted that Azikiwe, who would go on to 
become Nigeria’s first president, had already in August 1943 initiated a document on ‘The Atlantic 
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Charter and British West Africa’, which, according to Anderson, ‘laid out a human rights agenda for 
the “post-war reconstruction of the colonies and protectorates” of Ghana, Nigeria, Gambia, and Sierra 
Leone’, aimed at developing them into ‘“full-fledged democratic States”’.324) Awolowo and Azikiwe’s 
joint proposal drew inspiration from the Indian constitution (which had in turn drawn inspiration 
from the United States) and included provisions on the freedom of religion. However, the Northern 
Region opposed the idea of a bill of rights and the Colonial Office’s view at the time was that bills of 
rights were ineffective or even dangerous. According to Stanley De Smith, the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, Oliver Lyttelton, responded to the proposal of a bill of rights ‘by laughing the idea out 
of the conference room’.325 By 1955, however, as described by Charles Parkinson, the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies and the Governor General of Nigeria had both been replaced by officials more 
sympathetic to bills of rights. The new Governor General, Sir James Robertson, also convinced the 
Northern People’s Congress that a bill of rights could protect the population of the Northern Region 
from discrimination by the southern regions. Thus, the alignment of forces had shifted and the notion 
of a bill of rights started gaining traction. At this time, the Christian Council of Churches in Nigeria 
and the CCIA, especially its chairman, Grubb – who was also the President of the Anglican Church 
Missionary Society – began to push for the inclusion of religious freedom, which would result in its 
inclusion in the 1959 bill of rights.326 
Ecumenical efforts to include the Universal Declaration’s Article 18 in Nigerian constitutional 
provisions got underway in 1955, as the records of a meeting between Grubb, Nigerian church and 
missionary representatives, and the regional government of the North illustrate.327 It seems likely that 
such representations were what the Northern Region’s governor referred to when he notified the 
Colonial Office, in August 1955, that ‘people were nervous about the prospect of early self-
government and the absence, so far, of a Northern “Declaration of Human Rights” with particular 
regard for religious freedom’. Parkinson credits this missive with setting in motion the Colonial 
Office’s acceptance of the need for constitutional protection of religious freedom, though it did not 
yet want a bill of rights.328 Subsequently, Grubb had lunch with Tom Williamson, the lead on Nigerian 
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affairs in the Colonial Office’s West Africa Department, who showed him the draft proposal for a 
constitution for Northern Nigeria. Grubb made two points regarding religious liberty, namely the need 
to secure freedom to change one’s religion and the right of parents to choose their children’s religious 
instruction, both of which were favourably received. However, reporting on the approach, Grubb 
noted an important reservation made by Williamson, who had said that he and his colleagues ‘did not 
like to proceed “by reference to the Declaration of Human Rights” but preferred an approach by 
reference to constitutional provisions which may be obtainable in other colonial constitutions’. 
Specifically, he had in mind the Sudan Self-Government Statute. Williamson ‘attributed this attitude 
to a general dislike both among parliamentarians and higher officials at the Colonial Office to the 
activities of the United Nations in regard to dependent peoples’, an attitude that reflected a dislike of 
international scrutiny and an attachment to established colonial legislation. Nevertheless, Grubb 
pressed Williamson to promise that he would ‘study Article 18 and other relevant articles in the 
Declaration’.329 
Article 18 did make its way into Colonial Office policy, after a church and missionary 
delegation met with John Hare, the Minister of State (standing in for the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies), on 16 July 1956. The delegation was led by representatives of the British Council of 
Churches and the International Missionary Council, but also included Grubb, the Rev. Canon C.A. 
Forster, Secretary of the Christian Council in Nigeria, and the heads of the Overseas Council of the 
Church of England and the Free Church Federal Council. Though the CCIA archives do not include 
minutes of the meeting, a document prepared by the British Council of Churches – an important 
constituent of the WCC – setting out its requests, opened with a call to include Universal Declaration 
Articles 18 and 19 into the federal and regional constitutions being prepared for Nigeria, with special 
reference to the North, because of its government’s ‘substantial Muslim majority’. A line at the end 
noted that while the CCIA ‘has been kept informed (…) [it] seemed more convenient to make the 
present approach through the British Council of Churches’.330 The meeting prompted the Colonial 
Office to add the Universal Declaration’s rights to change one’s religion and to propagate it to the 
religious freedom provision of the Sudan Self-Government Statute. Pressure from the three Nigerian 
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regions at the 1957 constitutional conference then contributed to the expansion of this minimalist 
commitment into a full-fledged bill of rights, a departure from long-established British policy.331 
The following year, Grubb spent almost a month in Nigeria. In his report on religious liberty 
he wrote that Nigeria was ‘the key area in Christian/Moslem confrontation in Africa’. Grubb worried 
that in the North, with its majority Muslim population, unlike in the East or the West, ‘the new 
nationalism’ might ‘turn against the missionary from overseas’. Meeting with Ahmadu Bello, the 
premier of Northern Nigeria, Grubb asked him to confirm the right to change one’s religion, to which 
Bello ‘emphatically’ assented while voicing a qualification with respect to ‘law and order’. Grubb felt 
that Bello’s expressed support for rights and freedoms was ‘probably only words’. At a subsequent 
meeting, the Acting Governor of Northern Nigeria indicated that he shared Grubb’s skepticism.332 
In Lagos, Grubb met with the newly established Minorities Commission, headed by Henry 
Willink, which had been tasked with addressing calls for minority protections. The otherwise pressured 
and overburdened body indicated that it was eager to receive a memorandum from the Christian 
Council in Nigeria. With Grubb’s assistance in drafting, the Council sent a memorandum to the 
Commission in December 1957, expressing its desire that ‘the Federal and Regional constitutions of 
our country should contain satisfactory guarantees of human rights and freedoms’, in the interests of 
‘the peaceful development of the country and the religious interests of all’, given its nature as a ‘multi-
communal state’. It echoed ecumenical wording in asserting that in such a society, ‘no religion should 
claim or possess rights, privileges, or freedoms which are denied to any other religion’. The appeal 
listed seven specific religious rights, including the freedom to change one’s religion, the freedom of 
parents to choose their children’s religious education, and the freedom ‘to establish and operate 
institutions for religious and charitable purposes’, all long-standing priorities of the CCIA. The 
Christian Council followed up these religious rights with a set of four more general human rights, 
most importantly non-discrimination: ‘the equality of all before the law, regardless of race, tribe, 
religion, or sex’. The document clearly showed the influence of the CCIA, through the focus on 
particular religious rights and the actual wording, as well as through their connection to human rights 
in general.333 
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The intervention by Grubb and his Nigerian-based colleagues dovetailed with the interests of 
the Minorities Commission and the Colonial Office. The report of the Willink Commission made 
repeated reference to the ‘Christian bodies’ that had made representations on ‘certain fundamental 
rights’, which it singled out for positive comment, as opposed to ‘almost all the witnesses’, who ‘were 
insistent that nothing but a separate state could meet their problems’. These ‘Christian bodies’ were 
in fact only Grubb and the Christian Council in Nigeria, since no other group had called for a bill of 
rights as a means of protecting minorities.334 The Commission’s report adhered closely to the 
desiderata put forward in the Council’s memorandum. The drafters of the proposed bill of rights had 
not taken the Universal Declaration as a source but instead (in the absence of a British bill of rights) 
drawn on the European Convention on Human Rights. However, since the latter’s Article 9 was 
virtually identical to the Universal Declaration’s provision, this mattered little with respect to religious 
freedom. The Minorities Commission also included two clauses on religious education borrowed from 
the Pakistani constitution. Strikingly, the report even went on to list six religious rights that it 
recommended be specifically taken up in drafting the constitution, a list apparently lifted almost 
directly from the Council’s memorandum.335 While the Colonial Office refused to take up these latter 
rights, for fear of incurring Muslim outrage, the remaining protections fulfilled ecumenical hopes.336 
The Nigerian bill of rights then served as a model for many other British overseas territories obtaining 
independence: Sierra Leone, Jamaica, Uganda, Kenya, Malta, British Guiana, Aden, and Nyasaland (of 
Commonwealth countries, only Ghana and Tanganyika did not enact ‘justiciable bills of rights’).337 
Thus, the activities of the CCIA and the Council of Christian Churches in Nigeria had obtained a 
major coup in securing religious freedom provisions in decolonizing countries. 
 
Conclusions 
Although the above account has shown how missionaries used the secular language of UN human 
rights to protect their interests, it would be wrong to assume that they therefore abandoned religiously-
grounded conceptions of religious liberty. Among missionaries operating in majority Muslim 
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countries, religious freedom continued to be conceived of as a fundamentally Christian principle, as 
illustrated by a 1965 consultation held in Jerusalem, on ‘Religious Liberty in Muslim Lands’. The 
American Rev. Melvin Wittler, Field Secretary of the Near East Mission of the United Church Board 
for World Ministries, praised the studies and statements of the WCC, and emphasized the 
fundamentally Christian basis of religious liberty, as an ‘implication of the Christian faith’, namely ‘the 
freedom which God has given man’. In contrast, from ‘the juridical point of view, religious liberty is 
a fundamental human right’. What this meant for the basis of Muslim-Christian relations remained 
ambiguous, however. Participants felt that the secular conception of religious liberty was not a 
sufficient basis for ‘inter-religious dialogue between Christians and Muslims’, but ‘it may be the means 
by which Christians and Muslims come to understand liberty’.338 This tension between pragmatic 
coexistence on a secular basis and the promise of more deep-rooted mutual understanding through 
what would come to be called interfaith dialogue calls for further study. What this chapter suggests, 
however, is that the ecumenical movement’s advocacy of religious liberty, based on its fear of the 
‘totalitarian’ potential of Islam in postcolonial societies, stood in tension with the desire to extricate 
itself from the legacies of empire and build new foundations for Muslim-Christian relations. 
How did religious liberty change through its integration into human rights? For one, it meant 
that ecumenical advocates of human rights were led to place greater emphasis on individual violations 
of religious freedom than had earlier systems for protecting religious liberty, such as the League of 
Nations’ Minority Protection Regime.339 At the same time, as Lindkvist has noted, the churches 
continued to draw attention to corporate rights, which were an essential part of their underlying 
conception of religious liberty, and thus went beyond the limits of what the UN’s formulation 
contained.340 The metamorphosis of religious freedom into a human right arguably made ecumenical 
advocacy of religious liberty more acceptable to non-Christian audiences, broadening its definition 
beyond merely Christian privileges. The process of indigenization of missionary work and its 
integration into indigenous church structures also contributed to changing the question of religious 
freedom from one of protecting foreign missionaries and churchmen to one of protecting indigenous 
Christians. Assessing the effects of these changes is beyond this study, but it seems evident that the 
outcome depended a great deal on local circumstances and politics. Nevertheless, it would seem 
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plausible that the recasting of religious liberty in universal and secular terms facilitated dialogue with 
other religions as well as with non-believers. At the same time, as Lindkvist has emphasized, and as 
critics have also pointed out, the formulation of Article 18 was geared to serve particular concerns, 
such as the freedom to evangelize, and not others.341 The curtailment of the 1949 Indonesian 
constitution’s provisions demonstrated that the country’s Muslim majority found this formulation 
unacceptable. 
In relation to the historiography of human rights, it is worth dwelling here on the categories 
of the national, international, and transnational. In the sense that the ecumenical movement pursued 
a ‘universal community of faith that would recognise no distinctions based on nation, race, or class’, 
it transcended other categories.342 But the category of the nation in fact remained of great importance, 
both because spiritual fellowship was never meant to altogether repudiate political allegiances and 
because supranational schemes of governance, embodied most hopefully by the UN, did not come 
close to substituting for them. The CCIA’s focus on establishing constitutional religious freedom 
provisions testifies to the priority it accorded to the domestic sphere, whereas international human 
rights politics could only be hoped to play a corrective role. As Nolde’s thinking on the subject 
showed, the CCIA ascribed positive value to domestic human rights provisions, since these more 
securely anchored religious freedom than international enforcement could. Intergovernmental action 
could be called for when, in spite of this, religious freedom was violated – a possibility the CCIA was 
all too aware of – but ‘world public opinion’ could only play a supplementary role. The ecumenical 
movement’s transnational engagement to insert the UN-approved conception of religious freedom 
into the groundwater of newly independent states thus complicates the distinction often made in the 
historiography of human rights between international and national rights language: in the context of 
Nigeria and Indonesia, international standards were anchored in a domestic context. The relative 
power of ecumenical lobbying efforts in this context helps account for this outcome – as the next 
chapter shows, when faced with more powerful and unified opposition, it had to fall back on attempts 
at dialogue, coupled with efforts at generating internal and external pressure.  
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3. ‘Error has no rights’: religious freedom in 
Spain from the Second World War through 
the Second Vatican Council 
‘[I]t is true that two weights and two measures must be used: one for truth and the other for error’.343 
Cardinal Ottaviani, 1953 
‘Ecumenical and other church bodies should continue to maintain that there can be room for a 
normal existence for a Protestant minority in an officially Roman Catholic state, especially when the 
latter is committed to the Charter of the United Nations’.344 – Report on the view of the Legal 
Commission of the Union Theological Seminary in Madrid, 1956 
Introduction 
In fascist Spain, the World Council of Churches (WCC) faced an opponent whose 
intransigence rivaled that of the Soviet Union – but which was Christian. According to John Pollard, 
after the Second World War the Vatican was ‘not fully reconciled’ to liberal democracy and saw Spain 
and Portugal, in particular, as ‘“ideal” Catholic states’.345 The tiny Protestant minorities of these 
countries were branded suspect, partly due to allegations of collusion with international communism. 
But fundamentally, Protestantism was perceived as a threat to the moral foundations of Catholic 
societies, in which the Church played a prominent and pervasive role – in the case of Spain, as the 
state religion. Protestants could thus not be allowed religious freedom, and certainly not as a human 
right, as the WCC had claimed religious freedom should be recognized. As Pollard writes, ‘[u]ntil the 
end of Pius XII’s reign [in 1958], the Vatican remained uncomfortable with and suspicious of human 
rights: they smacked too much of nineteenth-century liberalism.’ He continues: ‘[t]he human “right” 
which really troubled the papacy was, of course, in relation to religion. (…) All this was based on a 
long-held and long-practised conviction that “error has no rights”.’346 In line with this, on 2 March 
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1953, Cardinal Ottaviani, Pro-Secretary of the Congregation of the Holy Office, gave a speech on ‘The 
Duties of the Catholic State Toward Religion’, which ‘aroused world-wide interest’. Ottaviani referred 
to the WCC’s Amsterdam Assembly as an example of Protestant disunity. He argued for an expansive 
meaning of religious freedom for Catholics and a reduced freedom for others: ‘it is true that two 
weights and two measures must be used: one for truth and the other for error’. In a surprising twist, 
Ottaviani then invoked the language of human rights, but in a way directly opposed to the meaning 
the ecumenical movement attributed to it: ‘[n]o one should be astounded that the Church, wherever 
Divine Rights are ignored, invokes, at the very least, respect for Human Rights’.347 In this rendering, 
human rights meant the right to be Catholic. 
Historians have recently begun excavating Catholic human rights discourse from the 1930s to 
the 1950s. Often, they have argued for the conservative and deeply religious nature of this discourse, 
so as to challenge established narratives that stress the supposedly secular and progressive origins of 
postwar human rights politics.348 But while such studies have yielded much insight into the era’s 
political landscape, connecting the 1930s to the postwar period, less attention has been paid to the 
very different politics of the ecumenical movement. Although Protestants shared with Catholics an 
aversion to ‘secularism’, particularly in the form of communism, which threatened Europe’s spiritual 
and moral character, across the continent great hostility between the two confessions remained. As 
Udi Greenberg writes: ‘The Cold War may have helped lead Catholics to the language of human rights 
in the name of combatting Communism, as some have claimed, but this did not automatically 
necessitate increasing tolerance for other churches or accepting state neutrality in religious matters.’349 
While Greenberg’s analysis deals with this question from the Catholic side of the equation, the present 
chapter calls attention to the role of the predominantly Protestant ecumenical movement. Although, 
as Dianne Kirby has written in relation to the British Christian Council, ecumenists were liable to 
prioritize communist persecution over ‘the persecution of Christians by Christians’350, the World 
Council of Churches (WCC) undertook a concerted effort against Catholic intolerance as well. How 
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did the WCC approach the question of religious liberty in Catholic countries? What role did the 
concept of human rights play in this? How did WCC-Roman Catholic relations evolve with Vatican’s 
mid-1960s embrace of religious freedom and human rights? 
The chapter takes the case of Spain as the most salient example of ecumenical engagement in 
this regard, owing to the dictatorial nature of the regime there and its symbolic importance for 
Europeans in particular and the West more generally. While a number of other countries, most notably 
Italy and Colombia, also were the subject of intensive ecumenical advocacy, none received more 
attention than Spain. Of the many crimes of the Franco regime, its violation of the religious freedom 
of Spanish Protestants hit especially close to home, leading Christians – above all those in majority 
Protestant countries – to campaign on this specific issue. Given the small size of Spain’s Protestant 
minority – roughly 30,000 communicant members, though the total amount could be thrice that, on 
a population of about 30 million351 – the intensity of this effort was remarkable when compared to the 
vast scale of religious repression in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, indicating the emotional, 
symbolic, and ecumenical significance of the issue.  
Based on the archives of the WCC’s Commission of the Churches on International Affairs 
(CCIA), its Secretariat on Religious Liberty, and its Department of Inter-Church Aid, which all 
cooperated closely with regard to Spain, the chapter provides a chronological account focused on a 
set of key junctures. Its relatively extensive coverage of the source materials reflects the absence of a 
narrative account of these events thus far. The first section discusses the postwar period (1945-1953) 
and the onset of Spanish Protestant protests alongside international support. The second section 
addresses the period during which Spain’s now-consolidated regime began to ‘integrate’ into the 
international community while continuing its religious repression, especially through the closure of 
the important Evangelical Seminary in Madrid. Finally, the third section highlights ecumenical 
involvement in the creation of Spain’s 1967 Law on Religious Liberty, in the context of the Second 
Vatican Council’s Declaration on Religious Liberty and the warming of WCC-Roman Catholic ties. 
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The consolidation and contesting of ‘National-Catholicism’, 1945-1953 
Fundamental rights and legality in post-Civil War Spain 
As Julio de la Cueva has recently written, based on the work of J.M. Sanchéz and Mary Vincent, 
Spain’s Civil War (1936-1939) could be characterized as a ‘religious war’.352 Hundreds of thousands 
were killed, including thousands of Catholic clergymen who fell victim to the anticlericalism of 
revolutionary Republican factions, particularly during a wave of violence in 1936.353 The Second 
Republic had disestablished Catholicism in 1931, nationalized Catholic property, and restricted the 
Church in other ways, thus laying the foundation for a backlash under Franco, who came to power 
through what the Catholic Church supported as a ‘crusade’. In the Republic, Protestants had faced 
restrictions too, but they had gained in stature from before, and so had looked on it more kindly – 
subsequently making them suspect in the eyes of Catholics.354 From the end of the Civil War in 1939 
to the consolidation of the regime by 1953, marked by the promulgation of the new 1953 Concordat 
with the Vatican and military agreements with the United States, the Protestant minority in Spain thus 
experienced severe intolerance.355 This included instances of violence, such as attacks on services, 
which in some cases led chapels to be closed.356 Through a 1941 Agreement, Franco restored the status 
of the 1851 Concordat between Spain and the Holy See, reestablishing Catholicism as the state 
religion, to the exclusion of any other public manifestations of religion (i.e. anything beyond private 
worship).357 The regime, meanwhile, consolidated its power and invested heavily into the ideology of 
‘National-Catholicism’ and ‘Catholic Unity’, making religion central to its legitimacy. Catholicism 
became bound up with what it meant to be Spanish, and an ‘anti-Spain’, as Mary Vincent has put it, 
was imagined: ‘Catholicism was simply innate, the religious identity of Spaniards and victory in the 
Civil War confirmed National-Catholicism as the natural expression of national character.’358 The 
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Spanish Church around this time described Protestantism in Spain as a ‘snake’ that had entered the 
garden of Eden.359 
The outcome of World War II led to initial steps to recognize a limited degree of religious 
freedom for Protestants. On 16 July 1945, against the background of the Allied victory over Spain’s 
ally Nazi Germany and on the day prior to the opening of the Potsdam Conference, Franco 
promulgated the Fuero de los Españoles (Charter of the Spanish People), a distinctly Spanish 
‘Fundamental Law of the Realm’ that represented a variant of a bill of rights, aimed primarily at 
garnering international goodwill. The Potsdam Conference isolated his regime politically all the same, 
as did the United Nations, but the Fuero subsequently remained in place. The document represented 
an increase in tolerance towards Protestantism, but its provision on religious liberty elevated 
Catholicism at the expense of all other confessions: Article 6 set forth that ‘The profession and practice 
of the Catholic religion, which is that of the Spanish State, shall enjoy official protection.’ Only a 
limited freedom of conscience was allowed: ‘No one shall be disturbed because of his religious beliefs 
or the private practice of his worship.’ The third line of the article stressed the strictly private nature 
of this freedom: ‘No other outward ceremonies or demonstrations than those of the Catholic religion 
will be permitted.’360 
The Spanish Minister of Government circulated his interpretation of Article 6 on 12 
November 1945: ‘The confessions dissident from the Catholic will be able to exercise their peculiar 
cults in all Spanish territory, provided that these are limited to the interior of the respective temples.’361 
But even these rights were not protected in practice, and other Fuero articles constrained them. For 
instance, Article 16 stipulated that to open a chapel (or to move one to another building) one needed 
government approval, opening up an obvious and much-used way to restrict the spread of 
Protestantism. Moreover, the Catholic hierarchy openly resisted the notion that freedom of worship 
applied to Spanish Protestants, insisting that it only concerned foreign Protestants. The WCC reported 
that Spanish clergy inveighed against freedom of worship for Spanish Protestants by ‘radio and from 
the pulpit, but especially in the pastoral letters of bishops’, and that zealous ‘Catholic reviews’ had 
written that it was permissible to disturb Protestant services and destroy religious objects. Adhering 
to the doctrine of thesis-hypothesis, which held that Catholicism, where it was able to do so, had to 
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be the state’s religion, to the exclusion of other religions, the Spanish hierarchy acknowledged the ‘de 
facto’ existence of Protestantism, but refused to recognize it ‘de jure’.362 (The other side of the doctrine 
was that where Catholics were a minority, they could tolerate not being the established religion; 
instead, they would demand religious liberty.) Mary Vincent has written that the WCC’s 1948 
Amsterdam Assembly served as a ‘flashpoint’ to Spanish Catholics, and anti-Protestant sentiment 
reached ‘a groundswell’ around this time. The same year, the Spanish episcopate ‘produced their first 
collective pastoral letter since the Civil War, strikingly dedicated to “Protestant propaganda”’.363 The 
Spanish Protestants Fernando Cabrera and Carlos Araujo protested that this vehement declaration 
reduced ‘the element of tolerance in Art. 6’ of the Fuero to ‘a simple courtesy with regard to foreigners 
living in Spain’.364 
Against this view, the WCC at its 1950 Central Committee meeting placed those of more 
liberal, ecumenically-minded Catholics, such as the French Jesuit Rouquette: ‘Do we [Catholics] not 
seem to approve the odious aphorism … according to which Catholicism claims liberty when it is 
oppressed and refuses it to others when it is itself the strongest?’365 In a 1949 article for Theological 
Studies, the American Jesuit John Courtney Murray channeled criticism by European Catholic scholars 
and himself on the Franco regime’s religious intolerance. He wrote that Father Jacques Leclercq, of 
the University of Louvain, thought that ‘“the Church will never bless a Catholic country which would 
apply in the service of the faith a policy parallel to that which the Soviets practice in favor of their 
conceptions”’.366 Murray also cited his fellow Jesuit Max Pribilla, who had written that ‘“the Church 
cannot demand freedom for herself in one state, as a human right, and deny it in another state, 
according as Catholics are in a minority or a majority (…) [Christians] should decide spiritual matters 
with spiritual weapons”’.367 
Vincent has noted, however, that the Fuero did help to shield Protestants to a degree. 
Protestants never faced the same kind of violent repression that the Republican left did, ‘particularly 
the anarchist and communist movements’.368 Vincent argues that Protestant pastors’ respect for the 
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letter of the law was an important element in their advocacy, as they sought to establish their 
credentials as loyal citizens in order to obtain reprieve from discrimination:  
‘Many pastors energetically proclaimed their status as law-abiding Spanish citizens entitled to the 
protection of the law, a tactic that would have been simply impossible for members of the political 
opposition. Ministers seeking to reopen their chapels, for example, were scrupulous in their respect 
for legality.’369  
This being said, it was the appearance that counted: according to a 1951 meeting of the International 
Committee for the Evangelisation of Spain (an organization discussed below), ‘the majority’ of 
Protestant marriages that had overcome ‘clerical or judicial awkwardness (…) were only achieved 
through falsified papers’.370 Appealing to the Fuero was by no means a guarantee for fair treatment, but 
legal maneuvering could yield results in some cases.371 Spanish Protestants also submitted a number 
of petitions to the Spanish government, such as in 1939, 1940, 1944, and 1950. Only the latter petition 
received an answer, from Franco’s Chief of the Civil House, who appended a copy of a circular by 
which a 23 February 1948 administrative decree had been confidentially disseminated to provincial 
governors.372 This letter justified discrimination against Protestants with reference to the privileges 
accorded to Catholicism through the Fuero but also by pointing to ‘masonic centers of conspirators 
against the public order’ which had been ‘camouflaged in Protestant Chapels’ in the 1930s. This meant, 
the letter continued, that it had to be ‘made clear and precise beyond any shadow of doubt what are 
the differences between the private practice of worship by these religious bodies and respect for their 
consciences, and, on the other hand, the abuses and infringements which, under the shelter of 
tolerance, are being attempted’.373 The government thus frankly showed its commitment to restricting 
Protestantism to the private realm. 
 
Spanish Protestants and their international supporters 
Given their predicament and the lack of recourse on the domestic plane, Spanish Protestants 
sought outside support, of which the WCC would be an important source. The connections between 
Spanish Protestants and the WCC began when the latter was still in the process of formation, and 
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primarily concerned with postwar reconstruction. In 1945, three Spanish Evangelical ministers 
travelled to the WCC-in-formation in Geneva and met with the Department of Reconstruction. Then, 
at its September 1947 synod, the Evangelical Church in Spain received a representative of the WCC’s 
General Secretary, W.A. Visser ‘t Hooft, who invited them to fellowship and offered assistance in 
training theologians, through scholarships and through funds for ‘the ministry of the orphaned 
congregations and the spreading of Evangelical literature’. This offer allowed for the establishment of 
a Spanish Committee for the Reconstruction of Evangelical Work, which succeeded in opening a 
theological seminary on 3 November 1947.374 At the 1948 Amsterdam Assembly, both the 
(Presbyterian) Spanish Evangelical Church and the (Anglican) Spanish Reformed Episcopal Church, 
which had originally been one but separated in 1880, joined the WCC (this meant that the two other 
major denominations present in Spain, the Baptists and the Plymouth Brethren, as well as many 
smaller groups, remained outside of the ecumenical fellowship).375 The WCC’s Department of Inter-
Church Aid would come to provide over $50,000 per year to the Spanish churches, making up a large 
part of their budget; the Spanish Evangelical Church in the late 1950s ‘only supplied 10% of its [own] 
general budget apart from purely local expenses of lighting and heating, church buildings, etc.’.376 
The WCC soon began raising awareness about the situation in Spain. On 15 May 1950, it 
published a long statement on religious freedom in Spain, detailing the history of repression from the 
Inquisition through Franco. The document appealed to Christian love, which began with ‘genuine 
mutual respect’ and challenged the Catholic Church: if it was so sure of its truth, why not allow it to 
compete freely with other convictions? After a long discussion of the recent history of religious liberty 
in Spain and the opposing political but above all theological viewpoints, the statement ended with a 
reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Quoting in full its Articles 18 and 19 (on 
freedom of religion and of opinion and expression, respectively), the WCC wrote that the Declaration, 
‘no religious but a simple social document, points out the first step in the right direction to all religious 
groups sure enough of the truth of their faith that they have cast out all fear’.377 The statement did not 
mention the Amsterdam Assembly’s Declaration on Religious Liberty, perhaps reflecting the hostility 
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of the Vatican towards the WCC at this time (discussed in the final section): the UN’s Universal 
Declaration apparently seemed like a more promising way to establish common ground. 
In July of the same year, the CCIA’s study on ‘Religious Freedom in Face of Dominant Forces’ 
included (in its confidential section) a report on Spain and how liberalization might be achieved, from 
an anonymous source. The report highlighted the difficulties of affecting change, which could only be 
‘a slow process of patience and without clamor to try to crystallize little by little the goodwill; first of 
all to find it, then to use it (…) But it naturally is necessary to be very prudent.’ Therefore, it was 
‘essential that Spanish Protestants do not mix in politics and try to be good citizens, whenever that 
does not go against their conscience – which allows them to have a firmer attitude when their 
conscience comes into play: refusal to attend mass, to be rebaptized, etc.’. But the report suggested 
this restrained attitude on the part of Spanish Protestants could usefully be complemented by 
‘international Christian action’, both ‘[t]hrough the churches’ and ‘[b]y political intervention’, or rather 
the combination thereof.378 This line of thinking would prove influential in the circles of the WCC 
throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s. 
International connections beyond the WCC existed in the form of the International 
Committee for the Evangelization of Spain. The CCIA had a very close connection to the Committee: 
Grubb had chaired it in the mid-1930s. This Committee, composed of both Spanish Protestants and 
international supporters, represented ‘the numerous committees in different countries which support 
the Spanish Evangelical Church’, even though its Spanish members in particular tended to claim it 
represented ‘the bulk of Spanish Protestantism’.379 Though the International Committee’s work was 
largely concerned with more practical matters relating to Protestantism in Spain, it also dealt with 
religious liberty, and it affiliated itself with the CCIA. This meant that the CCIA, Grubb in particular, 
was an important interlocutor in discussions on how to advocate for religious liberty. For example, in 
1955, when Grubb attended the Committee’s meeting in Paris, he was asked ‘what the C.C.I.A. could 
do’; he responded that it ‘could in any case only intervene if requested to do so by a “member church” 
or a recognized cooperative body representing the interests of member Churches in Spain itself and 
not interests managed on their behalf from overseas’. Grubb said this to preempt Spanish sensitivities 
about unwanted foreign interference. Grubb continued by saying that ‘in the case of Spain both her 
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national psychology and her international position made it very difficult for the C.C.I.A. to intervene 
effectively’. Moreover, ‘the resources for further possible effective protest internally had possibly not 
been exhausted, and until this was the case it was a mistake to look outside’. Pressed to explain what 
exactly he meant, Grubb pointed to a few recent successes in civil marriage court cases and suggested 
that the Spanish Evangelical Church should build up ‘a body of precedence and [an] argument could 
be built up and a wedge inserted in what seemed to be a crack in the rigidity of official practice’. Grubb 
reported that this ‘argument greatly appealed to the Spaniards present’.380 Grubb thus sought to 
distinguish two levels of advocacy, the national and the international, with different tactics appropriate 
to each. The national level was to be preferred, as long as it offered viable ways of contesting religious 
discrimination.  
When the ecumenical movement lobbied to obtain intergovernmental action against Spain, 
Britain and the United States were the two states whose assistance was most often sought out, not 
least due to the strong connections ecumenical leaders had with the (virtually entirely Protestant) 
foreign policy establishments of these two countries. National ecumenical bodies played a role here. 
For example, Andrew Preston notes that in a 1949 press release, the Federal Council of Churches, the 
WCC’s most important constituent body, not only warned of communist repression of religion but 
went on ‘to castigate authoritarian anti-communist regimes in Spain, Latin America, and elsewhere for 
violating the religious liberty of non-Catholics, most notably Protestants’.381 Such pressure helped 
bring about a number of diplomatic actions. For instance, on Truman’s instruction, on 14 March 1951, 
the American Ambassador to Spain, Stanton Griffis, spoke with Franco about religious discrimination 
against Protestants. He pointed out that Truman would soon consider economic and military aid to 
Spain as part of the coming year’s budget, and ‘begged Franco to make a gesture such as instructing 
Civil Governors to respect the rights theoretically enshrined in the’ Fuero. But Franco in response 
‘blamed intransigent clerics and undertook to raise the matter at the next cabinet meeting’, deflecting 
attention from his own power, and did nothing. The conversation moved on to military relations, 
especially the use of Spanish bases.382 This pattern did not undergo essential change except as to skew 
further in favor of military relations. In the context of the Cold War, anticommunism increasingly 
dominated American official attitudes, as the American FCC leader Walter Van Kirk found out 
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speaking to an official representing the State Department’s Spain Desk. The official explained to Van 
Kirk that ‘in Communism we are confronted with a challenge to all religion (…) What we are doing 
in Spain, as elsewhere, is for the preservation of the American way of life.’ Van Kirk objected that 
religious freedom was precisely part of ‘the American way of life’, but to no avail.383 Truman’s 
replacement by Eisenhower, who was lukewarm about the concept of human rights, meant religious 
liberty became yet more marginal as an issue in US-Spanish relations. It did not stand in the way of 
the landmark Defense Pacts of 26 September 1953, and the conclusion of Spain’s Concordat with the 
Vatican in 1953 cemented the hegemonic status of Catholicism in Spain.384 
 
The Concordat, the Evangelical Seminary, and the Evangelical Defense 
Commission, 1953-1965 
On 27 August 1953, Spain and the Holy See signed a new Concordat, which affirmed the close 
connection between the Roman Catholic Church and the Franco dictatorship. Paradoxically, however, 
the signing of the Concordat coincided with the start of a reduction in the persecution of Protestants. 
Not only was the dominance of the Catholic Church fortified, the regime’s consolidation meant that 
the fear of anti-Francoist conspiracies declined. Meanwhile, Spain sought to improve its ties with the 
West, especially the United States but also with Western Europe, which at this time was taking the 
first steps towards European integration. Vincent writes that ‘after the signing of the concordat in 
1953, evangelicals became less prominent in the imagined ‘anti-Spain’, though their presence in Spain 
had actually increased’.385 Whereas the number of Spanish Protestants had dwindled to as few as 5,000 
at the end of the Civil War, by the early 1960s estimates were up to 30,000.386 
Advocates for religious liberty hoped to benefit from Spain’s developing domestic and 
international political situation. On 14 December 1955, the country joined the United Nations. This 
prompted at least one Spanish periodical to crow that Spain’s membership associated it with the UN 
Economic and Social Council’s promotion of human rights without discrimination on the basis of 
religion or other reasons, which the British Council of Churches’s Alan Keighley, returning from a 
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visit to Spain, reported ‘brings derisive laughter from Protestant groups in Spain’.387 But Spain’s 
accession to the UN could be seen as generating leverage for religious freedom advocacy. A press 
release by the London-based Evangelical Alliance remarked that Spain had recently been admitted to 
the UN, ‘and presumably, has accepted the Declaration of Human Rights’.388  
Intergovernmental approaches remained the most promising avenue to exert pressure. For 
example, in 1955, Visser ‘t Hooft and Nolde met in Geneva with the WCC’s old friend John Foster 
Dulles, now US Secretary of State, asking him to raise the issue of religious liberty during an upcoming 
meeting with Franco, in Spain, on 2 November. Dulles obliged, though the thrust of the meeting was 
concerned with cementing US-Spanish relations and promoting Spain’s integration into the Western 
bloc. Visser ‘t Hooft subsequently wrote to Dulles that his raising the issue ‘had greater effect than 
may have appeared at the moment’, according to ‘very reliable’ information the WCC had obtained.389 
The documents in the WCC’s files do not make clear what exactly this impact might have been, 
however.  
Immediately adjacent to the correspondence with Dulles in the archives is a French-language 
aide-mémoire, marked ‘strictly confidential’ and annotated as ‘for nobody else’, which seems to have 
originated with the Spanish government or at least represented a position it took. The one-page note, 
which reflected a ‘verbal communication’, indicated that if it were to be made public, ‘the Government’ 
would ‘deny’ it. Its sensitive content was a three-point list of conditions Spanish Protestants would 
have to meet in order ‘to enjoy better treatment from the Government’s side’. The first of these 
conditions was to adhere to a strict separation of Spanish and foreign churches. The second was for 
foreign Protestants to observe a perfectly ‘correct attitude and international courtesy with regard to 
the country which welcomes them so graciously’, while Spanish Protestants should ‘show their honest 
and loyal patriotism’, though Protestant ‘churches should abstain from politics entirely’. Finally, ‘in their 
relations with the Roman Catholic Church, all Spanish Protestants [should] give proof, individually 
and collectively, of their best ecumenical spirit’.390 The provenance of this remarkable note is unclear; 
most likely it was passed on to the WCC by a diplomat (as happened a few months later, see below). 
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In any case, the note reflected the Spanish government’s suspicions of Protestants’ political allegiances 
as well as its concern for its international reputation. But the fact that a Spanish government official 
was apparently willing to so forthrightly state a Spanish position in terms of conditions for better 
treatment was significant, not least because it recognized a problem that Franco publicly denied existed 
in the first place. 
Though the WCC’s records on the subject are sparse, no doubt owing to the confidentiality 
in which contacts were conducted, it seems clear that its associate, the former ‘very distinguished and 
prominent’ Spanish former Jesuit A.F. Carillo de Albornoz, was around this time beginning to play a 
role as an informal connection between the WCC and the Spanish government. Carillo had come to 
the Vatican in 1947 to serve as the international head of the Marian Congregations, but within two 
years, he had ‘lost patience with Rome’s hostility to the ecumenical movement’ and ‘jumped ship’ to 
the WCC, where he became an adviser to Visser ‘t Hooft, and a specialist on religious liberty.391 
According to a letter by an unidentified ecumenist, in December 1955, Carillo had responded to a 
Spanish ‘note verbale’ (possibly the above-mentioned French-language document) by transmitting to 
the Spanish Ministers of Education and of Foreign Affairs, Ruis Jiménez and Alberto Martín Artajo, 
through the Spanish Embassy in Paris, a text which included a request for permission for ‘the 
functioning of schools for the children of Protestant families and a Protestant theological Seminary 
purely for the education of pastors’.392  
Ecumenical hopes of liberalization were dashed, however, when on 23 January 1956, the 
Spanish authorities closed down the Union Evangelical Seminary (Seminario Evangélico Unido) in 
Madrid. This Seminary held its classes in a building that had already been threatened with 
expropriation in the late 1940s: the Colegio El Porvenir, which was at the time described by the 
American Howard Schomer, of the WCC’s Department of Inter-Church Aid, as ‘a central citadel of 
Spanish Protestantism’.393 The building was part of a set of properties in Madrid and Barcelona, 
including churches that served German Lutherans there, which had been established by the German 
Fliedner family, from 1870 onward. In 1949, the Spanish government twice announced its closure, 
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but international pressure (including an ecumenical campaign) had prevented this.394 According to one 
source of the WCC’s information, the 1956 closure was the result of Jesuit pressure on the Minister 
of Education, Jiménez.395 Another possibility, however, stated more gingerly, was that it had 
inadvertently resulted from contacts between Carillo and Spanish government ministers. One of 
Carillo’s contacts, in whom he had ‘the greatest confidence’, according to a member of the Seminary’s 
governing body, was the Minister of Education.396 The suggestion here was that Carillo’s above-
mentioned request to legalize the Seminary had drawn attention to a situation which had thus far been 
quietly tolerated. A telegram by House to Visser ‘t Hooft, however, reported that local ‘representatives’ 
indicated that it had been no ‘Protestant indiscretion’ but ‘local churchleaders [sic]’ who had convinced 
the Minister of Education to initiate the move, which had then been supported by the entire cabinet.397 
The WCC took a public stance in response to the closure and sought to use Spain’s recent 
admission to the UN as leverage. Despite CCIA skepticism of the importance of this change in Spain’s 
international position – ‘there being no U.N. machinery for remedial measures, and Spain being a new 
member’398 – the language of UN human rights featured prominently in WCC appeals. At its February 
meeting in Gilbulla, Australia, the WCC Executive Committee issued a statement saying that the 
seminary’s closure ‘at the very time of Spain’s entrance into the United Nations contradicts the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principle of respect for the rights of religious 
minorities’.399 The 26-27 July 1956 Vienna meeting of the WCC Executive Committee noted that the 
seminary was still closed. It protested this with reference to the ‘principles of religious liberty as laid 
down in the United Nations’ Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for the 
observance of which Spain as a member of the United Nations must accept moral responsibility’. It 
also expressed its conviction that ‘the existence and full functioning of the Seminary are in complete 
accord with the rights and liberties of Spanish citizens as guaranteed by constitutional provisions’.400 
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The heads of the Spanish Evangelical Church and the Spanish Reformed Episcopal Church, 
which sponsored the Seminary, petitioned the government several times, appealing to the Fuero and 
the ‘manifest, tacit, official consent with which the said Seminary has been functioning’.401 According 
to one of the WCC’s close associates, Spanish Protestants perceived the closure as part of ‘a full-
fledged anti-Protestant campaign’, linking it to a number of other incidents. The associate also wrote 
that ‘[g]iven the 19th century experience which is still very much alive in the memories of the elders in 
Madrid, their immediate tendency has been to turn to the Foreign Embassies for protection’, a hint at 
the longstanding nature of the issue. Following the advice of Carillo, however, the Spanish Protestants’ 
international contacts advised them ‘rather to push their own Government on every possible level, for 
redressment [sic] of their grievances’. Thus, the Seminary’s governing body, the Patronato, of which 
the above-mentioned (unidentified) associate was a member, created a legal commission of Spanish 
members ‘to coordinate all negociations [sic], petitions and eventually law-suits’.402 The members of 
this legal commission, however, insisted that its efforts would remain ‘without practical effect, if it is 
not continuously supported by diplomatic and publicity action from outside the country’. As the 
associate reported, ‘[t]hey understood our references to the long term evil effects of appeals to Foreign 
Powers in such cases as that of China or Bulgaria’, yet they could not ‘surrender the old arm of directly 
negotiated foreign intervention’ if they could not count on ‘the serious support of the WCC and the 
CCIA’. According to the Spanish Evangelical Protestants, the Southern Baptists in Spain, who 
remained aloof from the ecumenical movement, maintained a close relationship with the American 
government, which exercised pressure to protect them, whereas they themselves were relatively 
exposed. ‘Geneva’ would thus have to do better.403 
The WCC’s campaign, joined by other bodies, would arouse ‘world-wide interest’ in the 
issue.404 Apart from its public statements, the WCC undertook approaches primarily to American and 
British officials, as well as to churches, while still avoiding any direct representations to the Spanish 
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government.405 The CCIA wrote to its commissioners worldwide, asking them to ‘bring the matter 
before the attention of your government in the immediate future’. Grubb used the occasion of a 
UNESCO Board meeting in Madrid to engage a number of relevant individuals.406 From a separate 
letter by a colleague it can be inferred that these included Sir Ben Bowen Thomas, of the British 
Ministry of Education, who was a member of UNESCO’s executive board. Thomas then ‘raised the 
matter privately with the Spanish minister of education’.407 Richard Fagley wrote to Dulles on the 
CCIA’s behalf, quoting the Gilbulla statement’s references to the UN and human rights.408 (Even 
before this, though, having received information about the seminary from other sources, the State 
Department had already undertaken a representation to the Spanish government.) Fagley also 
consulted with officials of the NCCCUSA, who sent ‘an independent inquiry and expression of 
concern to the European desk in the State Department’.409 Grubb repeated the Gilbulla references to 
human rights and the UN in a letter to the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, sent in the name 
of the British Council of Churches, adding that ‘Spain is a member State of UNESCO which is 
concerned to promote human rights’.410  
The diplomatic approaches that the WCC’s contacts undertook initially seemed effective. The 
US Ambassador to Spain, John Davis Lodge, expressed a strong interest in the matter, and he and the 
Swiss Minister Suter were, according to Schomer, the primary interlocutors for Spain’s Foreign 
Minister, Artajo. After a meeting of Spain’s cabinet, which articulated ‘the general line of a settlement 
acceptable to the Papal Nuncio’, Artajo told Lodge on 25 February that ‘the matter is settled’, but then 
told Suter that ‘the conditions for reopening the seminary would be quite simply those applied to any 
other institution of higher education’, which he affirmed, at Suter’s request, through a written note 
‘prepared by his chef de cabinet’ two days later. Artajo also expressed to Suter ‘the desire that the latter 
should at once inform the World Council of his government’s favorable settlement of the Seminary 
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problem’, much to the WCC’s content. Suter discussed Artajo’s note with the Seminary’s Theodore 
Fliedner, and they together proposed to amend the note to refer not to ‘“the usual legal conditions 
applying to university instruction”’ but to ‘“the requirements of a residence for university students”’. 
At his next meeting with Suter, Artajo ‘readily accepted’ this and another amendment ‘and wrote them 
in hand on the letter which the Swiss Minister had received from his chief of cabinet’. This new 
formulation was, according to Schomer, not one that officially existed, in order ‘to get around the 
insuperable obstacles which would have been created if the Seminary, a private Protestant institution, 
had to conform to the usual regulations applied to university instruction in this country where such 
instruction is always Catholic and public’. Fliedner’s hope, apparently, was that the requirements for 
the seminar would amount to no more than ‘simply those applicable to any hotel’. But the Patronato’s 
legal commission became ‘rather fearful of this condition’ – and rightly so, as it turned out. They 
instead came to ‘prefer to obtain from the Government a simpler statement such as ‘“[t]he order 
closing the Seminary is revoked, and the Seminary is tolerated”’, sidestepping the Concordat, since 
referencing it was likely to bring more harm than good.411 
While the Spanish authorities seemed initially to back down and allow the seminary to reopen 
at least informally, WCC sources reported how Artajo’s ostensibly sincere initiative was caught in a 
web of opposing forces. Canon law jurists argued that the Seminary’s reopening would contravene the 
1953 Concordat’s provision that ‘“all educational institutions”’ had to teach the Catholic religion.412 
Moreover, the Interior Minister, Blas Pérez González, reputedly a close affiliate of the Jesuit 
organization Fé Católica, was ‘obdurate’. When Artajo then took the question back to the Spanish 
cabinet, on 8 June, it was decided to obtain the opinion of the Roman Catholic Church, and to transfer 
responsibility from Artajo to the Minister of Justice. The Church’s Conference of Metropolitans 
‘formulated a fully negative opinion and transmitted it to Rome through the Nunciature in Madrid, which 
appended a statement of its own judgment favorable to de facto toleration’. This clash between the 
Conference and the Nunciature provided the Spanish government with an excuse to postpone taking 
a decision.413 
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Meanwhile, Visser ‘t Hooft sought to exert influence through the Swiss foreign ministry, which 
he described as ‘extremely helpful’. But as it became clear that the situation was not improving, he 
turned to the CCIA for ‘heavier ammunition’: the US State Department. Visser ‘t Hooft also felt it 
was time to throw caution to the wind in regard to church action: ‘there is now no need to hold back 
any churchbodies [sic] who want to protest about the recent events in Spain. On the contrary it will 
be helpful to get some strong resolutions.’414 Significant American pressure was apparently not 
forthcoming, however: Schomer reported that two days after the Spanish Foreign Minister returned 
from a trip to Washington DC, several new measures were applied against Spanish Protestants.415 The 
Seminary’s legal commission stressed the importance of international support, and called on 
‘[e]cumenical and other church bodies’ to ‘continue to maintain that there can be room for a normal 
existence for a Protestant minority in an officially Roman Catholic state, especially when the latter is 
committed to the Charter of the United Nations’. It also stated that the WCC and its members ‘should 
try to find some way to approach Rome about the Seminary, getting its support, if at all possible, for 
the only way out of the impasse: the guarantee of the right of the private practice of non-Catholic 
religions, contained in Article 6 of the 1945 “Spanish Bill of Rights”, which is expressly mentioned in 
the appendix to the 1953 Concordat with the Holy See’. A report to the Vienna Executive Committee 
meeting indicated this latter suggestion might be well worth pursuing, pointing to a 1953 papal 
pronouncement that tolerance could ‘“be justified when the interest of a higher and greater good is 
thus served”’, as interpreted by the pontiff himself.416 But at a time when the Vatican adhered to a 
highly restrictive reading of what such a ‘greater good’ would mean, proposals to get the Pope to 
pressure Spain to change the Fuero remained wishful thinking. 
The Seminary did not reopen, and the ecumenical campaign on its behalf died out. Though 
some teaching would still be carried out at El Porvenir clandestinely417, the education of Spanish clergy 
was also carried out elsewhere, partly in Madrid but also in Barcelona and beyond.418 Support for the 
Seminary flagged not only because of the authorities’ intransigence, but also because doubts arose 
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about the reasons why the churches associated with the Seminary did not themselves pursue its 
reopening more vigorously. A few years later, Grubb – who had been closely involved with the 
Seminary – later concluded that the campaign had ultimately been ‘a false fight, since the difficulties 
were not only with the government, but in the interior of the Spanish Evangelical Churches’. Grubb 
wrote that he had ‘always suspected’ such – indeed, he had written as much in his diary in 1957419 – 
and wistfully asked ‘why is it that people will not listen to the experience of history and prudent advice’. 
Since the Seminary had closed ‘not only for legal difficulties, but because of internal difficulties’, it 
would ‘probably never be reopened and in my judgement never ought to be reopened again’. He was 
supported in this view by Schomer, who explained to Grubb that a root cause of the problem was 
that there had been too many pastors in relation to the only slowly expanding flock. (Grubb, ever the 
wisecrack, jibed that ‘a Church which was “over-pasteurised” was already on the way to being 
sterile!’)420 In May 1960, Grubb wrote that the Seminary was ‘a dead duck, and regrettably my previous 
impressions were again confirmed, namely that most of the younger and abler ministers (and some of 
them are very able) did not really regret its passing’.421 Given these assessments, there was no reason 
to continue waging a campaign on its behalf.  
The campaign for the Seminary was consequential, however, in prompting an intensification 
of legal work for religious liberty, as the legal commission set up by the Patronato developed into a 
permanent Evangelical Defense Commission (Comisión de Defensa Evangélica Española). This 
Commission was presided over by Bishop Santos Molina, of the Spanish Reformed Episcopal Church 
(of the Anglican Communion in Spain). It looked to its Italian counterpart, the Legal Office of the 
Federal Council of Evangelical Churches in Italy, headed by the Waldensian lawyer Giorgio Peyrot, as 
a model.422 Grubb proposed that Evangelical Defense Commission be given the status of a national 
commission of the CCIA.423 The Baptist lawyer and pastor José Cardona Gregori (mentioned above 
as the lawyer who in 1961 found a legal loophole that protected meetings of up to twenty Protestants) 
was hired as the Evangelical Defense Commission’s secretary. Cardona was appointed a 
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Commissioner of the CCIA in 1963.424 By 1962, the Evangelical Defense Commission had ‘acquired 
direct access at a high level in ministries concerned’ with religious liberty, Grubb reported.425 Cardona 
was also able to use his stature and relations with government officials to help others publish works 
that would otherwise not have received permission.426 He became an important contact for the WCC; 
in 1962, Grubb introduced Carillo to him and the rest of the Evangelical Council, to Carillo’s gratitude, 
since it provided him with much-needed information about religious liberty in Spain.427 
The Evangelical Defense Commission was separate from but closely linked to the 
International Committee for the Evangelization of Spain, which at this time became, briefly, the 
International Committee for Evangelization in Spain, before becoming the Evangelical Council for 
Spain. Grubb was behind this change from what he had come to realize was ‘a very bad name’.428 He 
redrafted its constitution, and was asked to become its chairman, a role he fulfilled from 1959 to 1965 
(having initially appointed him for a maximum of two years, the Council, ostensibly against Grubb’s 
wishes, amended its statutes to allow him to remain longer).429 Grubb’s tenure was accompanied by a 
revival and a widening of its work: he reported that meetings were now attended by 40 or more, 
whereas the old Committee had been ‘dying’. Moreover, the Council widened its participation to 
include groups such as the ‘Plymouth Brethren and Episcopalians, Presbyterians and Pentecostals’, 
making it ‘the only forum at which all Spanish Protestant groups meet’.430 At the end of his tenure, the 
organization was transformed into the Spanish Evangelical Council, led by the Spanish Rev. Pedro 
Bonet, with international representatives reduced to ‘associate members’ (observers without a vote).431 
The organization had thus become more Spanish than international, which the CCIA considered an 
accomplishment, especially given its ecumenical character. Moreover, this no doubt assuaged earlier 
fears that by allying itself with the Evangelical Council, the WCC would line itself ‘up in the public 
mind with what might be called the Protestant defence organisations’, leading it to be perceived as a 
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‘World Council of Protestant Churches’.432 Ties between the Spanish Evangelical Council and the 
WCC nevertheless remained close, as during the mid-1960s the prospect dawned of fundamental 
reform of Spain’s laws on religious liberty. 
 
The Second Vatican Council, WCC-Roman Catholic Dialogue, and Spain’s 
Law on Religious Liberty, 1962-1967 
During the 1960s, the WCC’s relations with the Roman Catholic Church entered a new era. 
The WCC’s early relationship with the Roman Catholic Church had been one of antagonism. Though 
initial efforts were made to allow Roman Catholic observers to attend the Amsterdam Assembly, the 
Vatican issued a decree prohibiting this (though a few Catholics observed the conference in an 
informal fashion). The Evanston Assembly proceeded similarly. Despite the Vatican’s hostility 
towards ecumenism, which was reciprocated in the form of ecumenical animosity towards 
Catholicism’s tendency towards ‘dominance’, some prominent Catholics had early on sought to 
improve relations. In 1952, the Dutch priests Frans Thijssen and Jan Willebrands founded the Catholic 
Conference on Ecumenical Questions (CCEQ), which served as a forum for Roman Catholic 
ecumenists. Willebrands established direct contact with the WCC in 1953; he would develop a lively 
correspondence with his fellow countryman Visser ‘t Hooft.433 The 1957 Oberlin ‘North American 
Conference on Faith and Order’, organized by the WCC’s US Conference and co-sponsored by the 
American and Canadian councils of churches, was the ‘first ecumenical gathering attended by 
authorized Roman Catholic observers’: Yves Congar and George Tavard, both of whom would be 
appointed expert observers (‘peritus’) at the Second Vatican Council.434 In 1960, at a meeting in Milan, 
Visser ‘t Hooft was introduced to Cardinal Bea, who had been appointed head of the new Secretariat 
for Promoting Christian Unity. They discussed, among other things, ‘the question whether the [Second 
Vatican] Council should deal with the subject of religious liberty’. In the event, one of the five 
schemata the Secretariat prepared for the Council dealt with religious liberty, which subsequently 
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developed into the Council’s 1965 Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae.435 The 
WCC’s contacts with those Catholics who favored a more open attitude to the world and to other 
confessions thus placed it in a position to influence the mid-1960s reorientation of the Catholic 
Church. 
In the lead-up to the adoption of Dignitatis Humanae, the CCIA put out a statement welcoming 
the progress made thus far and laying out seven requirements it hoped the Declaration would meet. 
Though it goes beyond the scope of this study to ascertain the influence of the WCC or CCIA on the 
content of Dignitatis Humanae, the Jesuit observer Edward Duff wrote in Religious News Service that the 
Declaration ‘incorporates implicitly and expands theologically the seven “requirements” of religious 
freedom’ the CCIA’s statement had elaborated. (He also wrote that the Declaration was ‘vastly more 
fundamental in its thinking (and, hopefully, more effective in its results) than the U.N.’s Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights’.)436 These requirements included the recognition of religious freedom 
as a universal ‘civil freedom’, the ‘freedom to manifest religion or belief’, ‘alone or in community, and 
in public or private’, and the ‘freedom to maintain individual or collective bonds with religious 
communities or associations, the character of which transcends national boundaries’, all of which 
would indeed be reflected in the Vatican’s Declaration.437 
As Gerard Mannion has written, the Declaration, which was promulgated on 7 December 
1965, was principally authored by Cardinal Pietro Pavan, who had also drafted Pacem in Terris, Pope 
John XXIII’s 1963 encyclical on human rights, on which the Declaration built. It was also deeply 
influenced by the American Jesuit Murray. Furthermore, Jacques Maritain played a role in persuading 
the new Pope Paul VI of the importance of the text. Dignitatis Humanae, declaring that ‘the human 
person has a right to religious freedom’, affirmed that the God-given dignity of the human person 
meant not only that people should not be coerced into any faith but also that they should be free to 
practice their own religion. It thus challenged prior teaching on the superiority of the Catholic faith, 
on the doctrine of ‘thesis-hypothesis’, and on the claim that ‘error has no rights’.438 Significantly, it 
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stated that the ‘right of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitutional 
law whereby society is governed and thus it is to become a civil right’. By articulating a radically 
different conception of religious freedom than that which had long been Catholic doctrine, the 
Declaration marked an important moment in the development of Catholic human rights discourse. 
Whereas in the 1940s, the Church had used the language of human rights to claim its singular privilege, 
as in the quotation by Ottaviani referenced above, it now asserted the universal ‘right of man to 
religious freedom’.439  
Writing after the Declaration’s adoption, Carillo voiced disappointment over such omissions 
as the freedom to change one’s religion or belief ‘without consequent social, economic, and political 
disabilities’, as recognised by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reiterated at the New 
Delhi Assembly, and noted that provisions of the declaration on society’s right to defend itself against 
‘possible abuses committed on the pretext of freedom of religion’ and ‘unworthy’ forms of 
‘persuasion’ allowed leeway for the state to repress efforts at proselytizing. This concern was especially 
relevant in relation to Spain, where the claim of ‘proselytism’ was used to clamp down on Protestant 
activities. Carillo also criticized the Vatican’s declaration for emphasizing certain corporate rights while 
omitting reference to the equivalent individual rights, in contrast to the Amsterdam statement. Yet all 
in all, he welcomed the declaration as a manifestation of Christianity putting its house in order, 
furthering its ‘moral leadership’.440 This sense of progress characterized the Declaration’s reception 
among ecumenists more generally. 
The Second Vatican Council also furthered dialogue between the WCC and the Roman 
Catholic Church, most directly through its 1964 Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis Redingratio (also 
known as De Oecumenismo). In 1965, with the Second Vatican Council still ongoing, a WCC-Roman 
Catholic Joint Working Group was established. This high-level forum for discussion served to increase 
the understanding between the WCC and the Vatican; its reports were sent on to the Pope and the 
Vatican’s Secretariat of State.441 The Joint Working Group’s agenda included not only the nature of 
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ecumenism and of dialogue, but also religious freedom, proselytism, and mixed marriages.442 On the 
question of religious freedom, in its May 1967 report, the Joint Working Group concluded that 
‘though the theological justification may still differ from one church to the other, there is basic 
agreement on what the principle of Religious Liberty requires in practice’. Indeed, though ‘ecumenical 
dialogue’ on the subject had to continue, ‘there is good reason to hope that in the course of time on 
the basis of the agreement reached, still existing tensions may be overcome’.443 Questions of religious 
freedom were still relevant, and a major document on ‘Common Witness and Proselytism’ referred 
back to the WCC’s New Delhi report on proselytism, the Vatican’s Declaration on Religious Liberty, 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for articulations thereof. But the emphasis on 
‘common witness’ pictured the WCC and the Roman Catholic Church as allies rather than antagonists, 
marking a departure from earlier exchanges.444 As described further in chapter 5, the way had thus 
been cleared for significant cooperation between the WCC and progressive Roman Catholics on 
religious freedom, and later on questions pertaining to human rights more generally. 
The big question that remained was how the Vatican’s embrace of religious freedom and 
ecumenism would affect the practice of Spain and other predominantly Catholic countries. Over the 
course of the late 1950s, the Spanish government had made repeated promises to improve conditions 
for religious liberty, but there remained a yawning gap between stated intentions and outcome. As 
Carillo had to admit, writing in July 1961, the situation was ‘paradoxical and contradictory’: 
‘Government officials seem to have promised on several occasions to adapt the legal and 
administrative situation of the Spanish Protestants to the requirements of the Declaration of Human 
Rights of the United Nations, to which Spain belongs’, but at the same time, ‘months and even years 
pass and nothing is being done to alleviate the Protestants’ situation’.445 In 1962, Carillo met with the 
Minister of Information and Press, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, the Minister of Justice, Antonio Iturmendi 
Bañales, and the Foreign Minister, Fernando María Castiella y Maíz. Carillo noted that his ‘personal 
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impression’ was that Castiella and Iturmendi ‘only felt the great need to justify themselves in the eyes 
of the World Council of Churches and Protestants abroad, and, unless I was taken in by him (which 
I do not believe), Fraga alone appeared to want to do something’.446 Spain was attempting to present a 
new face to the West, yet the country did not undertake serious political reform. 
Despite these misgivings about the Spanish ministers’ intentions, they were the best hope the 
ecumenical movement had of effecting change, and so Carillo continued to do his best to assist and 
to push them. In 1959, he had reported that ‘the Spanish government’ saw two main obstacles to 
liberalization: Spanish public opinion and ‘the intolerant attitude of the Spanish Roman Catholic 
hierarchy’ (both these claims had of course been used to deflect demands for liberalization in the past). 
To circumvent the first of these two issues, the government had agreed, ‘in principle’, to develop a 
general law ‘on the status of non-Roman Catholic minorities in Spain, without especially referring to 
Protestants’, which would declare that everyone ‘would have the same civil, social and political rights 
as the Roman Catholic citizens’. The Minister for Justice and Religious Affairs said that such a law 
would also apply to the much larger Muslim and Jewish minorities, though he admitted that this meant 
that ‘it would be very difficult to provide for evangelisation’. (The same minister also claimed that the 
‘very imprudent and offensive attitude’ of certain Christian ‘“sects”’ impeded liberalization.) As to the 
second problem, since the Vatican, under the new Pope John XXIII, was more favorably disposed 
towards liberalization than the Spanish hierarchy, the government proposed to make the proposed 
law into ‘a complement of the Spanish Concordat with the Holy See so that the Spanish Bishops 
would have nothing to say in the matter’.447 The notion of using this latter tactic would continue to 
surface as late as 1966, raising ecumenical hopes that the forces in Spain opposed to reform could be 
circumvented. Yet in the end such an amendment of the Concordat was not attempted; reform instead 
came through civil law and amendment of the Fuero, as discussed below.448 
Castiella, the Foreign Minister, had been a key figure in Spain’s attitude to religious freedom 
previously and would continue to be so. A controversial figure, he had fought on the Eastern front 
alongside the Nazis, as part of Spain’s Blue Division, winning the Iron Cross. This, and possibly his 
advocacy of Gibraltar’s return to Spain, had led the British government to refuse him as Spanish 
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ambassador in 1951.449 Prior to the war, he had studied law in Paris, Cambridge, Geneva, and the 
Hague, become a professor of international law, and served as member of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration.450 In 1953, as the Spanish ambassador to the Holy See (1951-1957), Castiella had been 
responsible for negotiating the new Concordat. But as Foreign Minister from 1957 on, he led Spain’s 
international charm offensive. Religious freedom served as a way to improve Spain’s standing and to 
bolster, among other things, its chances of entering the European Economic Community, which it 
had begun to formally pursue in 1962.451 Entry into the Common Market, the Spanish government 
hoped, would help solve the country’s economic woes. To this end, Castiella consulted with the Dutch, 
Swiss, and West German governments, as well as the American one, on what shape new legislation 
on religion should take.452 He also sought to renew the ten-year old treaty with the United States on 
military bases on more favorable terms.453 According to Grubb, the visit of Eugen Gerstenmaier, the 
president of the German Bundestag, to Madrid in February 1964, made a particular impression on 
Castiella, since Gerstenmaier ‘took the question up vigorously’ (and also met with the Evangelical 
Defense Commission).454 Finally, on 10 September 1964, Castiella presented a proposal on developing 
religious freedom for non-Catholics, which had been approved by the Church hierarchy. Yet at the 
cabinet meeting where it was discussed, this proposal ran into opposition from conservatives, and the 
outcome was that Franco did nothing.455 
The key factor looming in the background was the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church, 
and its 1965 Declaration on Religious Liberty put pressure on Spain to conform to the new doctrine. 
A 1966 WCC report identified Spain, however, as ‘the most difficult particular case concerning the 
application of the Vatican Declaration’. In response to the Declaration, ‘[c]ivil and ecclesiastical 
Spanish authorities’ had posited three lines of defense. First, they argued that ‘[a]ccording to general 
juridical principles, a particular law has priority over a general law’, and since the Concordat was a 
particular law and the Vatican’s Declaration a general one, the Concordat would have to be changed 
(which would be resisted) before the Declaration could be applied. Second, the Spanish bishops had 
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argued in a collective letter that ‘“[t]he limitations of the religious freedom should be different 
according to the different sociologic character of each country”’, and the Declaration had (in their 
highly contestable view) recognized the Spanish reality ‘“of a confessional State (sic) and of a situation 
of Catholic unity” (sic)’.456 And finally, the Spanish bishops had interpreted the Vatican’s Declaration’s 
restriction on ‘persuasion that is (…) less fair’ to mean ‘that a Catholic State has the right to investigate 
each witness of the religious minorities and to prohibite [sic] or punish it if it seems to it “minus recta”’ 
(‘less fair’), referring to a phrase in the Declaration on Religious Freedom which described proselytism 
in these terms.457 
The drafting of the new Law on Religious Liberty proceeded, however, and Carillo kept the 
WCC abreast of the process. On 15 November 1966, he transmitted to a group of senior WCC 
officials, including Grubb and Nolde, the text of the new draft of the Law on Religious Liberty, which 
he had acquired from Spanish government officials who were ‘very anxious to know the opinion of 
the ecumenical movement on this matter’.458 (The confidence that Carillo enjoyed was evidenced by 
the fact that, in his understanding, he was shown the drafting commission’s text even before cabinet 
ministers who were not part of it.)459 In Carillo’s analysis, which he had informally supplied to Castiella, 
whereas the Vatican’s Declaration had stated that a country’s having a state church should not impinge 
on religious liberty, ‘90% of the text of this project [the draft law] is concerned with the legal status of 
the non-Roman Catholic confessions’ rather than with religious freedom. It thus conflated ‘matters 
concerning strictly religious liberty and matters about relationships between church and state’. In 
Carillo’s opinion, issues of church-state relations should not be part of a bill on religious liberty. When 
they were so to be regulated, however, Carillo stressed, they should take account of the differences 
between confessions; in a ‘Christian state’, non-Roman Catholic but Christian confessions ought not 
to have the same ‘juridical status’ as ‘Muslim, Buddhist, or Animist religions’ (though without 
infringing on their religious freedom). Each such relationship between a religious community and the 
state should be the product of negotiations, such as the Italian state was undertaking at the time.460 
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Carillo’s view of a just hierarchy betrayed a commitment to Christian privilege over other 
religions, and Nolde objected to Carillo on this point, setting against his acceptance of hierarchy the 
examples of the United States and India, where ‘all religions so far as I know are equal before the law 
and have the same status’. Moreover, Nolde argued, to accept the fact of Spain as a Catholic state 
would place Protestants in Spain on unequal footing from the start.461 This critical attitude towards 
church establishment highlighted Nolde’s American background (British colleagues such as Alan 
Booth and Grubb were more skeptical of state neutrality, describing on another occasion the ‘neutral 
state’ as ‘“a liberal pipe-dream”’462). Consultation with Cardona, however, who in turn consulted with 
the Evangelical Defense Commission and Spanish church leaders, made clear that Spanish Protestants 
agreed with Carillo’s views. These were thus taken as the basis for a letter sent to the Foreign Minister, 
on the initiative of Visser ‘t Hooft, in what would be the first ever official approach by the WCC to 
the Spanish government.463 Micheli as well as Grubb and Booth rewrote the letter to make it more 
diplomatically appropriate but also to stress less the Vatican’s Declaration and more the WCC’s own 
adopted positions on religious liberty. At the same time, word arrived through Carillo that Minister 
Castiella ‘had indicated his willingness to try and take into account the points’ Carillo’s informal 
memorandum had made. This made the letter by the WCC General Secretary all the more important, 
since it could strengthen Castiella’s hand in shepherding the law through.464 Sent on 15 December 
1966, the letter called attention to not only the Amsterdam but also the New Delhi statement on 
religious liberty.465  
Reform finally came the following year, but it fell well short of what the WCC and Spanish 
Protestants had hoped for. In 1967, the Spanish government initiated a modification of Article 6 of 
the Fuero, which was amended with the phrase: ‘The State will assume the defense of freedom of 
religion’. This phrase replaced an old one that had read: ‘No ceremonies or external manifestations of 
religious faith other than Catholic shall be permitted.’466 Carillo noted that this change in the Fuero was 
unusual in that it preceded any change in the Concordat, which superseded it in status. A ‘formal and 
                                                 
461 Nolde to Carillo, 22 November 1966, 1-2, WCCA CCIA 428.15.3.2.2.3. 
462 Grubb to Micheli, 6 June 1962, WCCA CCIA 428.13.5.2.3, 
463 Micheli to Grubb and Nolde, ‘Spain – Draft Law on Religious Liberty’, 30 November 1966, 1, WCCA CCIA 
428.15.3.2.2.3 
464 Micheli to Grubb and Nolde, ‘Spain – Draft Law on Religious Liberty’, 15 December 1966, 1, WCCA CCIA 
428.15.3.2.2.3. 
465 Blake to Castiella, 15 December 1966, WCCA CCIA 428.15.3.2.2.3. 
466 Quoted in Almudena Rodríguez-Moya, ‘High Courts Reign Supreme: The Role of Case Law in the Spanish Transition 
towards a Secular (Non-Denominational) State’, Revista de Derecho Político, 78 (2010) 187-216, on 196. 
124 
 
express authorisation of the Pope’ had enabled this move, which also served as a way of overcoming 
parliamentary and episcopal resistance.467 While this development was hopeful, the content of the 
‘freedom of religion’ the state was bound to defend would have to be worked out through Castiella’s 
law. 
This Law on Religious Liberty, promulgated on 1 July 1967 and entered into force on 21 July, 
disappointed ecumenical hopes. The law extended legal recognition to non-Catholic confessions, but 
these could merely register, under restrictive conditions, as ‘confessional associations’, rather than as 
churches. Just before the law was promulgated, the Evangelical Defense Commission had already 
protested to the Minister of Justice that this was unacceptable to Protestants, but without success. 
They had also noted their ‘anguished disappointment’ at the fact ‘that the Draft Law passed by the 
Commission of the Cortes contains no guarantee that the State will grant the right to liberty 
proclaimed in the Commission of Human Rights in the United Nations, in the Catholic doctrine 
proclaimed by the Second Vatican Council, nor in the statements of the World Council of 
Churches’.468 This appeal to outside sources of authority reflected the increasing internationalization 
of the issue of Spain’s treatment of Protestants. The WCC’s Central Committee meeting in Heraklion 
in 1967 expressed the same concern, referencing the same documents.469 The Vatican, Carillo reported, 
for its part did ‘not seem satisfied with the law’.470 His own analysis found many flaws in the law 
besides the one mentioned above, and Carillo observed that in many respects it went against the 
Vatican’s Declaration. While the Vatican had asserted that the establishment of a state church should 
not impede the religious freedom of other confessions, the new Spanish law stated the reverse: ‘“The 
exercise of the right to religious liberty understood according to the Catholic doctrine must be 
compatible in any case with the Roman Catholic confession of the Spanish State, as it is proclaimed 
in its fundamental laws”’. Furthermore, the Spanish law included language suggesting it demanded 
unquestioning ‘obedience due to the laws’ as well as privileged respect for ‘the Catholic religion, which 
is the religion of the Spanish nation’, and purposefully failed to distinguish between public order and 
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private morality. It also included a paragraph setting forth an expansive definition of proselytism, 
including any act which ‘might imply physical or moral compulsion, threat, bribery or promise’.471 
After the promulgation of the law, the Evangelical Defense Commission was reduced to 
restraining ‘the more extreme and radical group among the Protestants’, which could and did lodge 
‘intransigent petitions’, or could take ‘actions which contravene the recent law’, pleading that 
Protestants should wait until it became clear ‘in what form this law is going to be administered’. The 
Commission tried to influence this by meeting with the government’s Ministry of Justice’s 
Commission on Religious Liberty on 28-29 November 1967. It felt it was effective in doing so and 
that the Ministry showed ‘good-will’ even as it stressed that liberalization could not be ‘too rapid’.472 
Spanish Protestant leaders also asked the WCC to influence the Vatican to pressure ‘the Spanish 
authorities to follow a liberal policy with regard to both the interpretation and application of the new 
law’.473 Carillo reported that ‘the government as a whole regrets that the Parliament had substantially 
reduced the area of religious freedom’ in the new law. Thus, Carillo reported, the Minister of Justice 
had ‘given to the Commission created for the application of the Law the instruction to be very liberal 
in the interpretation of the legal provisions’. Both he and Castiella had ‘privately stated that they 
consider this Law only as a first provisional step towards full religious liberty, and they have voiced 
the hope that in the not too distant future following the general political evolution of the regime, the 
Law could be modified in much more liberal terms’.474 But more fundamental change would only 
become possible after Franco’s demise in 1975, and after a new constitution had been adopted in 
1978. In 1980, finally, a new version of the Law on Religious Liberty would be enacted which 
established the secularity of the Spanish state and recognized the Spanish Evangelical Church and 
other churches.475 
The Catholic Church’s mid-1960s turn towards religious freedom marked the beginning of the 
end of Carillo’s work at the WCC, though the exact circumstances of his departure remain unclear: at 
the end of 1967, the Secretariat on Religious Liberty was disbanded. On the eve of his departure, 
however, Carillo wrote a memorandum in which he expressed his vexation at the discrepancy between 
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the Vatican’s Declaration on Religious Liberty and the Spanish Law on Religious Liberty. In his view, 
also stated at earlier meetings, the Spanish law had ‘the character and importance of a test of the 
Roman Catholic sincerity concerning Religious Liberty’. After the Vatican’s Declaration, ‘the Spanish 
Law was precisely the unique occasion to show the seriousness of the Vatican’s insights in this matter’. 
But the law being ‘what it is, it has opened in the whole world an enormous “credibility gap”, and has 
put the Roman Catholic Church in an impossible position’, which it had to ‘redress’. This had bearing 
on the WCC, too, given its rapprochement with the Roman Catholic Church, meaning that ‘the Roman 
Catholic failure to take a clear position against the Spanish Law would be in some extent also the 
failure of the World Council of Churches’.476  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has shown how Franco Spain’s discrimination against its Protestant minority led 
the WCC to advocate publicly and privately for religious freedom. The CCIA’s ties to the American 
and British foreign policy establishments played a key role in lobbying those governments to undertake 
interventions. The language of UN human rights (and the wartime alliance) was an important element 
in such approaches. But the WCC was fighting an uphill battle: as a result of the onset of the Cold 
War, human rights and Christian Democracy had become essential and interrelated elements of the 
anticommunist Western bloc. The pursuit of religious freedom in the Eastern bloc, in other words, 
encouraged turning a blind eye to religious discrimination in Spain, Portugal, and Italy. Even among 
ecumenists, the fact that Franco’s Spain was Christian, rather than atheist, meant it was regarded as 
more respectable and amenable to reform than Eastern European regimes were. But for the WCC, of 
course, the Spanish interpretation of religious freedom, like the general Catholic one, was 
fundamentally misguided. Without ensuring religious freedom for Spain’s Protestants, the regime 
could not be legitimate and had to be subjected to constant pressure and attempts at persuasion to 
change its ways. 
A striking feature of the story is the connections between various actors and at various levels: 
between different Spanish religious bodies, between Spanish Protestants and the WCC, those of the 
Evangelical Council in Spain (to choose one of its intermediary appellations), between the CCIA and 
foreign policy officials, between the WCC’s leadership and Roman Catholic ecumenists, and of course 
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between Carillo and Spanish government ministers. Another study might expand these by focusing 
on the relations between Spanish Protestants not in contact with the WCC and their international 
supporters, or those between the Vatican and the Spanish episcopate and government ministers, all 
of which could only be hinted at in the present study. What seems clear, though, is that references to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights most often appeared in contacts involving (the possibility 
of) intergovernmental action, as the campaign for the 1956 closing of the Evangelical Seminary amply 
shows. When it came to protests by Spanish Protestants to the Spanish government, on the other 
hand, international points of reference were discouraged. In this way, there existed a functional 
separation or division of labor between the international level (where the CCIA was most active) and 
the national level, though by the 1960s the border between the two had become highly porous. 
Yet when it came to the question of how exactly Spain’s laws should be changed, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights played a less prominent role. Here, it was ecumenical statements – the 
1948 Amsterdam Declaration and the 1961 New Delhi Statement – that served as the principal basis 
for ecumenical advocacy. The 1965 Vatican Declaration on Religious Liberty added an important 
instrument to the WCC’s arsenal, despite the misgivings Carillo and others had about its nature as a 
Catholic document and its substantive flaws, which lent themselves to abuse. These documents can 
be understood in part as human rights documents: while the Amsterdam Declaration did not reference 
human rights, its emphasis on individual rights, at the expense of corporate rights (the rights of 
religious communities or of churches), had resulted from the simultaneous drafting of the Universal 
Declaration; the New Delhi Statement had emphatically embedded the right to religious freedom in 
the context of related civil and political rights. The Vatican’s Declaration, meanwhile, built on Pacem 
in Terris, the Vatican’s landmark statement on human rights, but it also emphatically included corporate 
rights. All of these documents articulated a distinctly Christian conception of religious freedom, while 
admitting of the need for a secular or civil right to be anchored in society. They went leagues beyond 
the Universal Declaration’s Article 18, which was brief and general, and did not include corporate 
rights, whereas the Spanish refusal to recognize the corporate rights of non-Catholic confessions – to 
recognize them as churches – was a crucial point of contention. As a secular document, moreover, 
the Universal Declaration could not be expected to appeal to Spain’s government, episcopate, and 
public opinion in the way that Christian principles could. As Carillo stated during a 1961 meeting 
between WCC and Roman Catholic theologians, his hope was that a ‘“bridge”’ could be established 
between ‘Christian inward freedom and the civil right to religious liberty’. Only this ‘could justify the 
defense of religious liberty as a specifically Christian conviction, and not as a purely humanistic claim 
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of the “Enlightenment”’.477 Thus, at stake in the discussions, debates and interventions around Spain’s 
new draft law was the articulation of a distinctly Christian basis for religious freedom as a human right. 
The development of such a basis would enable Protestant-Catholic cooperation, including the joint 
work in Latin America described in chapter 5. 
  
                                                 
477 Translation mine. Carillo, ‘Reunion avec des theologiens Catholiques sur des questions de liberté religieuse’, 23 May 
1963, 14, WCCA Secretariat on Religious Liberty 4226.3.06. 
129 
 
4. Ecumenical antiracism and human rights: 
the World Council of Churches, South 
Africa, and the Programme to Combat 
Racism 
‘The championship of those unjustly treated, the Christian calling to defend the weak and bear 
witness to those aspects of the gospel which the strong are tempted to overlook, is hard to combine 
with the role of mediator or reconciler, not least in the particular circumstances of this case.’478 – 
Alan Booth on South Africa, 1964 
‘Our goal is not moderation but liberation from a racist minority and government by majority rule! 
How can you accept anything less?’479 – Bola Ige to Andrew Young, 1975 
Introduction 
From early on, the ecumenical movement spoke out on questions of race and discrimination 
in ways that were ahead of most of Christianity. The seminal Oxford Conference on State, Church, 
and Society (1937) affirmed ‘[t]he right of every person, whatever his race, colour or present status, to 
the conditions essential for life as a person, to education, to opportunity in his vocation, recreation 
and social intercourse.’480 Building on this, the Provisional Committee of the World Council of 
Churches (WCC) at a 1939 meeting stated that  
‘[a]ll humans are of equal worth in the eyes of God and should be so treated in the political sphere. 
It follows that the ruling power should not deny essential rights to human beings on the ground of 
their race or class or religion or culture or any such distinguishing characteristic.’481  
Following World War II, at the WCC’s founding Amsterdam Assembly, the section on international 
affairs concluded that  
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‘[w]e affirm that all men are equal in the sight of God and that the rights of men derive directly from 
their status as the children of God. (…) We are profoundly concerned by evidence from many parts 
of the world of flagrant violations of human rights. Both individuals and groups are subjected to 
persecution and discrimination on grounds of race, colour, religion, culture or political 
conviction.’482  
Moreover, it stated that ‘[w]ith all the resources at their disposal they [the churches] should opposed 
enforced segregation on grounds of race or colour, working for the progressive recognition and 
application of this principle in every country.’483  
These pronouncements took place at the same time as the ecumenical movement developed 
its conception of human rights, which the Amsterdam statement reflected most directly. One might 
thus expect that antiracism (to use a catch-all term) was a major part of the WCC’s postwar human 
rights engagement. This chapter, however, argues that this was not the case – antiracism and human 
rights proceeded as largely separate agendas until the 1960s, and when the former became a central 
concern of the WCC after 1968, the latter figured only in an ‘auxiliary’ role, borrowing a term from 
Barbara Keys (quoted below). Richly detailed previous accounts – especially those produced by Antti 
Laine and Erica Meijers – have pointed out that the late 1960s were a turning point in the history of 
the WCC’s antiracism, which moved from pronouncements to action, especially through the 
Programme to Combat Racism (PCR).484 Some have nevertheless sought to emphasize underlying 
continuities. Antti Laine has argued that though the ‘emphases of the racism discussion’ changed, 
ecumenical ‘[v]iews on the methods of fighting racism did not change to any great degree’. Instead, 
‘what did clearly change was that from the Uppsala Assembly [of 1968] onwards those views were put 
into practice’.485 Thembeka Mufamadi has written that ‘[d]espite the competing views of its members, 
(…) the WCC was at least categorical and consistent in its denunciation of apartheid from 1948 to 
1994.’486 By approaching the subject from a different angle, namely the distinction between human 
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rights and antiracism, the account presented here places greater stress on the discontinuities and 
tensions in the ecumenical approach towards racism. 
In distinguishing between human rights and antiracism, this chapter takes its cue from the 
analytical distinction forcefully made by Samuel Moyn, in his argument that ‘anticolonialism wasn’t a 
human rights movement’, between individual human rights and collective self-determination. 
According to Moyn, the ‘utopia’ of anticolonial self-determination, with sovereignty in its sights, had 
to go into decline for the ‘minimalist utopia’ of individual human rights, which sought to curtail 
sovereignty, to ascend.487 In a similar way, the pattern demonstrated in this chapter highlights tensions 
between the WCC’s liberal human rights discourse and its commitment to antiracism, which came to 
demand a more radical stance. At the same time, it nuances this claim by showing how the two were 
not merely opposed but could also be complementary. I argue that the importance to the WCC of the 
civil rights movement and the UN help account for this. The chapter begins by describing the WCC’s 
engagement with South Africa, the case that took center stage throughout the period under discussion, 
highlighting the relative paucity of human rights language among South African opponents of 
apartheid but its prevalence at the UN in the 1960s. The second section outlines the influence of the 
American civil rights movement on the WCC’s stance on racism, before turning to the PCR, the 
WCC’s flagship antiracism program. 
  
Rights and reconciliation in South Africa 
The WCC’s dialogue with South African churches 
In the years after the victory of South Africa’s National Party in 1948, the government 
launched segregationist policies under the umbrella of ‘apartheid’, a term which, as clear-cut as it may 
sound in retrospect, was then still fluid and contested. The government was heavily weighted with 
men of the cloth – Prime Minister Malan himself included – and Christianity played a key role in 
justifying apartheid. It thus mattered a great deal how the South African churches responded. In the 
main, the Afrikaner churches, especially the most important one, the Dutch Reformed Church, 
supported the government, while the English-speaking churches were more critical (this was in line 
with conflicts over racial questions since the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, with 
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the English-dominated south’s advocacy for integrationist policies gradually losing ground to the 
Afrikaner north’s insistence on segregation).488 As this section shows, even when they criticized 
apartheid, the South African churches – the WCC’s members and interlocutors – tended not to refer 
to human rights. In fact, their reasoning was often to reject human rights in favor of conditional 
conceptions of rights, coupled with theological rather than secularized critiques of apartheid. 
In 1949, the Christian Council of South Africa, which represented ecumenical churches and 
missions489, organized the Rosettenville Conference on ‘The Christian Citizen in a Multi-Racial 
Society’, in which it responded to the victory of the National Party and criticized its policy of apartheid. 
The conference affirmed that ‘God has created all men in His image. Consequently, beyond all 
differences remains the essential unity.’ The statement continued in a paternalistic vein, however: 
‘Individuals who have progressed from a primitive social structure to one more advanced should share 
in the responsibilities and rights of their new status.’ Similarly qualified language was used with regard 
to the franchise, which ‘should be accorded to all capable of exercising it’, as was the case with ‘the 
right to work in that sphere in which he [every man] can make the best use of his abilities for the 
common good’.490 John de Gruchy and Steve de Gruchy euphemistically describe this as ‘not very 
radical’ and smacking ‘a little of paternalism’, but note that ‘they were a direct attack on the unfolding 
policy of apartheid’.491  
Similarly conditional rights language featured in conferences in Pretoria in 1953 and after, 
organized by the Dutch Reformed Church, which stood outside the Christian Council. At Pretoria, 
though, other church delegates were invited to participate. The conference’s final statement’s only 
political stance related to apartheid: ‘It was generally felt that Non-Europeans have a claim to right 
and justice in all matters, great and small, but that there should be no talk of rights if there were not 
also admittance of fundamental duties.’492 As De Gruchy and De Gruchy observe, elaboration on this 
subject of rights and duties appeared ‘seldom, if ever’, in Dutch Reformed Church ‘pronouncements 
over the years’.493 The Rosettenville statement shows a more critical stance towards apartheid than the 
Pretoria statement, but it, too, accepted the conditionality of rights, counter to the concept of 
                                                 
488 John de Gruchy and Steve de Gruchy, The Church Struggle in South Africa: Twenty-fifth Anniversary Edition (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2005; 1st edn. 1979) 51-56. 
489 Mufamadi, ‘The World Council of Churches’, 26. 
490 Quoted in De Gruchy and De Gruchy, Church Struggle, 53-54. 
491 Ibid., 54. 
492 Quoted in ibid., 57. 
493 Ibid., 57. 
133 
 
inalienable or natural rights, and thus failed to contest an essential tenet of apartheid and the ideology 
legitimating it. 
Attempts at dialogue between the WCC and the South African churches on the subject of 
apartheid got underway when in 1950, the WCC sent the Dutch Reformed theologian Rev. J.C. 
Hoekendijk – whose activities in Indonesia just prior are detailed in chapter 2 – to South Africa, on 
an exploratory visit. His impressions provide valuable insight into the relationship between the WCC, 
the UN, and human rights, in relation to apartheid and the South African churches. Hoekendijk 
reported that ‘Reading Afrikaans theological literature one is struck by the total lack of any 
“Renaissance” influences. A reference to human rights, “dignity of the human personality” etc. will 
be considered as “an influx of liberalism”, than which it is impossible to think of a more dangerous 
contamination.’ In a footnote to this observation, Hoekendijk noted: ‘One of the theological leaders 
in Febr. 1950, after having referred to the “old humanistic slogans”: “brotherhood of man, human 
dignity, human rights”, etc. - stated, ‘“this is old liberalistic, spiritless humanism. The humanist speaks 
a foreign language for a real Christian.”’494  
Hoekendijk also noted how the WCC was often equated by South African Christians with the 
UN and Michael Scott (the Anglican minister who had recently testified to the UN’s Fourth 
Committee on behalf of the indigenous peoples of South African-occupied South West Africa). This 
was brought home near the end of his visit, as a member of Prime Minister Malan’s entourage warned 
Hoekendijk: ‘Take care that the W.C.C. will not make itself into an ecclesiastical U.N.O.’ Reflecting 
on his observation about the UN and Scott, Hoekendijk noted that ‘One of the tasks of a W.C.C. 
representative seems therefore to be to disentangle the ecumenical cause from general world politics 
and to speak about the Churches’ concern for South African race relations.’495 In other words, 
Hoekendijk’s analysis, which was representative of the dominant viewpoint among the WCC’s 
leadership at the time, was that the WCC should keep its distance from efforts to use the UN to 
denounce South Africa. The organization stood in contrast, then, with the effort of Scott and other 
priests, most notably Trevor Huddleston and John Collins, who opposed apartheid during the 1950s, 
laying, according to Rob Skinner, the ‘moral foundations’ of (British) anti-apartheid activism.496 
                                                 
494 J.C. Hoekendijk, ‘South Africa: An Informal Travel Diary – No. 1’, 4 April 1950, 5, WCCA PCR 4223.0.02.1. 
495 Ibid., 4 and 8. 
496 Rob Skinner, ‘The Moral Foundations of British Anti-Apartheid Activism, 1946-1960’, Journal of South African Studies, 
35, 2 (2009) 399-416. 
134 
 
A few months later, after the WCC’s Central Committee in Toronto, Canada, where the 
situation in South Africa was discussed, Visser ‘t Hooft wrote that it was of vital importance that ‘such 
questions be dealt with not in a polemical spirit, but in the manner of brotherly dialogue’. Thanks to 
a presentation by Ben Marais, a South African Dutch Reformed minister, Visser ‘t Hooft wrote, ‘we 
were able to avoid that in Toronto extensive resolutions were adopted about the race problem (some 
had in fact wanted this) and that we unanimously decided to travel the road of personal contact’.497 
Thus, the Central Committee reaffirmed the Amsterdam Assembly’s language, quoted above in the 
introduction, but did not build on it, while it affirmed the sending of a delegation. This delegation was 
to be multiracial, on the insistence of Benjamin Mays, the President of Morehouse College in Georgia 
and a mentor and close friend to Martin Luther King, Jr., who tangled during the meeting with Marais, 
after Marais, according to Mays, had stated ‘that communists alone support the political movement 
against the Apartheid in South Africa’. Mays wanted more outspoken criticism of apartheid, but this 
demand was buried in a muddled discussion, during which Ernest John Bingle, an English Methodist 
historian, former missionary in India, and adviser to the WCC on race relations, felt that ‘the voice of 
the Bantu peoples’, which Mays had claimed to advocate, ‘had been heard in ecumenical circles’ 
already; moreover, he ‘did not consider it to be the responsibility of the Central Committee to 
pronounce against any one member Church’.498 
The most directly critical stance taken by the WCC yet in response to apartheid policies came 
in 1957. In that year, South African churches resisted government policy when the Native Laws 
Amendment Bill of 1957 threatened religious freedom by making it illegal for Africans ‘to attend 
church services, go to schools, hospitals, clubs, or other meetings outside the native areas’. The 
churches protested vehemently and successfully: the provision on church services was weakened. 
Hudson has written that the WCC, for its part, responded to the Bill in terms of human rights: ‘At the 
1957 meetings of the CCIA Executive Committee and of the Central Committee, resolutions took 
note of the treason trials and this violation of human rights [the Native Laws Amendment Bill].’499 But 
while the CCIA’s annual report described the Executive Committee’s discussion of ‘the evils of 
segregation and other discriminatory practices’ as one concerned with ‘violations of human rights’, the 
Committee’s resolution on the subject, as well as the subsequent Central Committee resolution, 
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avoided such language in favor of more conciliatory words of ‘interest, understanding, and Christian 
concern’.500 Moreover, it is telling that it was a racially discriminatory policy with direct implications 
for religious freedom that triggered this response. The CCIA’s human rights agenda remained focused 
on religious freedom above all.  
 
Sharpeville, Cottesloe, Mindolo, and the limits of dialogue 
From 1960 on, however, the WCC’s attitude gradually became more confrontational. In the 
aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre of that year, in which South African police shot dead 69 
protesters, the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, Joost de Blank, urged the WCC to 
excommunicate the Dutch Reformed Church. According to De Gruchy and De Gruchy, this call led 
the WCC to initiate a December 1960 consultation in Cottesloe, a suburb of Johannesburg, in which 
eighty representatives of ten South African member churches met with each other and with a 
multiracial seven-member WCC delegation.501 The consultation issued a relatively reserved 
denunciation of ‘unjust discrimination’, but for the Dutch Reformed Churches even this statement 
went much too far. After a period of controversy, and under pressure from the government, they 
announced their rejection of the statement adopted at Cottesloe and withdrew from the WCC, setting 
in motion a drift of the South African churches towards isolation.502 
The consultation’s statement, adopted by the vast majority of the participants, did not refer to 
human rights or international actors, focusing as it did on theological dialogue about apartheid. But a 
few of the consultation’s discussion groups, of which there were four ongoing at a time, provided 
hints of the prevalent views on these subjects. One group agreed on a statement of ‘scriptural 
principles’ on ‘race relationships’, which ‘leaned very heavily’ on a statement produced in preparation 
by the Dutch Reformed Church (Cape). One of the first principles was that  
‘Man was created in the image of God, and for this reason, there is no respect of persons before 
Him[.] As Creator God is the Father of all men, irrespective of the racial group or nation to which 
they belong, and for this reason all creatures are of equal worth before God’.  
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A footnote to this principle stated that the group agreed ‘that the egalitarian doctrines of 18th century 
liberalism are not of Scriptural warrant’.503 Repeated references to the ‘human dignity’ of the ‘Bantu’ 
(Africans) thus did not mean that they could claim human rights. Insofar as they had rights 
nonetheless, another discussion group affirmed, these were conditional on meeting Christian 
civilizational criteria: ‘In proportion, as the Bantu absorb the Christian principles of civilization and as 
their sense of duty and responsibility develops accordingly, all rights and privileges shall be accorded 
them together with duties and responsibilities.’504  
After Cottesloe, the worsening of relations between the WCC and the Dutch Reformed 
Churches and increasing pressure from both black and white South African opponents of apartheid 
began to shift the WCC towards a more confrontational approach. A milestone in this process was 
the 1964 Mindolo consultation in Northern Rhodesia, on ‘Christian Practice and Desirable Action in 
Social Change and Race Relations’ in Southern Africa. The consultation, organized by the WCC, the 
All Africa Conference of Churches, the liberal South African Institute of Race Relations, and the 
Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation in Northern Rhodesia, brought together more than 50 Christian 
leaders, all critics of apartheid.505 The South African anthropologist and activist Z.K. Matthews, a 
CCIA Commissioner and Africa secretary at the WCC’s Division of Inter-Church Aid, Refugee and 
World Service, ‘warned that in South Africa, violence was the only option left open for blacks to resist 
apartheid’.506 The press release at the end of the consultation, which dealt with race relations in 
Southern Africa at large, pointed to its discussions on fundamental rights. However, such rights 
featured not only with reference to the ‘full and just participation of all’ South Africans. They were 
also raised with the aim of easing fears among South Africa’s white population of a transition to 
majority rule:  
‘[t]o ensure this [full and just participation of all] and to allay the fears of present dominant groups, 
the Consultation recommended that in plural societies the granting of equal rights and 
responsibilities of citizenship should be accompanied by a constitutionally guaranteed Bill of Rights 
entrenching the liberties of all citizens so as to ensure minorities of legal protection secured by an 
independent judiciary.’507  
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Reporting on his visit to Southern Africa after the Mindolo Consultation, Dr. Thomas M. Okuma, 
one of the two secretaries of the WCC’s Secretariat on Racial and Ethnic Relations (along with 
Kitagawa), reported that ‘[p]erhaps the greatest preoccupation of the white populace, who are opposed 
to the policy of apartheid, in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa is the question of the guarantee of 
European rights under an African majority government’. As Okuma explained, ‘[t]he situation is an 
unhappy one for them. On the one hand, Europeans who are working for a change in the present 
racial practices cannot convince others of the necessity for this move unless they can present 
guarantees’. Yet  
‘[o]n the other hand, Africans question the motives of Europeans who demand guarantees, 
maintaining that the guarantees which Europeans desire are those which maintain their positions in 
the status quo. Africans say that the only possible guarantee in any form of government is a 
guarantee of equal rights for all races, economic, political, and social. Moreover, how can Europeans 
talk of guarantees when in the present situation Africans are denied these same rights?’508  
The same problem was registered by the CCIA’s Booth, who noted a contemporaneous Danish 
proposal at the UN ‘that the U.N. itself might be able to offer a guarantee of human rights to minorities 
in South Africa’, that is, to whites in a post-apartheid South Africa. He dismissed this as ‘scarcely 
realistic’, not just because the UN was not credible or acceptable as a guarantor of such rights, but 
also because ‘at present the Afrikaaner is looking for something more than accepted human rights – 
he is seeking ways of preserving his whole way of life and, with the English speaking community, is 
anxious to preserve his high living standards and economic position’.509 Thus, while rights-talk featured 
as part of critiques of apartheid, it was at the same time tangled up with Afrikaner desires to maintain 
their privileged position in South Africa. 
 
The Christian Institute and Pro Veritate 
The fallout from the 1960 Cottesloe consultation spurred into action the figure who would 
quickly become one of the most important white South African Christian voices speaking out against 
apartheid: C.F. Beyers Naudé, a Dutch Reformed pastor and former missionary. In 1963, Naudé 
founded the ecumenical and multiracial Christian Institute, as a means of implementing the call for 
reconciliation between white and black endorsed by the majority of the participants at Cottesloe.510 
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This led his church to strip him of his pastorate. Naudé also began publishing the associated newsletter 
Pro Veritate, and he worked closely with the South African Council of Churches, which had its offices 
in the same building. Naudé regularly drew comparisons between South Africa and Nazi Germany: in 
their version of the Kirchenstreit, the South African church should model itself on Germany’s 
‘Confessing Church’, which had resisted the regime’s demand of fealty. It was fitting, in this respect, 
that on a 1973 visit to South Africa, Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s friend and biographer Eberhard Bethge 
said that Naudé was ‘South Africa’s Bonhoeffer’.511 In pleading for a ‘Confessing Church’ in Pro 
Veritate, Naudé called on the churches to embrace a ‘witness of the recognition of the image of God 
in every man regardless of his class or color, and of the practice of neighborly love, charity, and justice 
in all human and societal relations’.512 
In the issues of Pro Veritate that were available for this study, the concept of human rights only 
surfaces sporadically, usually in reporting on international ecumenical activities, and without further 
comment.513 A possible reason for this was the publication’s need to dissociate itself from accusations 
of ‘liberalism’. A 1965 editorial made clear how great this need was. In response to critics who alleged 
that Pro Veritate was ‘liberal’, the editors shot back that anyone ‘who wishes to exalt himself and his 
human freedom above the truth or the authority of God’s Word is regarded by us as a liberal’.514 In 
line with Pro Veritate’s mission of engaging in theologically-grounded dialogue, this clearly made it 
difficult to speak secular human rights language. But did the members of the Christian Institute desire 
to do so in the first place? 
Though only a more in-depth study of its relation to human rights could answer this question 
in full, the only sustained discussion of human rights in Pro Veritate in the late 1960s suggests they had 
serious reservations, at the very least. This discussion resulted from a long piece by Naudé’s colleague 
at the Christian Institute, Dr. W. Bruckner de Villiers, who wrote a regular section in the periodical. 
In his 15 November 1965 contribution, entitled ‘“Human Rights” and Christian Responsibility’, De 
Villiers associated human rights with the era of mass politics, referring to Adolf Hitler as one of the 
‘arch-apostles’ of the ‘errant doctrine’ that ‘the greatest lie, if it is repeated often and convincingly 
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enough, will persuade the masses to accept it’. De Villiers wrote that ‘[o]one such slogan, repeated ad 
nauseam, and which has probably exerted the greatest and most corrosive influence on the thinking 
as well as the actual historical events of our times, is thát [sic] regarding the supposedly sacrosanct 
inviolability of so-called “human rights”’.515 Reading the extended invective that De Villiers unleashed 
at the concept of human rights, one might have been tempted to think that the piece was a sly satire 
of hardline Dutch Reformed support for apartheid, intended to support human rights while evading 
censorship. But De Villiers’ article did not stop here; instead, it turned to a discussion of why man’s 
fall from grace had stripped him of any rights that his creation in the image of God had conferred 
onto him. Thus, rather than joining in ‘mass screams’ for human rights, Christians should heed the 
call to ‘responsibility’ to God and ‘love’ for one’s neighbor.516 
Responses included that of the American Rev. Leonard Verduin, who at the time was visiting 
South Africa, and who took umbrage at De Villiers’ dismissal of America and its Bill of Rights. Verduin 
marshalled Scriptural passages to show what he felt was the incontrovertible basis for the American 
conviction that ‘all men have been endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights’.517 Another 
critic, writing under the pseudonym of Thomas Didymus, asked De Villiers if his critique of human 
rights meant he condoned tyranny, while he provocatively quoted Rousseau’s accusation that ‘True 
Christians are made to be slaves! They know it, and care little, for, in their eyes, this brief life counts 
for nothing.’518 De Villiers responded that man’s sinful state ‘does not at the same time mean that no 
divine norms or creaturely responsibilities apply to us any longer’, because norms of ‘right and wrong, 
good and evil, better and worse’ were ‘universally revealed divine norms’. De Villiers had thus intended 
his article not as a defense of ‘baseless tyranny’, but rather as an attack on one of its many forms, ‘that 
of the greedy and power-hungry proletarian mass, which seeks to impose its bigoted will upon all and 
sundry almost solely on the strength of the hollow slogan of “human rights” instead of upon really 
valid grounds’.519 Though De Villiers was probably exceptional in the vehemence with which he 
rejected human rights, the fact that he could put forward and defend his opinion in this way in the 
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pages of Pro Veritate suggests that the Christian Institute was hardly to be counted among the ardent 
supporters of human rights at this time.  
Perhaps the most important action undertaken by South Africa’s ecumenical Christians was 
the 1968 publication of the SACC’s ‘Message to the People of South Africa’. De Gruchy and De 
Gruchy suggest that it was the 1966 WCC’s Geneva conference that spurred Naudé and Bishop 
Burnett to initiate consultations and establish a theological commission which produced this six-page 
document.520 The ‘Message’ denounced separate development as in conflict with ‘the Christian Gospel, 
which offers salvation, both social and individual, through faith in Christ alone’. The SACC argued 
that to insist on the importance of ‘racial characteristics’ meant ‘to reject our own humanity as well as 
the humanity of the other man’. At the same time, it distinguished the gospel, which ‘declares that 
God is love’, from ‘“sentimental humanism”’. Its rejection of separate development was extensively 
argued, but purely on theological grounds. The SACC called on South Africans to ‘be faithful to the 
Gospel of Jesus Christ, and to be committed to Christ alone!’521 The reference to the accusation of 
‘sentimental humanism’, one in line with the South African vilification of ‘liberalism’, seems to have 
been directed at secular languages such as that of human rights. 
This is not to say that human rights language was entirely absent among Christian progressives 
at this time, as shown by the example of Peter Randall, the assistant director of the South African 
Institute for Race Relations. In 1968, Randall gave a lecture on human rights to the Institute, 
apparently in relation to the UN International Year of Human Rights. In the lecture, he introduced 
the Universal Declaration and, strikingly, argued that human rights were at the heart of Christian 
ethics. Drawing on South African precedents such as the ANC’s 1955 Freedom Charter and the 
interdenominational 1956 Bloemfontein conference, which had spoken out in favor of multiracialism, 
Randall expressed his ultimate hope for a Universal Court of Human Rights (modelled on the 
European Court of Human Rights). He focused heavily on civil and political rather than social and 
economic rights, and on the importance of political power rather than a redistribution of power more 
generally.522  
Randall came to play an important role in the Christian Institute’s activities when, in order to 
relate the 1968 SACC ‘Message’ to the churches, it initiated a study project and then an action-oriented 
program, the Study Project on Christianity in an Apartheid Society (Spro-cas) I (1968-1972) and II 
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(1972-1973). Randall was picked to lead this endeavor. As described by De Gruchy and De Gruchy, 
Spro-cas I ‘was an attempt by the SACC and the Christian Institute to work out alternatives to 
apartheid in South African society’. Spro-cas II ‘shifted to action and implementation’, and the 
Christian Institute ‘rapidly attempted to become more clearly involved in the struggle of blacks who 
had rejected any co-operation with the system of separate development’, and ‘was beginning to offer 
a radical critique of the economic structures of South African society’. According to Peter Walshe, 
this meant ‘a parting of company with “the old liberal illusion that change could be effected solely by 
education and moral appeals directed at the privileged”’. Instead the Christian Institute now ‘“began 
to encourage the resurgence of black consciousness as a source of renewed dignity and potential for 
the poor”’.523 A reading of the final report of Spro-cas, entitled A Taste of Power (1973), bears this out. 
Leslie Anne Hadfield has aptly summarized it as follows:  
‘Randall wrote that South Africa needed radical change: black people should share political power, 
workers should have the right to join trade unions, there should be a redistribution of land, wealth, 
and income, greater access to social security and education, and an overhaul of the educational 
system. He also predicted that black people would initiate these changes. They had begun to “taste 
of power” and whites could not indefinitely prevent them from enjoying the full meal.’524  
By the time of Spro-cas’ final report, then, Randall seemed to have traded in his faith in a liberal 
conception of human rights for a much more radical vision of a transfer of power from white to black, 
which did not engage with human rights. 
Both the Christian Institute and the South African Institute for Race Relations, though 
multiracial, struggled to establish legitimacy among black South Africans. A 1964 visit report by the 
WCC’s Dr. Thomas Okuma noted that  
‘Africans tend to look at multi-racial organizations [like the two Institutes] with a jaundiced eye. The 
principal reason is that these organizations are European led [sic] and oriented. In their present 
structures multi-racial institutions cannot speak for Africans, and I was reminded by politically active 
Africans that their influence is nil among the African population.’525  
Among black South Africans, support for human rights was also limited. Saul Dubow has argued that 
the ANC, the most important representative of the South African liberation movement, had turned 
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towards rights language during the 1940s and early 1950s, in the wake of the Atlantic Charter’s 
expression of the hope that ‘after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny (…) all the men in all lands 
may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want’. But this commitment was gradually replaced 
by other means of fighting apartheid, so that ‘it was only in the mid-1980s that the organization’s 
active engagement with rights revived’. As Dubow puts it provocatively, ‘if there was one issue uniting 
Afrikaner and African nationalisms through most of the second half of the twentieth century, and 
throughout the Cold War, it was a mutual suspicion of liberal ideology and of individual-based human 
rights.’526 Thus, the overarching conclusion that arises from this section is that among the WCC’s allies 
and contacts in the South Africa of the 1960s, there was little appetite for the concept of human rights. 
Human rights featured primarily as a language of international support, spoken by actors in the orbit 
of the United Nations. 
 
Apartheid, racism, and human rights at the UN in the mid-1960s 
At the UN, South Africa had become the object of human rights politics even before the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was articulated (many have noted the irony of Prime Minister 
Jan Smuts’ role in inserting human rights into the UN Charter in the first place). But the CCIA in the 
1940s and 1950s did not usually cast issues of ‘race relations’ in terms of human rights. While its 
reports initially mentioned the subject under the broad rubric of ‘human rights and religious liberty’, 
in 1953 the WCC’s General Secretary, W.A. Visser ‘t Hooft, proposed it be reported on separately.527 
Issues like apartheid in South Africa and the ongoing tensions in the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland could instead be discussed under the heading of ‘Situations involving Group Relations’.528 
This reflected a widespread framing among Western churches of these situations as matters of ‘race 
relations’ or ‘racial and ethnic tensions’, a view that was supplanted by a focus on ‘racism’ only over 
the course of the 1960s.529 Moreover, the desire to preserve ecumenical dialogue with South Africa 
meant that the CCIA did little in response to UN denunciations. Thus, the CCIA consistently reported 
that it ‘reserved its position with respect to specific U.N. resolutions or political devices for 
ameliorating conditions’. The CCIA’s rationale for this was that ‘[t]his attitude seems advisable in order 
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not to jeopardize action under way within the Christian fellowship’.530 As an overview of its work from 
1948 to 1966 acknowledged, ‘Racial and ethnic tensions have not figured very much in the C.C.I.A. 
business during the first two decades’.531 
The UN in the 1960s promulgated several major declarations and instruments to fight racism, 
but the CCIA provided these only with general support. When the UN adopted its 1963 Declaration 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the CCIA reported that ‘[w]ithout 
commitment to detailed provisions, C.C.I.A. officers generally supported the objectives sought by the 
declaration and have continued to encourage all other efforts which are indispensable to the 
attainment of full racial equality.’ The 1963 Declaration set in motion the process of drafting a 
convention on the same issue. The CCIA welcomed this prospect, but not without reservations: ‘While 
debates on this subject can hardly be expected to remain without political or anti-colonial overtones, 
C.C.I.A. officers are keeping U.N. delegates informed’ of WCC positions and ecumenical church 
efforts ‘to renounce all forms of segregation or discrimination and to work for their abolition within 
their own life and within society’.532 In 1965, the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) was adopted, an achievement in which small states from 
the global South had played a key role, as recently described by Steven L.B. Jensen.533 But again, while 
the CCIA monitored the process with interest and reported that its representatives had ‘generally 
supported the objectives sought by the declaration’, they did not commit to specific provisions, 
suggesting a largely passive role.534  
The CCIA did not see much scope for itself to act, because it understood the issues at hand 
as ones of ‘communal tensions’:  
‘the limits of useful external influence are soon reached in all such communal tensions, while it 
remains emphatically true that the world community, itself multi-racial, cannot dissociate itself from 
the struggle for racial justice in any country’.535  
The continued understanding of these issues as pertaining to relations within ‘communities’ that 
needed to work through these problems internally militated against interventions in terms of human 
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rights, which would have involved identifying victims and perpetrators, or (in the language of later 
years) oppressed and oppressors. In the view of the CCIA, this would upend the necessary process of 
dialogue and reconciliation and was more likely to exacerbate conflict rather than to solve it. 
The increasingly dramatic and widely disseminated politics of American civil rights (discussed 
further in the next section) and South African apartheid challenged this view. On 12 June 1963, Fagley 
wrote to O. Frederick Nolde and Kenneth G. Grubb, the CCIA’s director and chairman, respectively, 
that the ‘pell-mell proliferation of ferments for racial justice in the U.S., stimulated in part by rapid 
emancipation in Africa, suggests a lacuna in our C.C.I.A. submission’ to a conference at the time.536 
On 21 June 1963, Fagley wrote to his two colleagues again, about his being ‘impressed by the rapidity 
with which the bubbling cauldron of racial tensions in the U.S. is beginning to boil’, which was leading 
‘international interest’ to grow ‘by leaps and bounds – for better or worse’. In light of the ‘emerging 
international conscience against racial injustice’, it seemed to Fagley  
‘that our present posture is inadequate. We quote ecumenical statements condemning racial 
discrimination and refer to representation at the church level. Do we not need to see a common 
mind on the degree to which we recognize racial injustice as a legitimate international concern, 
relating the ecumenical statements to international affairs?’537  
Shortly after, the CCIA Executive Committee meeting at Rochester, New York, from 19 to 
22 August 1963, took up such concerns in its statement on ‘International aspects of racial and ethnic 
tensions’ (drafted by Grubb). This led the WCC Central Committee immediately after to issue a three-
part statement on ‘Racial and Ethnic Tensions’. The second part of this statement included a phrase 
which focused attention on rights, though no connection was made to international human rights 
provisions:  
‘[All Christians] must urge the government of the Republic [of South Africa] to re-establish contact 
with the African, Coloured, and Indian Communities; to lose no time in reversing the political trend; 
in securing full political, civil and economic rights for all members of these communities, particularly 
for those in urban areas, and to restore justice to all.’538  
In October 1963, after the Rochester Central Committee meeting, the CCIA’s officers ‘decided to give 
a high degree of priority to’ South Africa.539 Subsequently, at its meeting at Geneva, 19-22 June 1964, 
the CCIA Executive Committee stated that in South Africa, CCIA officers were to  
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‘Encourage and support such international actions, particularly through the U.N. or consonant with 
the U.N. Charter as are necessary to create conditions in which all men have equal rights, equal 
participation in government, and equal economic opportunity in South Africa.’540  
Thus, the mid-1960s represented a moment in which human rights came to play a gradually more 
significant role in the CCIA’s approach to South Africa. As the next section shows, however, when, 
at the end of the decade, the WCC pivoted towards supporting the ANC and other liberation 
organizations, the nascent connection between antiracism and human rights in its work at the UN 
played at most an auxiliary role. 
Civil rights and the Programme to Combat Racism 
Civil rights, human rights, and the WCC 
The relationship between civil rights and human rights is an issue of ongoing scholarly 
contention. Many scholars have observed that while the rise of human rights in the 1940s raised hopes 
among civil rights activists and was seen by some as a way to connect their domestic to their 
international (anticolonialist) concerns, this hope did not survive in the long run. The significance of 
the connection in the first place, its longevity, and its legacy remain open to question.541 Barbara Keys 
has provided a nuanced account of this question, arguing that in the 1950s and 1960s ‘human rights 
were a familiar component of the discourse of civil rights’, functioning not as its core or a more 
advanced version of it but as ‘an auxiliary of civil rights, invoked in the natural law tradition of the 
rights of man’. By contrast, from 1973 on, human rights ‘began to conjure up not the rights of 
Americans guaranteed by domestic law but the rights of foreigners as delineated in UN documents’.542 
The most clearly internationalist embrace of human rights, as Moyn has pointed out, was 
Malcolm X’s turn to the concept in the months before his assassination.543 Peniel Joseph has described 
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Malcolm X’s statement, delivered after his break with the Nation of Islam and in an attempt to reach 
out to civil rights leaders, at the New York Park-Sheraton Hotel, on 12 March 1964. Malcolm X 
‘predicted that the year 1964 threatened to be “an explosive one”, and he was determined to actively 
engage in what he called a human rights struggle’.544 This was followed by his five-month tour of 
Africa, after which he gave his ‘The Ballot or the Bullet’ speech in Cleveland, Detroit, and elsewhere. 
‘Braiding an analysis of self-defense, electoral politics, and Pan-Africanism with an assertion that 
America’s civil rights struggles were part of a global movement’, Joseph writes, Malcolm told his 
audiences that ‘“We need to expand the civil rights struggle to a higher level – the level of human 
rights”’.545 Malcolm X created the Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU), which remained as 
small as a few hundred members, but which issued a press release during his trip to Africa, where he 
attended a meeting in Cairo of the Organization of African Unity, transmitting a similar message as 
his speech had. ‘Our problem is your problem (…) It is not a Negro problem, nor an American 
problem. (…) This is a world problem; a problem for humanity. It is not a problem of civil rights, but 
a problem of humanity.’546 But though it was rhetorically powerful, Malcolm’s connection of Pan-
Africanism to human rights seems to have remained the exception. As Moshik Temkin has argued, he 
was by this point an outsider to the civil rights movement.547 
More representative of the civil rights movement than Malcolm X’s statements were those of 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. According to Thomas F. Jackson, King, a democratic socialist at heart, 
was driven to the language of human rights by his desire to emphasize the global nature of the struggle 
against racism and the wish to strike more broad-based alliances, especially with labor unions. 
Moreover, King faced the problem that demands for economic justice could not be phrased in the 
language of civil rights, because the American constitution, at which such appeals were directed, 
provided only for the right to property, not to work or related socioeconomic rights. Thus, King 
proclaimed in 1965, ‘It is not a constitutional right that men have jobs, but it is a human right.’548 While 
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different views exist on how to date King’s shift towards human rights, it is clear that in the final years 
of his life, he gravitated in this direction.549  
The American National Council of Churches (NCC), meanwhile, the WCC’s biggest 
constituent, had connected antiracism to human rights in the 1940s (when it was still the Federal 
Council). It included social and economic rights in its conception of human rights. As Gene Zubovich 
has argued, a December 1948 NCC conference in Cincinnati, Ohio, attempted to ‘apply international 
norms to the institution of segregation’. One of the key figures behind the final statement the meeting 
was produced was Fagley, who would go on to serve as a core staff member of the CCIA. Fagley and 
a colleague drew on the Universal Declaration as well as the WCC’s statement at Amsterdam. They 
put forward two categories of rights: those that were long-established in American society, and those, 
namely ‘social, economic, and cultural rights’, which ‘were new and needed special effort to become 
established’. Doing so was imperative in relation to segregation, which was incompatible with these 
rights.550 This emphasis on the inclusion of social, economic, and cultural rights, either survived into 
the early 1960s or it was revived at this time (as further research will have to show). A 1963 NCC 
policy statement on human rights, timed to coincide with the fifteenth anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration, included a range of ‘economic rights’, including the right to ‘obtain employment solely 
on the basis of ability and character’ and the right to ‘receive equal pay for equal work’. The 
‘pronouncement’ also included a set of ‘social and cultural rights’, including the right to ‘receive equal 
service from businesses and persons serving the public’.551 Over the course of the 1960s, though, the 
NCC’s human rights agenda became less concerned with domestic matters and more with 
international affairs. Jill K. Gill has argued that by 1968, the year of King’s death, the NCC’s position 
on human rights was focused on international issues, such as discrimination in Southern Africa and 
religious freedom in Eastern Europe. Its opposition to the Vietnam War and its ‘new focus on heeding 
the voices of the oppressed (…) set the entire Council on a human rights course that emphasized 
systemic economic and political empowerment for the poor and marginalized’ worldwide.552 
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As the largest constituent of the WCC and an important contributor of personnel, the NCC’s 
influence in pushing the ecumenical movement to a stronger stance on racism cannot be 
underestimated. This was especially so since the WCC’s new General Secretary from 1966, the 
Presbyterian Rev. Eugene Carson Blake, had previously served as a leader of the National Council of 
Churches. In 1963, he had participated in the March on Washington, and he was insistent that the 
WCC should make racism a central concern.553 Rev. Andrew Young, who would be appointed one of 
the PCR’s first commissioners, had been a close associate of King’s and had served as executive 
director of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (he would go on to become US Ambassador 
to the UN under the Carter administration). WCC staff member Rena Karefa-Smart, who would lead 
staff efforts to drum up support for a strong stance on racism at the Uppsala Assembly and played a 
leading role in the PCR, was the first black woman graduate from Yale Divinity School and would go 
on to become a professor at Howard University. One of the PCR’s secretaries, Rev. Charles Spivey, 
came from a civil rights background (Baldwin Sjollema, the head of the PCR, identified his perspective 
as one of Black Power554). And though not part of the PCR, the CCIA’s secretary, Dwain C. Epps, 
had first been ‘conscienticized’ by his encounter with the Student Non-violent Coordinating 
Committee in Mississippi in the early 1960s.555 Awareness of the civil rights movement and racism in 
the US context, which at the time had the attention of a worldwide audience, thus served as a common 
frame of reference for the WCC’s discussions on race. 
Chroniclers of the WCC’s antiracism have emphasized the importance of the stance it took at 
its 1954 Assembly in Evanston, Illinois, where President Eisenhower welcomed the delegates to the 
United States. A few months earlier, the American Supreme Court had arrived at its decision in Brown 
v. Board of Education, a victory against segregation in public schools, energizing the civil rights 
movement. Moreover, in the preceding years the South African government had gradually 
implemented apartheid policies, leading to international outcry. The civil rights movement and the 
anti-apartheid movement came together at Evanston, perhaps most dramatically in the speech by 
Mays, in which he refuted South African justifications for apartheid.556 The Evanston Assembly 
declared ‘its conviction that any form of segregation based on race, colour, or ethnic origin is contrary 
to the gospel, and is incompatible with the Christian doctrine of man and with the nature of the 
                                                 
553 Laine, Ecumenical Attack, 5. 
554 Baldwin Sjollema, Never Bow to Racism: A Personal Account of the Ecumenical Struggle (Geneva: WCC, 2015) 92. 
555 Epps, interview with the author, 22 July 2016. 
556 Michael G. Thompson, For God and Globe: Christian Internationalism in the United States between the Great War and the Cold 
War (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2015) 197. 
149 
 
Church of Christ.’557 While, according to Laine, these intonations were chiefly directed at the church 
itself, the Assembly also spurred the churches to undertake action against discriminatory laws, 
including laws against racial or ethnic intermarriage.558 
The WCC itself did not spring into action after Evanston, however. Only in 1960 did it 
establish its Secretariat on Race and Ethnic Relation, which carried out studies and co-organized the 
1964 Mindolo consultation. But the fact that its work was not so much as mentioned at the 1968 
Uppsala Assembly suggests it was of limited significance.559 The WCC’s deliberations in the following 
years produced a steady trickle of statements reaffirming what had been said at Evanston and building 
on it, but only near the end of the 1960s did the critical mass accrue for it to undertake more decisive 
action. The continued impulse of the American civil rights movement was essential to this. In 1966, 
Martin Luther King addressed the WCC’s Conference on Church and Society in Geneva through a 
recorded message (race riots in Chicago had prevented him from attending). The sermon he gave was 
‘A Knock at Midnight’, which included a strong reference South African apartheid and to the 
‘frustrating midnight of economic deprivation’. King called on the churches to bring closer ‘that 
brighter day when all of God’s children will live together as brothers and every man will respect the 
dignity and the worth of human personality’.560 In response, the WCC sent him a message of solidarity, 
which included reference to human rights: ‘we earnestly pray that in the United States the challenge 
to fulfil the pledges of human rights and dignity may be met’.561  
King visited the WCC in 1967 and was invited to give a keynote speech at the 1968 Uppsala 
Assembly. Following King’s assassination, the African-American author James Baldwin took his place. 
Baldwin addressed the hundreds of delegates as ‘one of God’s creatures whom the Church has most 
betrayed’, urging the audience to take a stern look at their role in the continued existence of racism, 
and received a standing ovation. Baldwin’s co-speaker, the British Lord Caradon, though more 
‘measured’ in his approach, ‘called for action and international collaboration as “vain gestures and 
sweeping declarations will solve nothing”’.562 The Assembly did not have time for a fully-developed 
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response to these calls, but concerted lobbying by a group of staff members organized by Blake 
ensured that the Assembly provided a strong mandate for a consultation to work out what a church 
program against racism might look like.563  
The Assembly did, however, issue reports which dealt with racism, and which connected it to 
human rights. It stated that ‘Christians and churches everywhere’ should ‘recognize, support and share 
the individual and collective interests of people who are disadvantaged by their race and ethnic origin, 
so that they may gain the basic human, political and economic rights enjoyed by the others in a 
pluralistic society’.564 In its section on international affairs, the Assembly’s report proclaimed that 
‘[c]ontemporary racism robs all human rights of their meaning and is an imminent danger to peace. 
(…) Racism is a blatant denial of the Christian faith.’565 In a symbolically important move, the Uppsala 
Assembly elected the Anglican Bishop Zulu, the first black bishop of the Anglican Church of the 
Province of South Africa, as a president of the WCC (though South Africa refused to issue him a visa 
to attend).566  
Nolde’s speech on human rights, in the context of the UN International Year of Human 
Rights, touched on racism, in stating that the Assembly offered ‘a signal opportunity for the 
consideration of specific problems, such as racism, in the context of the broader issues of human 
rights’.567 Speaking after Nolde, Dr. Robert K.A. Gardiner, the executive secretary of the UN 
Economic Commission for Africa, tied the need to overcome racism and the legacies of colonialism 
to human rights. The specific policy recommendations under the heading of ‘human rights’ that came 
out of the Uppsala Assembly, however, were still very much focused on developing the UN’s 
international human rights instruments: advocating for ratification and national application of the UN 
Covenants, pushing forward the Draft International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Religious Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief, and promoting the 
appointment of a high-level UN official tasked with coordinating action in the field of human rights.568 
The CCIA’s report at Uppsala on its work relating to ‘human rights and religious liberty’ likewise 
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remained strongly focused on the UN.569 Thus, though the WCC’s human rights and antiracism 
agendas were clearly converging in terms of rhetoric, they were not yet integrated in practice. The less 
UN-centric, more radical trajectory of the PCR would ensure this emergent entanglement remained 
of limited significance. 
 
The creation of the PCR 
Whereas previously the WCC had limited itself to issuing statements denouncing racism, the 
PCR initiated a number of more concrete activities. These ranged from studies and awareness-raising 
(mostly in the West) to direct material support to liberation movements (mostly in Southern Africa). 
This latter aspect was by far its most visible and controversial one, as the PCR set out to provide 
highly symbolic grants to organizations combating racism, most notably black liberation movements 
in Southern Africa. Furthermore, the PCR represented a milestone in that it drew attention to the 
international connections supporting South African apartheid and campaigned for divestment and 
sanctions (this and its grants are discussed in greater detail in the next section). Thus, the PCR did not 
only call for international scrutiny of apartheid, but it also initiated direct support for liberation 
movements and sought to weaken Southern African regimes. 
In a 1983 overview of the human rights policy of the WCC, its Executive Secretary, Erich 
Weingärtner, noted that the PCR had made relatively little use of the language of human rights. 
Nevertheless, to Weingärtner’s mind, the PCR’s work undoubtedly fell within the ambit of human 
rights: 
‘The problem of racism is, of course, a problem of human rights. But because of the persistent 
tendency to regard human rights only in its liberal individualist guise, human rights language was not 
accentuated in the PCR. The emphasis was to move beyond the liberty of individuals to the 
liberation of peoples.’570 
Katharina Kunter has written that ‘It seems as if the fight against racism at this time [1969] wasn’t 
seen as a struggle against the violation of individual’s [sic] human rights. (…) The PCR therefore 
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perhaps also marked an ideological turn for the WCC, where the fight for social justice became more 
important than engag[e]ment for human rights in liberal understanding.’571 
The most important step in developing the PCR was the 1969 Notting Hill consultation, 
chaired by US Senator and Methodist layman George McGovern. This consultation took up the task, 
bequeathed by the Uppsala Assembly, to articulate the foundations for a dedicated program against 
racism. The assassination by parcel bomb of Eduardo Mondlane, the leader of Mozambique’s 
liberation movement FRELIMO, who had been due to speak at the gathering, loomed over the 
gathering (Mondlane had previously spoken at the WCC’s 1966 conference on Church and Society).572 
The six-day consultation, held in west London, was at times chaotic. One meeting was disrupted by 
members of the far-right National Front. Near the end of the consultation, an American delegation 
of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee interrupted the proceedings, reading out a 
‘Declaration of Revolution’, which echoed James Forman’s ‘Black Manifesto’ in demanding the 
churches pay reparations. The consultation, which had the liberty and the drive to be more radical 
than the more staid Uppsala Assembly, called upon the churches  
‘to move beyond charity, grants and traditional programming to relevant and sacrificial action 
leading to new relationships of dignity and justice among all men, and to become agents for the 
radical reconstruction of society. There can be no justice in our world without a transfer of economic 
resources to undergird the redistribution of political power and to make cultural self-determination 
meaningful.’573  
These lines indicated the thrust of the WCC’s new approach to antiracism, to which human rights 
were only auxiliary. At the Notting Hill consultation, a number of contributions, including that of the 
ANC’s president, Oliver Tambo, and the position paper of the NCC, referenced human rights, but 
such uses were overshadowed by more structural and collective emphases. The consultation’s report 
only used the phrase to say that the CCIA was to work through the UN, and ‘churches should urge 
their governments to act upon international conventions’, specifically the ‘U.N. Declaration on 
Human Rights’ and the ICERD. A separate one-paragraph resolution welcomed the ICERD and 
called for its ratification and implementation, but this was followed by a much longer and forceful 
section calling for the churches to ‘make a serious and negotiated response to the demand of 
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reparation[s]’, a subject the consultation gave far more serious attention to.574 A statement by Epps to 
the UN Division on Human Rights in 1973 showed that the CCIA would soon become impatient 
with the UN’s emphasis on ‘standard-setting’, since it had thus far failed to find ‘ways effectively to 
implement its many already existing resolutions and conventions condemning racial discrimination 
and apartheid’.575 
The grants disbursed by the PCR’s Special Fund totaled $4,188,000 between 1970 and 1980, 
half of which went to Africa, and most of the rest to Europe and North America.576 The grants were 
disbursed on the basis of a principle of equality: while intended for humanitarian and educational 
purposes, the WCC would not audit how the money was spent. A number of the organizations in 
question, such as the ANC in South Africa, had rejected nonviolence as insufficiently effective. In 
response, the South African Prime Minister John Vorster charged that the churches were ‘subsidizing 
murder in the name of God’. This resonated with many Western Christians, who were deeply troubled 
by the idea that they were abetting violence against fellow Christians.577 Many were also sensitive to 
the concern that liberation movements were Marxist and received aid from the Soviet bloc. The 
Programme thus became the most controversial initiative in the WCC’s history – to some, like the 
Central Committee’s chairman, M.M. Thomas, it was a breakthrough in the Council’s work, but to 
others it was a bridge too far.578 
The PCR’s Special Fund triggered intensive discussions on the Christian attitude to violence. 
The Addis Ababa meeting’s report captured some of the ambivalence in the WCC’s stance, in stating 
that ‘the WCC does not and cannot identify itself completely with any political movement, nor does 
it pass judgement on those victims of racism who are driven to violence as the only way left for them 
to redress grievances and to open the way for a new and more just social order.’579 Laine has analyzed 
this aspect of the PCR in detail, noting that as early as the 1964 Mindolo consultation, participants 
considered violence as a potential last resort, though under strict conditions.580 At the 1970 
Arnoldshain meeting of the PCR’s International Advisory Council, which set out policy priorities for 
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the program, it was accepted that in some cases, victims of racism had no choice but to resist it in 
ways that broke the law. While funds disbursed by the Special Fund would not in any way be 
controlled, applicants did have to give ‘their assurance that should they receive funds they would not 
be used for purchasing military equipment but only for humanitarian purposes’.581 Partly due to poor 
communication on the PCR’s part and partly due to church apprehension at the Special Fund’s 
implications, this was the beginning of a years-long controversy, as the PCR persisted in carrying out 
what it felt was the mandate it had been given by the churches, while criticized by those who felt the 
Special Fund went too far. 
Although human rights language cropped up in attempts to defend the PCR against its 
critics582, there remained the ‘persistent tendency’ in the WCC to conceive of human rights in a 
gradualist and liberal manner, focused on religious freedom and related civil and political rights, as 
mentioned by Weingärtner (himself a proponent of the capacious conception of human rights 
developed during the 1970s). In an apparent response to this ‘tendency’, at the next Central Committee 
meeting, in West Berlin in 1974, the PCR attempted to clarify the relationship between racism and 
human rights. However, its contribution, which is worth quoting in full, was in a curiously defensive 
key:  
‘We agree with many that the question of racism has always been considered as a violation of Human 
Rights. Racial discrimination gravely distorts human relationships; institutionalised racism 
perpetuates injustice and endangers peace between peoples. Racism is one of many forms of 
discrimination, such as discrimination on grounds of sex, age, creed, national origin, all of which 
can lead to the denial of basic human rights. 
However, it must be understood that for the victims of racism it would be a blurring of the 
issue to widen the scope of the programme so much that the particular focus on racism is lost. 
Therefore, we would reaffirm that the emphasis on racism as a particular denial of human rights 
should remain essential to and central in the Programme to Combat Racism.’583  
Though the PCR’s text did not specify to which suggestion it was responding, this seemed like a 
rejection of the idea that the PCR should be widened to the entire gamut of discrimination, under the 
banner of human rights, rather than only racism. It is not clear from the official documents that this 
proposal was in fact put forward by its critics, but the fact that the PCR felt compelled to preempt it 
shows that its staff perceived a tension between antiracism and human rights. Human rights could be 
used, they feared, as a way of diluting the PCR’s focus. 
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The PCR’s view of human rights as a potential curb on its ambition also showed in its report 
to the Nairobi Assembly of 1975. This included the trenchant lines that  
‘[t]he PCR has no choice between merely demanding standards of minimum treatment or identifying 
the causes of racism and combatting them. The latter course was the only one possible. It was the 
right decision if only for the reason that the oppressors wrongly claim that human rights can be 
donated by the powerful to the powerless.’584  
This formulation was clearly a critique of an approach to human rights that limited itself to demanding 
of the South African regime that it respect the human rights of the nonwhite population, especially if 
human rights meant mere ‘standards of minimum treatment’. Such an approach simply did not provide 
the prospect of fundamental change, in the PCR’s view, and smacked of the very paternalism the 
program set out to break with. It did not signal a rejection of human rights as such, and in this it was 
consistent with the 1974 report’s acknowledgment that racism was, in a broad sense, a question of 
human rights. Thus, it left open the possibility that the ecumenical conception of human rights could 
itself be transformed into something sufficiently ambitious. Such a process was, of course, ongoing at 
the time, and the Nairobi Assembly’s section on international affairs wove together human rights and 
antiracism more closely than ever before.585 To the extent that the Nairobi Assembly’s conception of 
human rights – discussed in chapter 6 – also entailed an emphasis on direct support to emancipatory 
movements, it moved towards reconciling the PCR’s Special Fund with human rights. 
 
Conclusions 
Despite the ecumenical movement’s early pronouncements on race, the connection between 
antiracism and human rights was anything but self-evident. Though the early WCC’s statements were 
analogous to the UN’s provisions against discrimination, they did not develop into a significant part 
of the WCC’s human rights agenda until the 1960s. ‘Race relations’ were understood to be a separate 
issue from human rights – which was then principally to do with religious freedom and associated 
liberties – which called for dialogue, so that those practicing racial discrimination might be persuaded 
to see the error of their ways. During the 1940s and 1950s, the interlocutors of the WCC in South 
Africa were primarily white churches, though the ecumenical movement did press, successfully, for 
multiracial contacts. 
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It took the mobilization of the American civil rights movement and the violence inflicted on 
them, as well as on South African protesters, by intransigent white supremacists, to start shifting the 
WCC to a more confrontational posture. The close link between the CCIA and the UN, where 
increasingly ambitious measures against racism were being developed, likewise spurred the ecumenical 
movement to action. The CCIA’s engagement with human rights, and its supranational position, 
invited it to begin crafting a policy that deployed human rights language in the cause of antiracism. 
But the CCIA remained committed to its liberal human rights idiom, focused on nondiscrimination 
and civil and political rights, whereas antiracism, especially in a case like the struggle against apartheid, 
was growing into something more radical. 
Thus, there was only a weak connection between the WCC’s human rights agenda from 1948 
to 1968 and its establishment of the Programme to Combat Racism in 1969. The discussions leading 
up to the PCR’s creation were dominated by concern for structural, especially economic, factors. Its 
willingness to effectively condone violence distinguished it sharply from the nonviolence associated 
with both human and civil rights. Moreover, the established focus of the WCC – and especially its 
constituency – on liberal rights led the PCR to regard those advocating for anti-apartheid in terms of 
human rights with suspicion. Only to the extent that, in the 1970s, the WCC was able to redefine 
human rights to be compatible with support for collective struggles for liberation could the PCR’s 
work be fully understood as a human rights program. To the extent that human rights remained 
associated with demands for ‘standards of minimum treatment’ instead, it could only serve as an 
auxiliary. While the PCR’s stress on supporting emancipatory organizations stimulated the WCC to 
apply similar approaches elsewhere, it was the rise of military dictatorships in Latin America, above 
all, that would lead it to develop a conception of human rights that combined individual and collective 
rights.  
  
157 
 
5. Human rights as a language of liberation: 
the ecumenical response to military 
dictatorships in Latin America in the 1970s 
‘There is then a twofold violation of human rights in the Third World, the violation of the rights of 
the masses, who comprise the societies of the poor nations, and the violation of the rights of those 
who struggle for those rights to be respected.’586 – Julio de Santa Ana, no date [early 1973] 
‘Taking the old language of human rights, so frequently and rightly criticized for being a liberal 
facade for ignominious behaviour in too many cases, we sought to give it a new content.’587 – Dwain 
C. Epps, 1973 
Introduction 
Opposition to the rise of military dictatorships in Latin America served as the crucible in which 
ecumenical human rights engagement underwent a fundamental and multifaceted transformation 
during the 1970s. Violence in Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and above all Chile, among other countries, 
galvanized a worldwide response during these years, generating an intricate transnational network that 
deployed the language of human rights.588 The World Council of Churches (WCC) was a key 
component of this transnational network, which included many Christian actors. Its longstanding 
commitment to human rights in its earlier guise, focused on religious freedom, no doubt helped to 
enable this response, and Latin American countries, especially Colombia, had received the attention 
of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA) and the International Missionary 
Council (IMC) from the 1940s. Moreover, the establishment of the colonels’ regime in Greece in 1967 
had prompted sustained ecumenical engagement in terms of civil and political human rights, as part 
of an international campaign that foreshadowed the rise of human rights in the 1970s.589 But the 
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repression that intensified across Latin America during the 1970s provoked a far more extensive and 
lasting ecumenical response, one that would exert a formative – if contested – influence on ecumenical 
thinking about human rights. 
As Patrick William Kelly has noted, the literature on human rights in Latin America in the 
1970s has hitherto been largely national in frame, a situation which he sets out to rectify as he analyzes 
how activists used ‘this new moral and political vocabulary [of human rights] to challenge prevailing 
notions of state sovereignty and social activism, blurring the borders of the nation-state to endow an 
individual with a set of rights protected by international law’.590 While Kelly includes the WCC, which 
he rightly identifies as an ‘underappreciated actor’, in his analysis, it is only as one organization among 
several, including Amnesty International.591 While this chapter deals with some of the same events as 
his narrative, it places these more fully in the context of the ecumenical movement and its approach 
to human rights. In particular, it considers in greater depth the relationship between civil and political 
rights on one hand and social, economic, and collective rights on the other. These two sets of rights 
correlate to what Kelly has distinguished, following Samuel Moyn, as ‘depoliticized’ human rights 
activism and ‘overt political paradigms’, specifically Marxist anti-imperialism, which adopted human 
rights language instrumentally: ‘Where Amnesty saw human rights as an ideology that rose above 
politics, solidarity activists saw it as a means to a political end.’592 I argue that even though the general 
trend of Latin American human rights activism was towards a narrow, depoliticized focus on civil and 
political rights, especially torture, the WCC and some of its contacts were determined not to let what 
they understood as the structural root causes of political repression disappear from view. The 
inflection of their perspective by Marxism, anti-imperialism, and most of all liberation theology 
ensured this. 
The chapter proceeds in three parts, the first of which presents a discussion of the 
development of liberation theology and its uneasy relationship with human rights. The second part 
traces the WCC and its interlocutors’ engagement with human rights in Brazil and Uruguay – a country 
which Kelly’s analysis omits – as well as through regional contacts, which shows nascent attempts at 
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using human rights to counter repression while keeping in view more structural issues. The third and 
largest section discusses the ecumenical network’s response to the establishment of the junta in Chile, 
leading to the creation of the Human Rights Resources Office for Latin America (HRROLA). 
 
Liberation theology and human rights 
Annegreth Schilling’s recent work has spotlighted the period of 1955 to 1975 as a time when 
Latin American Protestantism in the ecumenical movement experienced a ‘boom’. Whereas even in 
the early twentieth century, Latin America ‘was not only seen as a Catholic but was also defined as a 
“neglected continent”’, by the 1960s Latin American Protestantism became enmeshed in ‘political 
theories such as Christian socialism and dependency theory’, ‘growing international solidarity in the 
political field’, and efforts at ‘developing a contextual Protestant theology from Latin America’.593 This 
latter undertaking was connected to the rise of Latin American liberation theology, which – against 
the background of a long history of Catholic Church entanglement with imperial rule and landowning 
elites – sought to recover ‘the church itself from its historical complicity in colonial and capitalist 
oppression’.594 Though Latin American Protestantism was, according to Schilling, perceived very 
differently, namely ‘as an emancipatory movement, and as a precursor of modernity, particularly 
through attitudes to education, representative democracy, and economic liberalism’, Protestant 
theologians were ‘often on the same track’ as Catholics, especially ‘in their theological reasoning’.595 
While liberation theology had roots in the 1950s, it was after the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) 
that it gained steam. The Second General Conference of Latin American Bishops, organized by the 
Latin American Episcopal Council, held in Medellín in 1968, is usually seen as the decisive moment 
in this respect: the documents produced here reflected on the application of the Second Vatican 
Council to Latin America, and gave a major impetus to the spread of liberation theology in the 
region.596 
As Schilling writes, the WCC’s primary point of contact in the region was the network Church 
and Society in Latin America (Iglesia y Sociedad en América Latina, ISAL), which was founded in 1961, 
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building on an older Latin American Christian student movement and youth organization.597 ISAL’s 
goal was to bring together Latin American churches to address the challenges facing the continent in 
the social, political, and economic realms, and to represent a Latin American voice in the international 
ecumenical movement. Its most important activities were social and educational projects as well as 
publishing an eponymous bulletin and the journal Cristianismo y Sociedad. The movement included 
figures such as the Argentinian theologian José Míguez Bonino (who would serve as one of the WCC’s 
presidents from 1975 to 1983), the Brazilian Reformed theologian Rubem Alves, and was led during 
its first seven years by the Argentinian Methodist layman Luis Odell. Theologically, it drew inspiration 
first from Karl Barth and later more from Dietrich Bonhoeffer – intellectual connections that linked 
it to European theology, which it took in new directions.598 Based in Montevideo, Uruguay, the 
organization was criticized by some for focusing on and representing too much the more European-
oriented countries of the Southern Cone.599 It was composed largely of young male intellectuals 
(theologians as well as laymen) of radical leftist political orientation, who were critical of the more 
reserved political attitude of most Latin American churches. Staff relations between ISAL and the 
WCC were tight, in no small part due to the exiling of many members as authoritarian rule intensified 
in Uruguay and Argentina. ISAL’s general secretaries between 1968 and 1975 (when repression forced 
it to end its activities) were Leopoldo Niilus, Julio de Santa Ana, and Oscar Bolioli. Santa Ana would 
become study secretary of the WCC’s recently founded Commission for the Churches’ Participation 
in Development (CCPD) from 1972 on, and Bolioli had already worked at the WCC, as the executive 
secretary of the WCC’s Youth Department from 1968 to 1972. Niilus became the new Director of the 
CCIA. In addition, the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, whose conception of ‘conscientization’ is 
discussed further below, upon his exile worked for the WCC’s education department and exerted a 
widespread intellectual influence. It is therefore no surprise that, according to Daniel Salinas, ‘in Latin 
America the two [ISAL and the WCC] were seen as one’.600 
ISAL representatives played an important role in challenging the WCC’s established focus on 
the ‘responsible society’, as exemplified by the Brazilian-American missionary Richard Shaull’s 
intervention at the 1966 Church and Society conference in Geneva. Shaull challenged the WCC to 
embrace the need for ‘revolution’, which he applied to the relationship between the West and the 
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Third World. ‘Revolution’, in itself not an entirely new concept within ecumenical thought but tainted 
by its association with communism, was understood by Shaull and others as a ‘permanent revolution’, 
signifying not ‘a sudden political overthrow of a regime’ but ‘slowly forcing the political and economic 
system to change’.601 An important element in this understanding of ‘revolution’, though, was Shaull’s 
rejection of strict adherence to nonviolence: ‘“there may in fact be some situations, in which only the 
threat or use of violence can set the process of change in motion”’.602 For this reason as well as the 
concept’s radical implications more generally, many European delegates resisted it.603 An attempt by 
General Secretary W.A. Visser ‘t Hooft to mollify Shaull and likeminded ecumenists by calling for the 
notion of a responsible society to be ‘renewed and reinterpreted in view of the need for a responsible 
world community and the demands for international economic justice’ failed.604 In the view of 
representatives of the ‘Third World’, this concept of a global responsible society ‘relied on a far too 
harmonious picture of a world community’. As Schilling writes, after thus upending the consensus 
position of the ‘responsible society’, those who wanted to address the uneven relationship between 
the global North and South shifted from the concept of ‘revolution’ to ‘humanization’ and 
‘liberation’.605 Liberation theology became the most important channel through which the ecumenical 
movement was exhorted to respond to the demands of its increasingly global constituency.606 
Both ISAL and the WCC were key actors in the development of liberation theology. ISAL 
would organize five of the most important conferences on liberation theology during the early 
1970s.607 And through the Joint Commission on Society, Development and Peace (SODEPAX), the 
WCC and the Vatican’s Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace together created ‘a space where the 
approach of liberation theology was designed and discussed ecumenically’.608 This cooperation in itself 
reflected the remarkable rapprochement between Protestantism and Catholicism, already noted at the 
end of chapter 3. At SODEPAX’s 1969 Cartigny consultation, Gustavo Gutiérrez, a Catholic priest 
from Peru, and ISAL’s Alves, both presented lengthy papers, which represented an important step in 
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moving from revolution to liberation – according to the historical sociologist Christian Smith, the 
event represented the ‘first international, public exposition of liberation theology’.609 Gutiérrez 
presented the ideas that would underpin his 1971 book, A Theology of Liberation, which would become 
liberation theology’s seminal text. Alves wrote of the need to ‘help human communities to transform 
the wordless groaning [of the Spirit] into articulate and conscious speech. This is the new language we 
are looking for.’610 (This reference originated in Exodus 2:24 – ‘God heard their groaning and he 
remembered his covenant with Abraham, with Isaac and with Jacob’ – and would be used by other 
theologians as well, including at the WCC.) In Alves’ view, the rise of Third World dictatorships, 
already apparent at this time, was a technocratic response (‘technologism’) to the problem of 
underdevelopment, to which he opposed the ‘process of humanization’, which ‘aims at no utopia but 
at a society which remains permanently open and unfinished’; ‘it is amidst the process that man finds 
his true humanity’.611 Neither presentation, however, referred to human rights. 
This was no coincidence: as Kelly has also written, ‘liberation theologians in the 1960s spoke 
rarely in the language of human rights’, focused as they were on ‘social and economic inequalities’. 
Gutiérrez’ A Theology of Liberation did not engage with human rights, a fact that Kelly explains as ‘less 
a conscious eschewal on his part than an example of the relative marginality of human rights before 
the 1970s’, a consequence of their apparent inutility in addressing questions of inequality.612 An 
important aspect of this was the association of human rights with individual rights, not least property 
rights. This clashed with an analysis at the level of ‘the community’, which David Keith May describes 
as a core feature of Gutiérrez’ thought: he focused ‘on the marginalized and poor as a group rather 
than as individuals, and he often emphasizes the power of community action in addressing situations 
of oppression’.613 
This skepticism or even suspicion of human rights was connected to longstanding Marxist 
critiques of the concept as one that served to legitimate bourgeois privileges and control over the 
masses. As Mark Engler has written, many liberation theologians were influenced by Marxism in 
viewing human rights as merely superstructural, as complicit in the maintenance of bourgeois property 
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rights and (neo-)imperialist foreign influence, and as ultimately irrelevant to the future ‘new society’. 
Even in the late 1970s, according to Engler, as the Carter administration turned to the phrase, many 
liberation theologians, including Protestants, denounced it as an ‘“ideological trap”’, ‘merely the most 
recent of the duplicitous attempts by which the United States government sought to put a human face 
on its domination of the third world’.614 Indeed, there were good grounds for thinking this: the 
historian Christopher Dietrich has recently suggested that there was continuity between the Ford 
administration’s attempts to sow division among those calling for a New International Economic 
Order by focusing on human rights violations in newly independent countries and the Carter 
administration’s attempt to draw ‘a tighter link between the rise of human rights and the decline of 
sovereign rights’, through promotion of the ‘doctrine of “Basic Human Needs”’. This latter concept 
was meant to allow the United States ‘to close the “values gap” between the North and the South on 
the topic of “basic economic rights”, [State Department] analysts suggested’.615 In other words, a focus 
on individual rights and economic needs was meant to neutralize demands for changes in international 
economic structures. 
Engler argues that only by the late 1970s, some theologians and laymen began attempting to 
reconcile human rights and liberation theology, not by subscribing to liberal understandings but by 
redefining the concept’s meaning. To this end, a milestone 1978 volume on the Carter administration’s 
human rights policies brought together Latin American theologians. Its contributors included Bonino, 
formerly of ISAL, who had co-founded the Argentinian Permanent Assembly for Human Rights in 
1975 and was then a president of the WCC. The volume’s contributors offered a distinctively Latin 
American reformulation of human rights. According to Engler, the ‘“preferential option for the poor,” 
perhaps liberation theology’s key tenet, would eventually come to guide a liberationist approach to 
human rights.616 Gutiérrez could thus write in 1978 that the ‘structural analysis’ by Latin American 
Christians had led them  
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‘to speak of the “rights of the poor” and to interpret the defense of human rights under this new 
formality. This alternative language represents a critical approach to the laissez-faire, liberal doctrine 
to the effect that our society enjoys an equality that in fact does not exist.’617  
According to Engler, this approach challenged the supposed universality of human rights. In the view 
of liberation theologians themselves, this meant not discarding the ideal of universality but rather truly 
realizing it, by correcting its established bias towards the rich and powerful. In the course of this 
undertaking, they not only demanded that human rights be implemented in such a way as to improve 
the position of the poor, but they also put forward new ‘rights such as the right to work, the right to 
participate in political and economic systems, and the right to transform society, as well as the right to 
equality’.618 Thus, liberation theologians proposed a new approach both in terms of human rights 
norms and their implementation, both of which were geared to fashion the concept of human rights 
into an effective tool for achieving structural change in the specific context of Latin America. 
Yet in the context of the ecumenical movement’s response to repression in Latin America, 
efforts at reconciling liberation theology and human rights were underway earlier than Engler’s 
account suggests. Already in 1971, for example, the German theologian Jürgen Moltmann, who was 
primarily active in the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC) but also well-known at the 
WCC, attempted to articulate a ‘theological basis of human rights and of the liberation of man’. He 
did so in response to a call from the WARC’s 1970 Assembly to study this subject. Moltmann’s 
discussion paper sought to ‘think through in a fundamental way the theological basis of human rights 
so that the summons of human rights does not remain a declaration to which we are not really 
bound’.619 Moltmann’s adoption of a perspective of liberation theology showed in his criticism of the 
Universal Declaration for expressing nothing ‘about suffering within the world which is necessarily 
entailed in the struggle for liberation’. Therefore, the Declaration had to be extended ‘in reference to 
social obligations’, namely ‘obligations to liberation of those from whom these rights [which secure 
the freedom of individuals] are withheld from others’. Moltmann challenged those who grounded 
human rights in ‘a Christian doctrine of natural law and a Christian doctrine of creation’. Instead, a ‘theology 
of human rights’ should begin ‘with the concrete meaning of liberation’, moving on from here to present 
‘the universal meaning of this freedom as universal human right [sic] and the common future of this 
freedom as new humanity’. Only in this way could ‘universal theories and declarations about the 
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freedom of man be protected from their misuse’.620 Thus, Moltmann subscribed to liberation 
theology’s fundamental tenet that one must begin from praxis and from the viewpoint of the poor 
and the oppressed. The concept and content of human rights followed from this approach as a core 
insight and moral imperative.621 Moltmann’s thought would become an important locus of negotiation 
between European and Latin American perspectives: as Engler writes, from the late 1970s he would 
be one of the ‘first-world theologians and human rights advocates (…) [who] admonished liberation 
theologians to look for the good in philosophical liberalism.’ Moltmann and others would charge 
‘those who were unwilling to do so with throwing the baby of human rights out with the bathwater 
of imperialism’.622 Dialogue on this question was already underway within the WCC and particularly 
the activities of the CCIA and HRROLA as they responded to the rise of military dictatorships. 
The WCC’s engagement before Chile 
Brazil and Uruguay 
The CCIA’s documents of the early 1970s show how it self-consciously chose the frame of 
human rights as the appropriate one to combat repression, while maintaining a structural analysis of 
its causes at the same time. In 1971, American Rev. Dwain C. Epps, the CCIA’s recently appointed 
Study Secretary, wrote an overview of the situation in Latin America. Epps, who had previously been 
active in the American civil rights movement and had attended the 1966 Geneva conference, had 
taken part in the Frontier Internship in Mission Project, serving with ISAL in Buenos Aires from 
1967, until Niilus had asked him to join him in Geneva.623 In his analysis, Epps wrote that  
‘where no provision has been taken to insure [sic] that a nation participates justly in the profits 
derived from the exploitation of its natural resources and manpower by foreign investors, not only 
is little done to narrow the gap between rich and poor, oligarchies find themselves obliged to resort 
to frequently brutal political repression in order to maintain their privileged position.’624  
His analysis continued: ‘The clearest response the CCIA can make to the situation described above is 
to be found within the frame of reference of the protection of human rights.’ On the one hand, this 
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meant action at the international level: ‘all that we do to promote the improved functioning of the 
United Nations in this area, and to encourage it to establish effective implementation procedures is of 
service to Latin America in general’. But this being said, Epps wrote that such work could ‘only be 
done if it is pursued in close co-operation with Christians in that continent [Latin America]. Therefore 
it is important to further improve our communication with them and to make possible frequent 
contacts with them.’ According to Epps, such contacts were already exercising a decisive influence on 
the WCC’s work: ‘In many ways it is the local groups which set our agenda in this regard.’625 This 
emphasis on the agency of local groups would remain a constant in the WCC’s efforts. 
The first country that drew the WCC’s attention was Brazil, which had been under military 
dictatorship since a coup in 1964, but where repression intensified significantly from December 1968 
on.626 The WCC had maintained close relations with Brazilian member churches since the 1950s. 
Information began to trickle out of the country, and in February 1970, the WCC Executive Committee 
‘noted that there was growing concern about the increasing number of reports alleging severe 
curtailment of human rights and legal guarantees in Brazil’. It moved for ‘the proper bodies of the 
World Council’ to support ‘those who, in conscience, may be struggling for the realization of human 
rights for all without discrimination’.627 On 22 July 1970, ‘a clandestine network of Brazilian lawyers, 
historians and dissident diplomats’ submitted a ten-page document on human rights violations to the 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and the WCC. Based on this, in 1971, the CCIA, the ICJ, 
Pax Romana, and the World Federation of Trade Unions, submitted a report on torture and political 
imprisonment to the UN Commission on Human Rights.628 This effort did not yield any immediate 
results, however, and the appeal remained an exceptional initiative. Another important initiative in 
Brazil took place independently from the WCC, but rather picked up on the Vatican’s 1967 creation 
of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. In 1972, Paulo Evaristo Arns, Cardinal of São Paolo, 
‘initiated the creation of Justice and Peace Commissions (…) whose aim was to conduct study projects 
of socioeconomic needs in different areas and provide material assistance for political prisoners and 
their families’. Yet the functioning of these Commissions depended on the personal role of prelates 
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such as ‘Arns himself, Aloísio Lorscheider and Helder Câmara’, meaning that by 1978, ‘only four were 
functioning properly’.629 Human rights activity in Brazil thus remained limited. 
A 15 March 1973 declaration of human rights produced by the National Conference of the 
Bishops of Brazil showcased the fluidity of human rights at this time. The document put forward 
nineteen proposals, which branched into many subproposals. For instance, the Brazilian Church was 
called to work for rights such as that to ‘instruction’, ‘a just wage for work’ as well as the right ‘to 
work’, to ‘Sunday rest’, to ‘the possession of land for those who work it’, and the right ‘to life, 
threatened by birth-control campaign [sic] and by an excessively-permissive legislation on the subject 
of abortion’. Another proposal put forward such rights as that to ‘development’, to ‘protest’, to ‘a true 
picture of situations’, to ‘one’s own view of the world’, to ‘respect one’s own private sphere’, and to 
‘conscientious objection’. From the ‘right to development’, the Brazilian bishops inferred that it was 
‘a right of poor nations, and consequently a duty for rich nations, that the development of the latter 
is not at the expense of the poor nations, and this duty involves also the obligation of restitution’.630 
Through these and many other proposals, the Brazilian episcopate supported a conception of human 
rights that was open to creative adaptation, and primarily a matter for the Brazilian churches, people, 
and government. 
The most significant exception to this was the document’s fourteenth proposal, by which the 
Brazilian bishops called for a ‘world tribunal on Human Dignity’, ‘whose function would be to judge, 
from an ethical point of view, the régimes which violate the basic Rights of the human person, taking 
as a fundamental criterion for their judgements the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights’. The Universal Declaration thus served as an impartial standard, which could be applied 
irrespective of ‘the sectarian attitudes of religious or ideological groups’. The proposed tribunal would 
also have to avoid being captured by authoritarian states, and therefore ‘[j]udges from those countries 
where these rights are systematically violated would not form part’.631 This proposal could be read as 
a critique of the UN’s Commission on Human Rights, which did not exclude members based on their 
human rights records. It also chimed with continuing debates at the UN on whether to establish a 
High Commissioner for Human Rights. The bishops’ document did not show any direct awareness 
of such debates, however, and it may make more sense to read it skeptically, as a vague call for 
                                                 
629 Pamela Lowden, Moral Opposition to Authoritarian Rule in Chile, 1973-90 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1996) 18-19. 
630 Press Office of the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops, ‘The Bishops of Brazil Call for a World Tribunal on 
Human Dignity’, 15 March 1973, 2, WCCA CCIA 428.15.3.5.1 (this document is not the original press release but a – 
possibly translated and/or altered – reproduction of its contents). 
631 Ibid., 4 (emphasis omitted). 
168 
 
international concern with little sense of how a ‘world tribunal’ ought to be realized. It shows that the 
possibility of international judicial enforcement of human rights was part of the bishops’ imagination, 
but only a marginal one.  
In the early 1970s, Uruguayans also began to turn to the language of human rights to articulate 
their claims against the state. Uruguayan transnational activism has been studied in-depth by the 
historian Vania Markarian, who has shown the complications involved in activists’ gradual turn to 
human rights language. As in Brazil, even though state repression was intensifying, Uruguayan activists 
were not immediately drawn to human rights language, since it was a concept they had previously 
rejected as ‘bourgeois’ and unhelpful to their goals. Markarian describes a 5-11 September 1971 
meeting on the relevance of human rights for Latin America, organized by the University of the 
Republic in Montevideo, in cooperation with the National Confederation of Workers (Convención 
Nacional de Trabajadores del Uruguay) and the Latin American Confederation of Christian Unions 
(Confederación Latinoamericana Sindical Cristiana, CLASC) – a record of which also reached the WCC and 
influenced its thinking. As she writes, the university’s president, Oscar Maggiolo, ‘refused to discuss 
international legislation and instead argued that economic exploitation by industrialized countries was 
the cause of human rights violations’. Instead of human rights as articulated by the UN, participants 
by and large focused on the need for structural economic change and liberation, as well as criticism of 
‘international organizations as “tools of U.S. imperialism”’.632 The CLASC’s contribution briefly 
mentioned that in response to violence in Guatemala, CLASC had requested an ‘intervention of an 
Investigative Commission to the United Nations, especially to the Division for Human Rights, to the 
ILO [International Labor Organization] and to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’, 
which showed some willingness to make use of international instruments when possible.633 Yet the 
piece was dominated by the language of political solidarity and dependency, ending with a call for 
‘liberatory revolution’ and the statement that ‘[o]nly the people can save the people’.634  
As political repression intensified, however, particularly after the 1973 military coup, the space 
for political radicalism shrank and leftist Uruguayans needed allies abroad. Like other Latin American 
activists, they found that human rights could galvanize support. Markarian argues that embracing 
human rights language required Uruguayan activists to change their rhetoric from one of heroism to 
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one of victimhood and from one of radical political (including social and economic) change to one 
demanding respect for minimum rules of political conduct.635 Surveying the rhetoric of various 
Uruguayan exile groups in the early 1970s, Markarian concludes that some stuck to revolutionary 
language and others reframed their concerns along the lines of Amnesty International’s language. This 
could lead to great tension – for instance, in 1975 the French-Uruguayan Committee for the Defense 
of Political Prisoners in Uruguay (Comité de Défense des Prisonniers Politiques en Uruguay) split into two 
over the question of whether to address wider issues underlying torture and imprisonment or not.636 
Between groups that made the transition, however, human rights allowed them to form a united front 
to the outside world. Yet Markarian argues that in spite of this (at least until the 1980s) competing 
underlying visions continued to exist and activists generally did not attempt to reconcile their use of 
human rights language with their political goals, viewing the former merely as a means towards 
realizing the latter.637 Human rights language was thus primarily a means to a political end – yet for 
activist exiles, with no direct power, means could gradually supplant ends. 
The WCC became directly involved after a set of meetings with Latin American church leaders 
in May highlighted the extent of the government’s repressive measures, which were aimed above all 
at countering the urban guerilla of the Tupamaros but extended to those suspected of supporting 
them. For instance, the Uruguayan Methodist minister Dr. Julio Barreiro, an associate of ISAL, 
reported he ‘had had his house visited’, in his absence, by a ‘“death squad”’.638 The WCC’s General 
Secretary Eugene Carson Blake decided to send a WCC delegation composed of three American 
churchmen, which visited the country from 9-14 June 1972 (Amnesty, by comparison, would only 
send a mission in 1974). The delegation was hosted by Emilio Castro, the Methodist part-time 
secretary general of the Protestant ‘Pro-Unity’ Commission in Latin America (Movimiento Pro-Unidad 
Evangélica en América Latina), which would prepare the ground for the establishment of the Latin 
American Council of Churches (Consejo Latinoamericano de Iglesias, 1982). Castro would join the WCC 
in 1973, as director of the Commission on World Mission and Evangelism, and would subsequently 
become the WCC’s general secretary (1985-1992).639 The delegation also met with ISAL’s Odell, Santa 
Ana, and Barreiro. Those they interviewed were consistent in drawing attention to state repression, 
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especially torture, but differed as to what ought to be done about this. Some thought international 
support was futile, or even that all hope was lost: meeting with the President of the Supreme Court, 
Dr. Carlos Dubra, the delegates asked whether he believed that an appeal to the Organization of 
American States (OAS) would be useful; Dubra ‘says “Maybe” and shrugs with the unspoken fear that 
this too seems hopeless’.640 When the delegation met Senator Zelmar Michelini, who would become a 
leading voice on human rights until his assassination in 1974, however, and asked what they might 
contribute, Michelini said that the ‘church should stand clearly for the preservation and protection of 
private and public rights’, especially in relation to torture.641 (Michelini’s later efforts would focus on 
mobilizing the attention of the US Congress, above all.) 
A meeting hosted by the Uruguayan Federation of Churches was suggestive of tensions 
between human rights and leftist political radicalism. Castro as well as the WCC delegates used the 
language of human rights and church solidarity in order to facilitate dialogue between progressive and 
conservative attendees. The meeting proceeded along these lines until ‘a group of individuals brought 
in by ISAL who are not part of the Federation’ took a more political stance. One of them spoke 
emotionally of his recent personal experience of torture, and the contributors ‘gave the meeting a 
political bend, arguing for a radical left ideology’.642 Castro signaled his displeasure with this, because, 
as he had expected, the conservative attendees considered this turn of events ‘politically inspired, 
unfair, etc.’, damaging the dialogue that he had wanted to instigate. (Upon receiving Castro’s 
complaint, however, the response of Niilus was that Castro must have had written his letter merely to 
appease the Uruguayan authorities.)643 The WCC thus began grappling with the question of how to 
address repression in Uruguay, even before the 1973 military coup marked the start of twelve years of 
yet more intense authoritarianism in the country. 
 
Regional contacts 
The WCC’s nascent work on Brazil and Uruguay, as well as meetings with SODEPAX and ‘a 
pilot project on human rights law and defense of political prisoners in Argentina’, led the WCC’s staff 
to begin ‘to “dream” of broader possibilities of involving the churches more deeply in the field of 
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human rights’, Epps recapitulated in June 1973.644 At a 7 November 1972 meeting, the WCC’s Latin 
America Working Party recommended that the WCC give priority ‘to the formation of a Working 
Group on Human Rights composed of leaders of the member Churches who have shown their 
concern about the violations of said rights’. Facilitated not only by the CCIA but also two other bodies 
that were part of the WCC’s Unit II on Justice and Service, the Commission on Inter-Church Aid, 
Refugee, and World Service and the CCPD, this working group would ‘aim at least to start a process 
which will educate the Latin American Churches and, in consequence those in the rich world, about 
the attacks on human dignity which take place in Latin America’. Envisioned members of the working 
group included Latin American Protestants, such as Bonino and Federico Pagura, an Argentinian 
Methodist bishop who would later come to head the Latin American Council of Churches, but also 
Archbishop Arns.645  
The Working Party’s proposal resulted in a ‘Consultation on Human Rights and the Churches 
in Latin America’, held in San Juan, Puerto Rico, 25-28 February 1973. The participants reported ‘a 
very sad picture’ of ‘brutal repression’; ‘[i]n country after country we find a reign of terror produced 
by injust [sic] national and international structures and imposed either directly, through the police or 
the military, or indirectly through para-police groups, by the authorities’.646 In the face of such 
repression, ‘mere expressions of solidarity are no longer sufficient’: ‘Thus we have met to see what we 
can and must do together with and through our churches to ensure better protection of all men on 
this continent.’ In Latin America itself, churches and Christians in general would have to be awakened 
to ‘a profound and permanent sensitivity to abuse’.647 But the most promising ‘resources’ existed on 
the ‘national and local’ level, with ‘no limits to their creative and imaginative utilization’. These 
included ‘[p]rograms of conscientization for ecclesiastical leaders’, communication that ‘could reach 
communities and social sectors which are not literate’, and ‘organized ecumenical teams’ which could 
familiarize themselves with ‘the crude reality of the violation of human rights’ and then become 
‘conscientization agents in their respective communities’. The consultation also mentioned the 
upcoming twenty-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration as an opportunity. Other proposals 
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were much more far-reaching, such as an already-approved project to develop ‘a modern Protestant 
catechism which could serve the Protestant Churches of Latin Amercia [sic] in their reinterpretation 
of the Gospel for our time’.648 As this connection suggests, what was at stake in the struggle against 
repression was not only human dignity but the nature of the church in relation to society. If ‘division’ 
was the price to pay for this, the consultation’s participants thought this acceptable. It could even be 
understood as an inevitable product of conscientization, since ‘when, upon perceiving the socio-
politico-economic implications of the Gospel, some accept to serve it at any price and others resist 
doing so because in the depth of their beings they want only to be served by it’.649 
The consultation held that international bodies such as the WCC could play a supplementary 
role in the process of conscientization, by developing their relations with churches, and undertaking 
‘concrete actions and decisions (e.g. the Program to Combat Racism of the WCC)’.650 The WCC was 
asked to create a ‘special program for the defense of human rights in Latin America’, or to ‘expand 
and strengthen presently existing WCC programs in this field’. The proposed special program would 
act as a channel to the OAS, UN, and non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International, 
and ‘channel aid in an adequate way to political prisoners, political refugees and/or their families’. 
Furthermore, it would work closely together with a newly to be established ecumenical Latin American 
human rights commission. Such a commission, while it was not in fact established, would act in 
‘defense of human rights as thez [sic] are defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and as seen in the light of the Gospel’.651 
Its work was to be complemented at the ‘national and/or regional levels’ by envisioned ecumenical 
human rights groups.652 Thus, by early 1973 – well before the coup in Chile – Latin American 
Christians and their allies in the WCC were aiming to develop a fully-fledged transnational advocacy 
network for the protection of human rights. The WCC’s HRROLA, discussed below, would in some 
ways embody the proposal for an ecumenical Latin American human rights commission. 
A letter by Epps to Giorgio Fillibeck, of the Vatican’s Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace 
in Rome, provides a window into the CCIA’s thinking at this time. Summarizing the WCC’s trajectory 
on human rights in Latin America, Epps wrote that  
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‘we were taking a qualitative leap from old ways of focussing on human rights as we began to think 
in these terms. Taking the old language of human rights, so frequently and rightly criticized for being 
a liberal facade for ignominious behaviour in too many cases, we sought to give it a new content. 
Thus, we hoped, one could speak to a rather conservative institutional church constituency in a 
language which those who read the Bible must be able to understand, i.e. the language of concern 
for one’s neighbor; and thereby we could help to conscienticize churchmen to the structural realities 
of violence and injustice.’653 
This statement provided a remarkably candid and concise explanation of the CCIA’s strategy: it saw 
in human rights a malleable concept, the moral appeal of which resonated with core tenets of 
Christianity, while its underlying content could and had to be reshaped into something that 
transcended liberalism and instead addressed structural injustice. 
Similarly, in another letter, Epps wrote that it was the Puerto Rico consultation’s conviction 
that human rights was  
‘one place in which nearly all Christians, regardless of their political convictions, must agree if they 
are at all faithful to the Gospel: Christians must be concerned about the fate of their fellow-men 
when they are tortured, intimidated when they have taken courageous stands against inhuman 
treatment, cut off from the truth by censorship, and marginated [sic] from national life by the 
destruction of long-respected democratic values’.654 
Human rights thus served as the common ground on which ecumenical activists sought to build 
support for opposition against repression, which they hoped would then broaden into support for the 
radical social changes needed to address the root causes of this repression. 
More generally, Epps and his colleagues sought ‘to determine how we could encourage 
churchmen in Latin America and elsewhere to be more courageous in defense of their of their [sic] 
oppressed brothers and sisters, and how we could at international levels cooperate and aid their 
efforts.’ Such international cooperation was essential, because Epps and his colleagues had observed 
that  
‘an individual or a small group working at a national level to defend political prisoners and document 
cases of violation of human rights were far too exposed to work effectively at the public level which 
in a sense is necessary for effective actions through the courts, despite the very minimum protection 
the latter provide’. 
Epps noted that the WCC and local actors were thinking in parallel on the need for international 
cooperation: ‘the idea was not exclusively being developed here, but independently by isolated groups 
of churchmen in Latin America’.655 Epps had an interest in emphasizing local agency, of course, which 
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would contribute to the legitimacy of WCC efforts, countering the impression that this would be ‘an 
initiative which goes from “Geneva down to Latin America”’. The WCC, he wrote, merely ‘provide[d] 
the supportive assistance they [Latin Americans] request of us’.656 Yet the importance of its role in 
offering such support and bringing together different church leaders should not be underestimated. 
Moreover, its ability to function as a conduit between Latin American Christians on one hand and 
non-governmental organizations, governments and intergovernmental organizations on the other, 
helped open up avenues of international support that might otherwise have remained unavailable. 
However, it is important to emphasize that in the Latin American context, the language of 
human rights did not necessarily refer to international fora such as the UN or the OAS. Various 
publications by Latin American church leaders from early 1973 showed disillusionment with the 
toothlessness of international organizations: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had set forth 
rights but these could not be enforced. Pagura wrote that this and other declarations were, ‘[f]or the 
most part (…) merely dead-letters, more honored in the breach than in the observance for most 
politicians’.657 Uruguayan church leaders observed that even specifically hemispheric instruments like 
the Inter-American Commission of the OAS and the incorporation of human rights into many Latin 
American constitutions had not prevented the surge in human rights violations.658 One of the WCC 
Working Group’s core members, Julio de Santa Ana, described the Universal Declaration as ‘an act of 
courage and hope on the part of the international community which should be valued and appreciated’. 
However, he continued, ‘no one could claim that much progress has been achieved in the 25 years 
that have elapsed since its adoption’. Even though ‘the archives of the United Nations contain 
hundreds of thousands of accusations concerning the violation of human rights’, ‘no effective action 
has been taken’.659 Santa Ana called for moving past ‘intellectual formulas’ and engaging in ‘effective 
action’, in which regard he mentioned the WCC’s Programme to Combat Racism as breaking new 
ground.660 This chimed with liberation theologians’ skepticism of declarations of rights: rather than 
putting one’s faith in declarations of rights, what was needed was a praxis of human rights that realized 
them from the grassroots up. 
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Thus, while Latin American church leaders did not generally see international human rights 
instruments as part of the solution, they did analyze the problem in terms of human rights. Camara 
and his colleagues framed their appeal as ‘statements on human rights’.661 Pagura described ‘the human 
rights crisis in Latin America’ in terms of poverty and marginalization leading to conflict and 
repression.662 Santa Ana pleaded for a reframing of human rights to include both a collective and an 
individual understanding: there was ‘a twofold violation of human rights in the Third World, the 
violation of the rights of the masses, who comprise the societies of the poor nations, and the violation 
of the rights of those who struggle for those rights to be respected.’663 All saw a need for the churches 
to educate and sensitize – ‘conscienticize’ – their peoples, especially the poor, with respect to human 
rights, in spite of the differences in what they meant by the latter term. This pastoral use of human 
rights language constituted a distinctly Christian approach, which preceded other forms of human 
rights engagement and would continue to be a major strand of ecumenical human rights engagement 
vis-à-vis Latin America – and beyond. 
 Latin American Christians and their allies did not understand the turn to human rights as an 
abandonment of Christian principles in favor of secular ones, as some charged at the time, but rather 
a rethinking of the Christian message and its implications for the churches’ role in society. On 5 
October 1973, Aldo Vannuchi, a Brazilian former priest and critic of the dictatorship there, who acted 
as a special consultant to the CCIA on human rights, wrote a memorandum in which he reflected on 
the ‘essential motivation’ for holding a consultation on human rights. Vannuchi wrote that ‘[f]or us 
the point of departure is not the Universal Declaration of H[uman ]R[ights], but the Word of God’. 
This word was revealed ‘in Scripture, in the Church and in Events’, such as ‘the struggle of individuals 
and of peoples for their liberation from oppression’. ‘Salvation and liberation’ were ‘a process of cross 
and resurrection’, and ‘fighting for’ human rights meant to take part in this process. In the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the ‘reflection and action’ of the church found ‘a provisional and partial, 
but extremely valid, expression’ of ‘the inspiring Word of God who saves’.664 Julio de Santa Ana 
responded to Vannuchi’s memorandum by writing that he felt it was right in emphasizing that the 
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‘focus of our attention must not be the legal notion of Human Rights (Universal Declaration, 
Philosophy of Law, History of Law, etc.) but fundamentally the Word of God’.665 
In a subsequent 26 October 1973 memorandum, Vannuchi confronted head-on the question 
of whether Latin American Christians’ turn to human rights was ‘tactical’ or ‘programmatic’. He 
argued that ‘Christians of Latin America are more conscious today of their need to struggle for human 
rights precisely because they are achieving a greater consciousness of the Latin American reality and 
of their christian [sic] commitment.’666 This ‘reality’ consisted above all, for Vannuchi, in ‘foreign 
imperialism’. Vannuchi’s perspective thus mixed a conception of collective sin with an anti-imperialist 
political analysis, as was common at the time: 
‘Is all of this only the fruits of the abuse of power by certain authorities? This we absolutely cannot 
accept. The roots of the evil are not to be found in given persons or circumstances, rather in the 
economic, political and social system, the whole of which is oppressive, injust [sic], violently 
inhuman. Therefore in Latin America, the struggle for human rights is a struggle for liberation.’667 
What this meant in practice would be put to the test in Chile, which was being turned into a military 
dictatorship at the very time Vannuchi was writing. 
Repression in Chile and the Human Rights Resources Office for Latin 
America 
On 11 September 1973, after months of increasing tensions, a military coup brought down 
Salvador Allende’s democratic socialist government. The downfall of Allende, whose government had 
been lionized by many as the future of reformed socialism, struck a major blow to the left in South 
America and beyond. Repression was especially fierce during the initial months of the junta’s rule, 
leaving no space for political opposition. Many thousands of Chileans were exiled – 200,000 were 
living abroad by the mid-1970s. But a global outcry and activity by international nongovernmental 
organizations (Amnesty, the ICJ, the International Committee of the Red Cross) as well as 
intergovernmental organizations (the UN, the OAS) and governments (Sweden and the Netherlands, 
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inter alia) created opportunities for Chilean exiles to exert pressure on the Chilean government, 
galvanizing a worldwide campaign that soon made human rights language a centerpiece of its efforts.668 
The Chilean coup swiftly led to a surge in the WCC’s involvement. It created a Chile 
Emergency Task Force, led by the Brazilian-born American Presbyterian Rev. Charles Harper. 
Through the rest of the 1970s, the WCC would raise and spend many hundreds of thousands of dollars 
per year in support of the churches in Chile. The first use Chilean clergy made of this support was to 
establish the National Committee for Aid to Refugees (Comité Nacional de Ayuda a los Refugiados, 
CONAR), on 6 October 1973, which worked to aid refugees, including the thousands of leftist exiles 
from other South American countries ‘who had come to Santiago to take part in Allende’s leftist 
experiment in democratic socialism’.669 By April 1974, around 10,000 Chileans and foreigners had been 
helped to leave the country in this way – roughly an equal number to those resettled by the UN High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), which began to work in Chile in parallel. In 1975, CONAR’s 
work would be followed up by the Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas.670 
As Kelly has also described, however, from early 1974, Harper voiced concerns over the 
downsides of this refugee-oriented response. Resettling refugees abroad was in line with the regime’s 
desire to be rid of those who might oppose it, and once resettled, the exiles were expected to integrate 
into their new societies rather than engage with Chilean politics.671 The limits of the status of mandate 
refugees under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention led many refugees to reject it, Harper reported, so 
as to better be able to ‘associate freely with compatriots in the struggle for democracy and the 
liberation of their home country’.672 Harper noted that existing structures to receive refugees in the 
West were established to receive ‘refugees from communist regimes’, leading to an unreceptive attitude 
towards leftist Chileans, only seventeen of whom had been accepted by the US, whereas in 1959 the 
country had taken in 40,000 Cubans.673 Demand on the part of exiles, the continuation of repression 
in Chile, and the involvement of Amnesty and other actors all invited more far-reaching WCC 
involvement.  
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As the refugee problem became less pronounced over the first half of 1974, the WCC’s 
emphasis shifted to a second organization that had been founded in the coup’s wake, also using WCC 
funds: the Pro-Peace Committee [Comité de Cooperación para la Paz en Chile or simply Comité Pro-Paz, 
COPACHI]. The organization had the blessing of the Archbishop of Santiago, Cardinal Raúl Silva 
Henríquez, and was presided over by the head of the Lutheran Church in Chile, Bishop Helmut Frenz, 
and Mgr. Ariztía, the auxiliary bishop of Santiago. COPACHI’s ecumenical directorate included 
representatives of the Catholic, Lutheran, Baptist, Methodist, Methodist Pentecostal, and Greek 
Orthodox Churches, as well as of the Jewish community (though this ecumenical representation would 
erode over time). The wide representation of Protestants should be seen in light of Chile’s 
comparatively high number of Protestants: close to 22 per cent of the total population in 1985.674 The 
lay staff it recruited was mostly ‘of the Christian left and, particularly, the’ Popular Unitary Action 
Movement (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario), a small party of leftist Christians that had been part 
of Allende’s Popular Unity coalition.675 José Zalaquett, who had taught law at the Catholic University 
and prior to that served as a junior member of the Allende government, came to play an important 
role from his appointment in January 1974 on. Under his leadership, the Committee’s legal department 
would file 2343 writs of habeas corpus, which were only successful on three occasions, but which carried 
symbolic significance – not least because the documentation involved was sent on to bishops ‘and 
later on to the relevant international organisations, notably the human rights commissions of the 
Organisation of American States (OAS) and the UN’.676 Thanks to Zalaquett’s work and the WCC’s 
financial support, the organization grew to 150 staff members in three months. 
How did the Pro-Peace Committee come to embrace human rights language?  As Kelly writes, 
in Zalaquett’s 2011 recollection, it was a visit by representatives of Amnesty in November 1973, above 
all, that inculcated human rights into the Pro Peace Committee’s work, whereas until then that 
language had been infrequent. One of the co-founders of the organization, Lutheran Bishop Helmut 
Frenz, on the other hand, described in his memoirs that he had wanted to call the organization the 
‘Ecumenical Committee for the Defense of Human Rights’, but had been, in Kelly’s words, ‘overruled 
by none other than the institutional godfather of the Pro-Peace Committee’, Cardinal Silva, ‘who saw 
the use of “human rights” in the group’s name as too direct a provocation to the Chilean junta’.677 
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Frenz recalled a phrase attributed to the Chilean Interior Minister General Oscar Bonilla’s: ‘Well, the 
government is responsible for defending human rights.’678 This latter account suggests a greater initial 
awareness of human rights than Zalaquett’s, which may have derived from Frenz’ engagement with 
the ecumenical movement, especially the Lutheran World Federation, which had begun a systematic 
process of reflection on human rights in 1970. 
Though the work of its legal department has received the most attention, as a result of its 
ecclesiastical origins and connections, and diverging from the more limited agenda of Amnesty, the 
Pro-Peace Committee’s agenda was and remained wider than civil and political rights. In a meeting 
with the WCC’s Chile Task Force on 31 May 1974, Zalaquett argued that the churches were uniquely 
well-placed to take a two-pronged approach to delegitimizing the Chilean regime: they should expose 
‘the sham and the myth behind’ not only the ‘“legality”’ of the junta but also its ‘“economic justice”’, 
in terms of jobs, inflation, and availability of goods and services.679 Zalaquett argued that the 
government had ‘in effect isolated itself’, alienating even the Christian Democratic party, ‘which was 
behind the overthrow of the Allende government’; ‘even the right wing “gremios” – or professional 
associations – are affected by the economic oppression’.680 The element of ‘economic justice’ was also 
part of the WCC’s thinking: in a March 1974 analysis of ‘the internal structure of police and judicial 
repression’, it observed that in Chile, 23 of the Universal Declaration’s enumerated rights were being 
violated. Although most of these rights were civil and political, the analysis also called attention to 
Article 23 (the right to work, including the right to unionize), Article 25 (the right to an adequate 
standard of living), and Article 26 (the right to education). According to Harper, COPACHI compiled 
information on this laundry list of violations, ‘resumés of which have been handed in regularly to the 
office of the Minister of the Interior, Oscar Bonilla, as well as serving as the basis of’ an April 1974 
protest by the Chilean episcopate to the junta.681 
 COPACHI’s socioeconomic work partly took place in the realm of its legal activities. By 17 
May 1974, it had handled 3823 cases in labor courts, compared to 3401 in penal courts, two thirds of 
which to dispute dismissals from public administration. But it also engaged in publicity work that went 
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beyond drawing attention to civil and political rights violations, albeit in circuitous ways: in May 1974, 
the Committee published a weeklong serial in the Mexican paper Excelsior, detailing its findings ‘on 
torture, illegal detainment, economic oppression, and the wide circulation of such information in the 
international press’. Apart from legal and publicity work, COPACHI’s activities included  
‘the creation of small work cooperatives, being a channel for food, clothing, blankets, money to 
families affected by penal and labor problems, looking for scholarships for students dismissed from 
universities and secondary schools, facilitating persons in danger to leave the country with legal and 
documentary (and financial) help’.682  
Institutionalizing such activities, the organization established a Commission for Solidarity and 
Development, which aimed to establish ‘small employment-creating schemes in Chile basically for 
workers and peasants’.683 Pamela Lowden has written that this Commission for Solidarity and 
Development ‘created 126 enterprises, employing nearly 2000 people’, by the end of 1975. In addition, 
COPACHI ran ‘lunch service[s] for malnourished children (…) which came to provide over 20 000 
with daily meals’, ‘employment cooperatives, some 60 in number, participation in which ranged from 
20 to 300’, and five ‘health centres’, attended by ‘[n]o fewer than 8138 people’ during the Committee’s 
existence. As Lowden writes, ‘the background to these developments was, on the one hand, the 
government’s reversal of the previous administration’s policies of improving the availability of health 
care and, on the other, its wider economic policies’, which included ‘shock stabilization policies to 
tackle the then 369 per cent inflation rate’.684  
At the end of 1975, pressure from the Pinochet regime forced COPACHI to close down, but 
it was in many ways reconstituted in January 1976 as the Vicariate of Solidarity (Vicaría de la Solidaridad). 
A major difference was that the Vicariate had to be a purely Catholic affair, because its existence 
depended on the fact that it was formally part of the archdiocese of Santiago, but the WCC still 
provided more than half of its funds.685 The Vicariate carried on the Pro Peace Committee’s activities 
in the socioeconomic realm. When Cardinal Silva published a pastoral letter on ‘solidarity’ in 1975, he 
built on COPACHI’s activities and applied liberation theology’s preferential option for the poor in his 
interpretation of ‘solidarity’: ‘the mutual dependency among men which means that some cannot feel 
                                                 
682 Ibid., 1. 
683 Harper to Ninan Koshy et al., ‘Meeting of Chile Task Force (Unit II Staff Advisory Group on Human Rights Resources 
Office for Latin America’ 14 November 1974, 1-2, WCCA HRROLA 429.02.02. 
684 Lowden, Moral Opposition, 39-40. 
685 Alexander Wilde, ‘The Institutional Church and Pastoral Ministry: Unity and Conflict in Defense of Human Rights in 
Chile’, in Wilde, ed., Religious Responses to Violence, 159-190, 167. 
181 
 
contented when the rest are not’.686 Lowden writes that the letter ‘made explicit that the defence of 
collective or economic rights was also integral to the defence of human dignity. In that respect, 
Lowden writes, ‘“Solidarity” was the way in which Silva Henríquez chose to put his own stamp upon 
the liberal notion of human rights, with its connotations of an emphasis on individual rights’.687 
Similarly, in 1977, ‘in his annual May Day homily, Silva Hénriquez spoke out strongly in defence of 
workers’ rights, emphasising that he saw the respect for those rights as the true means of ensuring 
national security’, a rebuke of the government’s version of national security.688 And when the Vicariate 
organized a major symposium on human rights from 22-25 November 1978, which promulgated the 
‘Santiago Letter’, the letter dealt with not only civil and political rights, but also called attention to 
social and economic rights, and called for a New International Economic Order.689 
The Chileans’ ecumenical allies abroad, meanwhile, sought to avoid a reduction of the scope 
of human rights work to one concerned only with individual victims on a case by case basis. In 1974, 
Harper argued that human rights violations in Chile were ‘a mass, and massive problem (...) [which] 
must be treated, therefore, as a mass problem, and not – as in the past – as a [sic] individual problem, 
by the churches’. He wrote that the churches ought to be ‘the defender of the oppressed- not in terms, 
primarily, of the individual but in terms of groups of people’.690 One way of conceiving of such groups, 
as in a later HRROLA report, was that of a ‘repressed majority’ pitted against a ‘rich and powerful 
minority elite’, but more specific groups could also be identified, such as the indigenous peoples of 
Brazil.691 In a 1975 speech, Harper distinguished between ‘[d]irect repression and endemic structural 
repression’.692 Harper’s travel diaries from around this time also suggest his critical attitude to a narrow 
conception of human rights. Though these scribbled notes often leave unclear whether Harper was 
penning down his own thoughts or those of his interlocutors, they reveal a pattern of shared concerns. 
In a 1974 meeting with the Latin American Evangelical Commission for Christian Education (Comisión 
Evangélica Latinoamericana de Educación Cristiana), for instance, concluding notes stressed the importance 
of taking ‘into account that legality is an elite instrument’ and ‘the fact that the Church has social 
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weight’. ‘Solidarity’ was key when it came to how to ‘mobilize the Church’.693 At a theological 
consultation in Costa Rica in 1974, Harper noted that it was key to ‘maintain “Liberation” as the key 
theme. to avoid the concept of “victims” (individuals)’. Nevertheless, his colleagues would have to 
‘infiltrate all assemblies, group meetings w/[ith] the h[uman]. rights theme’.694 These notes illustrate the 
inchoate nature of the approach being developed by Harper and others at the time, which saw risks 
in embracing legalistic tools and an orientation towards individual victimhood. The promise of 
liberation and the churches’ pervasive role in society were ecumenical Christians’ trump cards. Yet the 
concept of human rights was not discarded on this account; rather, it would have to be either used 
pragmatically or reconfigured to serve the purpose of liberation. 
A document setting out a ‘provisional typology of human rights violations in Latin America’ 
illustrated the continuing importance of social and economic rights in the mind of the international 
ecumenical network at this time. This document was initially prepared at an ecumenical meeting in 
Lima, Peru, from 18 July to 1 August 1974. Participants included Brazilians, Chileans, and Uruguayans. 
Chile’s Pro-Peace Committee was held up as an example of ecumenical cooperation.695 The analysis 
(now marked only as crafted by ‘Latin American Christians’) was subsequently included in the 
preparatory materials for the St. Pölten consultation. The categories of the ‘typology’, which sought 
to provide a systematic overview of rights violations across Latin America, were not only ‘[p]olitical 
and legal repression’ but also ‘[e]conomic repression’, ‘[i]deological and cultural repression’, and 
‘[r]eligious repression’. All four of these categories of violations were found to be endemic in the 
nineteen countries catalogued, with countries such as Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Haiti, and Uruguay 
featuring the most intense concentration. ‘Economic repression’ was subdivided into that ‘against 
individuals’ – including ‘[s]uspension and dismissal of victims, their relatives and friends’ or 
‘[c]onfiscation of property’ – and that ‘against social groups’ – such as ‘[c]learance of lands occupied 
by farmers subject to political persecution’ or ‘[o]bstacles to all forms of trade union, corporative, 
professional, etc. associations’.696 
The accompanying analysis subscribed to an emphatically systematic view of the problem:  
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‘Repression in the various Latin American countries is a massive, systematic, scientific and highly 
technical apparatus which is regarded by its users as the most inflexible way of maintaining the 
imperialist system, now menaced by the oppressed sectors as they come to realize the fact of 
oppression and begin to organize.’  
In line with this, its authors rejected a humanitarian approach from outside actors: ‘Repression cannot 
be considered as a fact or facts in isolation, to which the response should be a condescending attitude 
of paternalism or compassion. Repression is a political fact.’697 Beyond the commitment to identifying 
a range of individual rights violations, the group put forward a conception of the collective rights of 
the Latin American ‘peoples’: ‘Among the fundamental human rights, the first and all-embracing as 
regards the subjected peoples of Latin America is the inalienable right to full liberty, economic, 
juridical and political, and cultural.’698 Conceptions of collective, social and economic rights thus 
continued to animate Latin American Christians even as the situation in countries like Chile made it 
difficult to practice resistance in ways that effectively incorporated these elements. 
Under the influence of Latin American participants, the WCC’s St. Pölten consultation on 
‘Human Rights and Christian Responsibility’, discussed in the next chapter, articulated an ambitious 
set of social, economic, and collective rights, an enumeration which was adopted by the WCC’s 1975 
Nairobi Assembly. That Assembly’s report on ‘Human Rights in Latin America’ drew attention to the 
fact that of the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration, ‘the fundamental rights to health, 
education, work, and a living wage have been either ignored completely or not sufficiently 
implemented by the majority of the governments’. It then moved on to a list of civil and political 
rights which were being violated, as well as the rights of (political) refugees and exiles.699 This sequence 
should be understood in light of the analysis in terms of root causes and symptoms put forward in the 
section’s general report on human rights. In this analysis, civil and political rights violations were 
conceived of as primarily a symptom of the underlying systemic problem of the denial of social and 
economic rights and self-determination. But in order to address these systemic issues, political change 
was required.  
In order to alleviate and remedy the situation, the report called on the governments of Latin 
America, and specifically those of Chile and Argentina (at a Brazilian delegate’s request, it was decided 
not to mention Brazil, since it was feared this would cause a backlash), to comply with the Universal 
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Declaration and to improve their handling of refugees. Furthermore, the report commended the work 
of the CCIA and HRROLA and called on Latin American churches to ‘educate and conscienticize 
their members’ to defend human rights, and to ‘create ecumenical commissions of churches to 
promote respect for human rights in their countries’ (no doubt with Chile’s Pro-Peace Committee in 
mind, though that organization was just then being shut down and replaced with the Vicariate of 
Solidarity).700 Churches in the West would also have to do their bit, however, by recognizing the 
responsibility their societies bore for the situation in Latin America. A 1978 HRROLA report relayed 
that Latin American Christians had urged the WCC to mobilize its network ‘to challenge, the deeper 
institutionalised forms of political, military and economic structures whose power base and control are located 
in these churches’ [in other regions’] societies’, so that ultimately they might begin ‘the difficult task 
of countering these forces on which the disproportionate prosperity of many of our societies 
depends’.701 Human rights advocacy was thus connected to or entangled in a structural critique that 
stretched beyond individual Latin American countries to identify the responsibility of the wealthy 
countries of the West. 
As Kelly and others have argued, over the course of the 1970s and into the 1980s, the discourse 
of human rights as such tended towards a narrow focus on individual civil and political rights, 
epitomized by Amnesty’s ‘impartial’ or politically ‘neutral’ approach.702 Despite the above-mentioned 
desire on the part of the WCC to maintain a broader view, in the WCC’s stance on the international 
level, a tendency in this direction seems discernable – though a full assessment of this question goes 
beyond the present study’s scope. The focus on civil and political rights in the UN’s treatment of Latin 
American dictatorships no doubt pulled in this direction, as did the narrowing of the agenda of the 
churches in the countries themselves. An emphasis on civil and political rights could also be explained 
from the fact that the content of the WCC’s human rights work remained contested after Nairobi, 
and this was especially true of the new emphasis on structures. In contrast, civil and political rights, 
especially torture, could count on much greater consensus as ecumenical priorities. This tension was 
made explicit in the WCC Central Committee’s 1977 ‘Statement on Torture’, in report to what its 
moderator called ‘a steady increase in reports of violation of human rights, and in the use of torture 
in an increasing number of countries of the world’.703 The statement read:  
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‘Torture is endemic, breeds in the dark, in silence. We call upon the churches to bring its existence 
into the open, to break the silence, to reveal the persons and structures of our societies which are 
responsible for this most dehumanizing of all violations of human rights.’  
It went on to concede ‘that there remain, even among the churches, certain differences of 
interpretation of human rights (…) But on the point of torture there can be no difference of opinion. 
The churches together can and must become major forces for the abolition of torture.’704 Subsequent 
statements similarly focused on questions of civil and political rights, such as a 1980 statement by 
Harper to the UN Commission on Human Rights on ‘the question of missing and disappeared 
persons’ and the Central Committee’s 1982 adoption of a ‘Statement on Extrajudicial Executions’.705 
Nevertheless, the structural problems facing Latin America continued to inform the WCC’s efforts at 
promoting proposals for a New International Economic Order or a Right to Development and similar 
collective rights. They also informed the WCC’s consciousness-raising among Western church 
constituencies in fields such as development and mission.706 These attempts at reworking human rights 
into a widely-ranging agenda for social justice are discussed fully in the next chapter. 
 
Conclusions 
The ecumenical response to repression in Latin America described in this chapter was the 
crucible in which the WCC’s conception of human rights was expanded reworked into one rooted in 
liberation theology. While liberation theologians were initially indifferent or suspicious towards the 
concept of human rights, ecumenical meetings helped to convince them of not only its pragmatic 
utility but its value as a moral principle. At the same time, they remained aware of some of its 
limitations, and conceived of it as part of a Christian social ethics rather than its starting point. The 
WCC and its interlocutors were ambivalent, however, as to whether social, economic, and collective 
concerns could effectively be framed as rights. As Engler has written, this is a question that has 
persisted: ‘[a]lthough the assertion of a broad range of system-oriented, second and third-generation 
rights is an innovative strategy for challenging the limits of traditional liberal conceptions of human 
rights, it remains uncertain whether the category of “rights” can bear the burden of this move’.707 In a 
juridical sense, enforcement of such rights remained a distant prospect. Similarly, enforcement of the 
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rights of peoples remained utopian, notwithstanding the WCC’s efforts at pursuing international 
economic change. This helps explain the scarcity of appeals to these rights in legalistic terms.  
But in a moral key, they could still play an important role: the WCC and its allies drew attention 
to social and economic inequality and marginalization not to provoke legalistic investigations, but to 
generate moral outrage and pressure for structural change. Such usage also allowed for the creative 
refashioning of rights as tools that emphasized popular agency, particularly on the part of Latin 
Americans who wished to ‘conscienticize’ the continent’s poor and oppressed. The WCC’s financial 
support, and its function as a hub that connected Latin American Christians and mobilized Western 
churches, meant more than the denunciations of human rights violations it issued at the UN and 
elsewhere. As the CCIA’s Executive Secretary Erich Weingärtner observed with regard to Chile, 
looking back in 1983, the WCC had exercised ‘considerable restraint’ in speaking out publicly. ‘This is 
due to the fact that it was felt much more important to support the life and witness of the churches 
of Chile, which ultimately has been proven to be far more effective for the promotion of human rights 
than making a political point by means of a statement.’708 
What stands out across this story is the contested and fluid nature of human rights in this 
context. As the most salient case, it is tempting to view Chile as the place where human rights activism 
came, as it were, into its own. But as the February 1973 Puerto Rico consultation shows most clearly, 
efforts at developing a transnational ecumenical network advocating for human rights were already 
taking shape before Chile’s September coup. This should serve as a caution against overemphasizing 
the decisive role of activism with regard to that country. Nevertheless, the case of Chile triggered a 
sharp increase in outside involvement, including that of the WCC. Moreover, COPACHI’s ecumenical 
directorate, even if its successor organization, the Vicariate, could not carry this on, marked the 
Chilean churches’ engagement out as an ecumenical exemplar – cooperation between denominations 
was far from a given, even in the face of repression. In these and other respects, there remains ample 
scope for research into variance across countries, as Jorge González-Jácome’s recent work on the case 
of Colombia also suggests.709 In the initial years of the churches’ response to repression in Chile, 
socioeconomic engagement seems to have played a greater role than subsequently, certainly with 
regard to efforts at mobilizing international support. But even if political repression, combined with 
foreign actors’ preoccupation with civil and political rights, whittled human rights discourse down to 
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a ‘depoliticized’ core of minimal demands, ecumenical deliberations between the WCC and its Latin 
American interlocutors – as well as the liberation theologians discussed by Engler – continued to aim 
at removing what they saw as the root causes of oppression. As the next chapter shows, this entailed 
a continued attempt to give ‘a new content’ to the concept of human rights. 
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6. Remaking human rights: the St. Pölten 
consultation on ‘Human Rights and 
Christian Responsibility’ (1974) 
‘Human rights are a political matter, like every attempt of man to realize the human potential with 
which the Creator endowed him.’710 Dwain Epps, 1974 
‘The key problem is that the human rights movement by definition tends towards the enforcement 
of a consensus, and hence can enter the conflicts involved in the arduous process of enlarging the 
consensus only at the risk of negating itself.’711 José Zalaquett, 1981 
Introduction 
Over the course of the early 1970s, the World Council of Churches (WCC) developed a new 
approach to human rights, marking a major discontinuity with its efforts since the 1940s. Whereas the 
Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (CCIA) had thus far focused heavily on freedom 
of religion and associated rights, it would now promote a much more wide-ranging agenda. Religious 
freedom was demoted to one right among others; as the WCC’s Executive Committee would put it in 
1979, ‘if it speaks in universal terms, the church cannot isolate for priority consideration the question 
of its own religious freedom. Conversely, a church which struggles for all rights for all people has, 
often with surprise, rediscovered something of its essential evangelical mission.’712 The previous 
chapter has described how the ecumenical response to the rise of military dictatorships in Latin 
America invited such a widening of the WCC’s human rights agenda. But at the same time, the WCC, 
and especially the CCIA, embarked on a process of reflection and consultation that sought to articulate 
a new ecumenical conception of human rights, which would be applicable across the ecumenical 
movement while reckoning with its increasing diversity, especially in terms of the ascendance of Third 
World churches. While Latin American perspectives played a key role in this process, the aspiration 
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of developing a general ecumenical approach to human rights meant that it engaged with a variety of 
viewpoints, most vividly so at the 1974 St. Pölten consultation on ‘Human Rights and Christian 
Responsibility’. The results of this consultation were then endorsed by the WCC’s 1975 Nairobi 
Assembly, and served as the basis for the ecumenical human rights agenda in the decades to come. 
This outcome would remain controversial, however, especially among the WCC’s Western 
constituency, and it arguably papered over differences as much as it resolved them. In the view of 
those driving the process, however, such an outcome was acceptable, as the inevitable product of 
pushing the churches to embrace a political, pluralistic, and liberationist conception of human rights 
that focused on the problems facing the global South. The CCIA’s staff in this sense represented the 
ecumenical ‘revolutionary’ tradition, in which process mattered more than the achievement of a 
consensus outcome.713 Rather than attempting to identify issues from a putatively neutral or universal 
standpoint, priority was given to understanding divergent viewpoints. This was not only seen as a 
precondition for meaningful practical engagement but was also necessary as the basis for any true 
ecumenical fellowship. Shifting notions of ecumenical unity and mission over time enabled this 
reorientation: unity could be manifested in diversity, at least in theory, and mission should be 
conceived of as global rather than directed from the West to Third World mission fields. Thus, in his 
address to the Nairobi Assembly, the WCC’s new General Secretary, Philip Potter, from the British-
associated Caribbean state of Dominica, reiterated a statement agreed by the 1973 Bangkok World 
Mission Conference: ‘the diversity of responses to Christ is essential precisely because they are related 
to particular situations and are thus relevant and complementary’.714 But at the same time, the WCC’s 
new approach to human rights was not merely a moral menu from which the churches could pick and 
choose. Through a process of consultation, the CCIA developed an approach to human rights that 
was liberationist and oriented toward social justice, and it pushed member churches to act on this. Its 
approach was sceptical towards liberalism, antagonistic towards capitalism, and sympathetic towards 
Third World Marxism and anti-imperialism. Building on Christian Albers’ excellent account of the 
process by which this approach was arrived at, this chapter draws on a wider range of published and 
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archival sources to provide a more in-depth and contextualized analysis of the WCC’s new approach.715 
The chapter’s structure is straightforward: the first section covers the ecumenical meetings leading up 
to the St. Pölten consultation; the second section describes the consultation itself; and the third 
sketches the WCC’s human rights agenda from the Nairobi Assembly onward. 
 
The road to St. Pölten, 1971-1974 
With the retirement of key figures such as O. Frederick Nolde and Kenneth G. Grubb in 1968, 
representatives of the ‘revolutionary’ tradition obtained positions of power in the WCC, enabling them 
– acting on the mandate provided by the 1968 Uppsala Assembly – to effect a change in many of its 
policies, including on human rights. A key figure in this regard was Leopoldo Niilus, CCIA Director 
from 1969 to July 1981. Niilus was born in Estonia, but his parents and he had fled the country in 
1944, staying in Sweden as refugees before moving to Argentina while Niilus was still in secondary 
school. He then took his education in law at Buenos Aires, and a Master’s in Comparative Law at 
Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas.716 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Niilus 
became a leader of the leftist network Church and Society in Latin America (Iglesia y Sociedad en América 
Latina, ISAL). In 1969, he was exiled from Argentina and travelled to Geneva, where he was put 
forward – at the young age of 35 – as the new Director of the CCIA, taking over from the renowned 
O. Frederick Nolde. This appointment was not without obstacles: as someone born in Estonia, 
Eastern bloc church representatives saw his appointment as an affront to the Soviet Union and delayed 
his appointment, while others saw him as not truly of the Third World. The ‘old guard’ of the CCIA, 
such as its London representative Alan Booth, mistrusted him for his radicalism. (Annegreth Schilling 
points out that Niilus’s thinking drew on Marxist authors ranging from Karl Marx to Che Guevara 
and Herbert Marcuse.)717 Consequently, Niilus was initially appointed on a very close vote for a 2-year 
probationary period. As Schilling writes, Niilus would work to make the CCIA, ‘in Christian 
responsibility, live up to its vocation and advocate for people on the margins of society, give voice to 
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the weak and the oppressed, and thereby sensibilize them to God’s freedom’. Furthermore, he moved 
to make the CCIA less the sole representative of the ecumenical movement in international affairs and 
more of a coordinating body between various organs of the WCC.718  
 Despite Niilus’ role, however, his appointed study secretary, the young American Presbyterian 
Reverend Dwain C. Epps, did most of the work in guiding along the CCIA’s process of study on 
human rights. The relative sparseness of Niilus’ written legacy in this area makes it difficult to ascertain 
how much freedom Epps had in this respect, but although the two clearly worked together closely, 
Epps’ own contribution should not be disregarded.719 Epps, originally from Oregon, had through 
student Christian networks become acquainted with members of the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee, and through the Reserve Officer Training Corps lived and worked in 
Mississippi from 1960 to 1963, before attending seminary in San Francisco. Later, he went on a student 
exchange to Tübingen, Germany, where he became acquainted with the ecumenical movement and 
ended up attending the WCC’s seminal 1966 Geneva conference. Julio de Santa Ana made a particular 
impression on him as a speaker there, as Epps recalled, and he took an interest in the ‘issues of the 
day’ – revolution, decolonization, and liberation. Epps then took up a Frontier Internship in Buenos 
Aires, where he focused on developing regional urban mission networks under Niilus’ leadership at 
ISAL.720 On Niilus’ departure to Geneva, Epps was asked to join him there to work for the CCIA, 
where he would go on to organize the St. Pölten consultation. (Significantly, Epps also rapidly gained 
clout as a non-governmental organizer at the UN: he soon became the Vice President of the 
Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with the Economic and 
Social Council of the UN).721 
Beyond Niilus and Epps, the 1972 appointment of Potter as General Secretary was significant. 
The contours of the CCIA’s development of a new conception of human rights were taking shape 
well before Potter took up his position. But Potter’s thinking about human rights was consonant with 
that of the CCIA, and as General Secretary he promoted the new approach.722 Similarly, the CCIA 
benefited from a supportive stance on the part of the new Moderator of the Central Committee (1968-
                                                 
718 Translation mine. Ibid., 198-199. 
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1975), the Indian theologian M.M. Thomas. Thomas, like Potter, had been associated with the 
ecumenical movement from the 1940s onward, but the need for development in the Third World had 
made him critical of liberal conceptions of human rights.723 He was thus an important ally in the push 
to expand human rights to reflect Third World concerns. 
According to Epps, it was Niilus and the Liberian Canon Burgess Carr, the General Secretary 
of the All Africa Conference of Churches and a former WCC staff member, who in January 1971 
initiated the process of redefining the WCC’s conception of human rights.724 The precise reasons for 
this are not entirely clear. Carr had joined the WCC after breaking off his PhD at Harvard University, 
because he had been appalled by images from the civil war in the Congo. According to his later 
account, this also underlay his desire to raise the question of human rights.725 Joseph Rudolph Grimes, 
who had served as Liberia’s Foreign Minister until 1971 and would subsequently join the CCIA, later 
remarked that the opportunity presented by the impending 25th anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration had played a role.726 For Niilus’ part, a speech given at the 1970 Conference of Secretaries 
of World Confessional Organizations, on religious freedom and human rights, gave an indication of 
his views at the time. The new director of the CCIA observed a ‘dramatic’ rise in violations of human 
rights, all over the world. Referencing South Africa, Niilus asked, rhetorically: ‘isn’t there also a lack 
of real religious freedom where large numbers of people are being oppressed, starved, dominated, as 
we are then truly hindered from doing what we are mandated to do, namely to communicate the Good 
News to all men and the whole man?’727 Niilus thus pushed for a conception of religious freedom as 
being safeguarded when not only civil and political but also social, economic and cultural rights were 
respected.728 In doing so, he engaged in a precarious dance with the Universal Declaration: on the one 
hand, he continually invoked its clauses, especially less-referenced ones suggesting, among other 
things, a right to rebellion against a regime that violates human rights, and called for their 
implementation, while on the other, he drew attention to the Declaration’s historical nature as a 
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‘political document reflecting the ideological slants and doctrines of its times and drafters’ that should 
therefore be regarded critically.729 
Ahead of the WCC Central Committee’s 1971 meeting in Addis Ababa, the CCIA submitted 
a ‘Memorandum on Human Rights’ and a statement on ‘Unity and Human Rights in Africa Today’, 
both of which were adopted. The ‘Memorandum’ focused attention on the need to implement human 
rights standards as established at the UN and by regional bodies in Europe (the Council of Europe), 
Latin America (the Inter-American Commission), the Middle East (the League of Arab States), and 
Africa (the Organization for African Unity). The memorandum noted that efforts at developing UN 
instruments for implementation had so far been confined to the area of discrimination, e.g. the UN 
Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, 
whereas elsewhere ‘most, yes almost everything, remains to be done’ (for more on the question of 
racial discrimination, the WCC, and the UN, see chapter 4).730 The memorandum ended by calling the 
UN the ‘natural international agency for advancing these rights’, which the churches should support, 
while it approvingly quoted Secretary-General U Thant, who had at a recent conference stated that 
‘[t]he United Nations… cannot progress, or even survive, without enforceable world laws, world 
police, and world courts for the maintenance of international peace and security.’731 The memorandum 
thus evinced an idealistic and UN-centric vision of international implementation of human rights. 
Perhaps most importantly, in the resolution that adopted the memorandum, the Central Committee 
called for the CCIA to initiate a consultation ‘to focus member churches’ concern on Human Rights’ 
– this would eventually result in the St. Pölten consultation of 1974.732  
 The statement on ‘Unity and Human Rights in Africa Today’ warned of the combined effect 
of (the history of) colonialism and ‘“neo-colonialism’” in the form of foreign interference, which 
‘makes the solution of the existing problems of tribalism and internal dissidence more difficult’. The 
statement endorsed the Organization of African Unity’s concept of ‘national, regional and continental 
unity’, though, as per its Charter, with ‘“due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights”’. This quest for ‘unity and self-determination in Africa’ was 
‘impeded’, however, ‘not only by the legacies of the colonial epoch, but also by the interference of the 
rich and powerful nations in the affairs of Africa’. The document warned that ‘[u]nity is not an end in 
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itself. National unity must include a recognition of legitimate human rights which also safeguard the 
basic rights of ethnic minorities.’733 But the specific areas in which the statement called for the support 
of the WCC’s member churches aimed at assisting African nations in attaining and preserving ‘their 
full self-determination, independence, and unity’, including pressuring governments and corporations 
to cease selling arms to white-minority regimes, ‘giving support and encouragement to foreign 
mercenaries’, and executing projects that ‘entrench racist and colonial majority regimes in Africa’.734 
While relatively vague, the statement thus connected human rights to the collective right of self-
determination and freedom from foreign interference, while implicitly detracting from the stature of 
individual rights. 
After this opening salvo of two somewhat divergent statements, the CCIA’s deliberations on 
human rights got underway in earnest. Its 9-12 July 1971 Executive Committee meeting put human 
rights center stage and featured extensive discussion. The first of its two keynote speakers was Marc 
Schreiber, head of the UN Human Rights Division, who asserted that the ‘basic task of those 
concerned with human rights is to promote respect for human values’ and stressed the importance of 
implementing human rights by ratifying the UN Covenants. The more significant presentation, 
however, was made by the Colombian CCIA Commissioner and sociologist Professor Orlando Fals 
Borda, who spoke ‘from the standpoint of the underdeveloped part of the world’.735 Fals Borda, a 
Presbyterian, had been a close friend and associate of Father Camillo Torres Restrepo, an important 
predecessor of liberation theology who was killed while fighting for the guerrillas of Colombia’s 
National Liberation Army in 1966 (Fals Borda, on the other hand, limited himself to nonviolent 
activism).  
In his presentation, Fals Borda denounced human rights as ‘basically the product of a Western, 
capitalistic, monopolistic economic system which tends to exploit and control the human and material 
resources of the Third World’, which went hand in hand with notions of ‘nation-building’ and 
‘modernization’. Human rights failed to represent ‘opposing views representing traditional cultures 
and the needs of the exploited poor’, as voiced by leaders like ‘Tupac Amaru, (…) Patrice Lumumba, 
Ho Chi Minh, Mao Tse Tung, “Che” Guevara and Eduardo Mondlane’. Against the Western emphasis 
on individual rights, which mostly benefited ‘the powerful and the rich’, Fals Borda proposed a new 
emphasis on the ‘rights of peoples’, most importantly the ‘right to rebel for justice’, that is, against unjust laws, 
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and the ‘right to cultural self-determination’. Fals Borda argued that a kind of ‘nationalism’ was called for, in 
which the ‘nation is conceived of not exclusively as a political system, but as a human, cultural entity 
as well’, which ought to be entirely free from any kind of foreign interference.736 While Fals Borda’s 
conception of foreign interference was focused on exploitative behavior by Western governments and 
corporations, his view of human rights as their handmaiden clearly sat at odds with the ideal of 
internationally enforced human rights. 
Fals Borda’s approach was supported by a draft document that was presented to, though not 
formally adopted by, the meeting, and which shared his emphasis on moving from individual to 
collective rights:  
‘The CCIA should consistently interpret “human rights” in light of the Christian conception of the 
relation of God and man and the brotherhood of all men as sons of God. This conception will 
necessarily move beyond the Western liberal interpretation that views individual rights as supreme, 
to give emphasis to collective rights of all men to act in pursuit of dignity free from exploitation by 
their fellow-men whether this exploitation is political or economic in character. (...) In many parts 
of the world, individual human rights may be attained only if there is group action to change the 
social structures that limit those rights.’737  
Fals Borda’s presentation also received warm support from the Ghanaian CCIA Commissioner A.L. 
Adu, who argued that similar maxims applied to Africa, ‘with its communal traditions’, and specifically 
to Ghana, the constitution of which ‘is a mere repetition of Western rhetoric and practically ignores 
indigenous traditions’, due to the history of foreign exploitation and the present state of 
‘neocolonialism’.738 (Adu had served first as Secretary for External Affairs and then Secretary to the 
Cabinet under Kwame Nkrumah, where he had been a rival to George Padmore, Nkrumah’s key 
advisor on ‘African Affairs’.739 After the 1966 coup, Adu went on to become the Commonwealth of 
Nations’ first Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs, serving from 1966 to 1970, before 
returning to Ghana as director of Ghana Consolidated Diamonds Limited.740) 
Western commissioners, on the other hand, were by and large critical of Fals Borda’s 
presentation, calling for attention to women’s rights as well as religious freedom in ‘societies which 
explicitly deny the Christian faith’, for further reflection on what might justify rebellion, and for the 
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need to learn from the Western experience in facing the challenges associated with ‘moving from 
traditional to modern society’. Nevertheless, the author of the last two of these points, the British 
CCIA Commissioner Geoffrey Goodwin, an emeritus professor of international relations at the 
London School of Economics, conceded that in countries like Nigeria, Pakistan and the Sudan, 
‘Western inspired ideas of nation-building and integration’ had trumped ‘[m]inority group rights’, with 
disastrous consequences. In relation to the question of dealing with human rights globally or 
regionally, he acknowledged that a regional approach, ‘where a greater degree of cultural, theological 
and political homogeneity exists to simplify matters’, could be fruitful, and pointed to the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) as a possible example.741 Most participants resisted Fals Borda’s radicalism 
and especially his disdain for individual human rights to some degree or another. Nevertheless, during 
the meeting’s subsequent presentations and discussions, perspectives suggesting that human rights 
needed to be not only implemented but also reformed in some way, based on a sense that the Western, 
liberal tradition of human rights was limited or outdated, were ascendant. The British Canon David 
Jenkins, who had prepared a paper on the theology of human rights, argued that ‘one particular area 
with regard to human rights will be to concentrate with particular intensity and sensitivity on the 
oppression of the poor’.742 Though there existed a range of views as to both problems and potential 
solutions, the discussion had opened up space for a fundamental reconsideration of the meaning of 
human rights. 
At the 13-23 August 1972 Utrecht Central Committee meeting, the CCIA presented a new 
‘Report and Further Recommendations on Human Rights’, which was unanimously adopted. The 
report stressed, as had the 1971 report, the need for implementation of existing international 
standards. But it added a second area of concern: the question of ‘how to relate the provisions of 
existing international instruments for the protection of Human Rights to the struggle for social and 
economic justice and other fundamental rights often ignored even by governments which have 
formally accepted the duty of safeguarding them’.743 The Central Committee adopted the consequent 
CCIA recommendation to establish a specific theme for the consultation on human rights that the 
Addis Ababa meeting had called for, namely: ‘how to relate standards of Human Rights to the cultural, 
socio-economic and political settings of different parts of the world, attention being given to religious 
liberty as a basic right, and emphasis being laid on finding more effective means of international 
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cooperation for the implementation of Human Rights’.744 Based on this mandate, the CCIA set about 
organizing its consultation on ‘Human Rights and Christian Responsibility’, which would take place, 
after a series of meetings organized by a steering group, in October 1974. 
 
The St. Pölten consultation on ‘Human Rights and Christian Responsibility’, 
21-26 October 1974 
The consultation’s intent 
From 21 to 26 October 1974, the CCIA brought together a group of 50 clergy and laymen in 
St. Pölten, Austria, to discuss the subject of ‘Human Rights and Christian Responsibility’. This 
represented a major step in the process whereby the WCC sought to articulate its position and policy 
on human rights. The WCC press release after the consultation listed six basic rights: ‘the essential 
human right to life, the right to enjoy and maintain cultural identity, the right to participate in decision-
making within the community, the right to dissent, the right to personal dignity, which includes 
protection from torture and the right to religious liberty’.745 This list was taken, with minor 
modifications, from the consultation’s report as it would be presented to the Nairobi Assembly.746 The 
Assembly would endorse these in virtually unchanged form, as discussed in the next section, thereby 
enshrining them as the core of the WCC’s human rights engagement moving forward. 
The consultation’s participants hailed from seven regions, as defined by the organizers (the 
number of participants from each area follows in brackets): Latin America (7), Asia (4), Africa (3), the 
Middle East (2), North America (5), Western Europe (18), Eastern Europe (9), and the Pacific Region 
(2). These numbers reflected a much stronger Western European representation than the organizers 
had envisioned: six places taken by Western Europeans had originally been allotted to African (3), 
Asian (2), and Middle Eastern (1) participants, which in terms of ‘blocs’ would have made the Third 
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World, rather than Western Europe or the wider West, the largest in numbers.747 For unclear reasons, 
the Middle East, while recognized as a represented region at the consultation, was not represented in 
any of the conference’s documents, nor was the Pacific Region. Apart from these participants, the 
consultation included seven WCC and five CCIA staff, as well as a few outside experts and observers 
from the Lutheran World Federation, the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, and the Vatican’s 
Pontifical Council on Justice and Peace. 
Ahead of the consultation, preparatory documents were compiled into two volumes, the first 
sent out in May 1974 and the second closer to the conference (at a relatively late time), as well as a 
few separately supplied documents. The image on the cover of the St. Pölten volumes, the same 
cartoon each time, drove home the central point the organizers wanted to make: a white man stands 
atop a pile of oppressed individuals, such as a laborer and a woman, apparently unaware of their 
existence and the burden he is placing on them; blinders block his view on either side while he gleefully 
looks through a telescope that reads ‘human rights violations abroad’ and points at the other countries 
(outside the frame) in question. The message was clear: Western churches should spend less time 
pointing out the splinter in the eye of others and more time examining their own responsibility for 
injustice.  
The WCC’s archives contain no minutes of the consultation’s discussions; instead, keynote 
speeches and working group reports were compiled into a final report. The working groups’ reports 
were later sent on to the participants of the Nairobi Assembly, with a new introduction. While this 
compilation of outcome reports was highly significant in that it captured and disseminated the (limited) 
consensus that the consultation had arrived at, it blended together all the various viewpoints expressed 
during the consultation, without attributing any given viewpoint to any specific source. Nevertheless, 
the preparatory documents and keynote speeches provide a window into which currents of thinking 
shaped the eventual outcome, as well as which perspectives failed to influence it. First and foremost, 
however, attention must be given to the viewpoints of the organizers, who wielded great influence 
through their framing of the issues, their role in the selection of participants, and their compilation of 
the preparatory materials as well as the report. 
A fundamental problem that the consultation grappled with was how the WCC, because of 
the diversity of its constituency, their viewpoints and the backgrounds they came from, could arrive 
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at a form of consensus from which to advocate for human rights – most crucially, in cases when there 
was tension between different rights or ways of promoting them. This problem was captured in the 
conference’s above-quoted theme, which cast the problem in terms of global diversity: ‘how to relate 
standards of Human Rights to cultural, socio-economic and political settings of different parts of the 
world’.748 Epps formulated the consultation’s objective in a more specific manner: ‘to develop an 
international ecumenical understanding on which effective relations of solidarity can be based to 
provide effective support to those in other countries who are struggling to defend and promote human 
rights in their own situations’.749 As these quotations show, the consultation was premised on a degree 
of relativism, while at the same time organized around the assumption that a common understanding 
of ‘human rights’ could be arrived at.750 This tension between the universal and the particular – a 
premise that challenged liberal assumptions about the universality of human rights – would have to 
be negotiated in practice. 
In taking up this question, the consultation’s organizers conceived of the meeting as offering 
a corrective to the overly ‘Western’ perspective represented by the WCC’s existing stance. Thus, they 
aimed to showcase Third World perspectives prominently. In the view of the organizers, the new, 
‘more integral approach’ to human rights required combating ‘root causes’: ‘human rights can be 
implemented only if threats to or open violations of them are opposed in terms of the socio-economic 
and political contexts in which they occur’.751 Their programmatic paper related this ‘integral approach’ 
to the rise of ‘new social concerns as ecumenical priorities’: refugees, anti-racism, the ‘economic and 
social self-development of peoples’, and the need for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).752 
This conception of human rights thus moved beyond ‘simple charity, which may ease the conscience 
of the giver, yet brings no solution to the vast problem of inequality and often diverts attention from 
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the real issues to symptoms’.753 The organizers were well aware that this meant taking human rights 
into the territory of the ‘political’, and in fact they embraced this, stating that ‘both implementation 
and violation of human rights are political problems which have international political implications’, 
distancing themselves from the views of those who would ‘consider them as purely “humanitarian” 
and “apolitical”’.754 
Epps’ writings in the lead-up to the consultation provide insight into the CCIA’s aims. In one 
memorandum, Epps posed the question: ‘Why place so much emphasis on human rights? They are 
not our “confession of faith”. Worse, they represent a liberal conception of the world which is today 
doing much more damage to the poor and the oppressed.’ Moreover, he continued, ‘there is no proof 
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the UN itself is effective in implementing these 
“ideals”’. But, Epps wrote, the Universal Declaration being ‘historically determined’ meant it could 
also be given a new ‘interpretation according to the historical context of man’ as well as undergo 
‘further development’ to correct its ‘individualism which does not correspond to the conception which 
many hold on the role of man in society’. Moreover, it was valuable because of ‘the very fact that an 
international code of human behaviour has been agreed upon in the midst of a vast plurality of views 
on what is the meaning of human existence and human dignity’. Epps explained that ‘[w]e take 
international human rights instruments as tools available to us for the reshaping of society and the 
structures of society in our attempts to remove the root causes of evil in the world.’ Given the 
authority such instruments enjoyed, the benefit was that ‘[w]e can talk in terms of human rights and 
be understood by even the most conservative of christians [sic]. If we leap immediately to other levels, 
we certainly will break communication with many.’755 Epps’ fundamental goal was thus to use human 
rights as an entry point for dialogue while at the same time envisioning a drastic expansion of the 
concept’s meaning. 
 
The consultation’s outcome 
At the start of the consultation, after the opening speeches, the participants were divided into 
four working groups, entitled ‘The Right to Life and Work: The Basic Social, Economic and Cultural 
                                                 
753 CCIA, Human Rights and Christian Responsibility: Report of the Consultation St. Pölten, Austria, 21-26 October 1974 (Geneva: 
WCC, 1975) 18, JPNL-KDC, inv. no. 63. 
754 ‘Human Rights and Christian Responsibility: Human Rights Basic Program Paper’, in CCIA, Human Rights and Christian 
Responsibility, Vol. 1 (1974) 5-12, 6 and 9 (emphasis omitted). 
755 Dwain C. Epps, ‘Human Rights and Christian Responsibility: Where are we today?’, 10 January 1974, 4-5, WCCA CCIA 
428.15.3.5.2. 
201 
 
Rights’; ‘Right to Equality’; ‘Rights to National Sovereignty, Self-Determination, International 
Community, and Related Rights’; and ‘The Proliferation of Political Prisoners and of Political 
Refugees’. Across these four groups, there was an emphasis on collective rights, though the third 
group took care to point out that ‘peoples’ were not synonymous with ‘nations and states’: ‘Peoples 
are continuous while nations and states may change.’756 Even the fourth group, which focused on 
individual civil and political rights, sought the ‘root causes’ of human rights violations in changes in 
‘the relationships between the rich countries and poor countries’: the ‘rising level of consciousness 
among the oppressed’ and their ‘realization that systemic and structural change from an oppressive to 
a more just society is indeed within reach (…) directly threatens the privileges enjoyed by the national 
and international ruling few’, who responded with ‘internationally coordinated political, military and 
police instruments (…) to repress the voices of change’.757 Common to the discussions was an analysis 
of the problem in terms of a developed North and an underdeveloped South, whereby the peoples of 
the South needed to be emancipated against the governments and corporations of the North and the 
Southern elites who were in thrall to them. 
For the second phase of the consultation, the participants divided themselves into three new 
groups, the conclusions of which were accepted by the entire consultation as representative, ‘with 
minor revisions, (…) of the consensus view of the whole’.758 The paper discussed four specific issues 
of principle in relation to the consultation’s main theme, which had been set out by the conference’s 
organizers (Epps in particular): first, whether, generally speaking, collective or individual rights 
deserved emphasis; second, whether some situations permitted an emphasis on certain rights (at the 
cost of others); third, whether human rights should be promoted in a ‘humanitarian’ or a ‘political’ 
way; and fourth, whether all human rights should be affirmed by all political or economic systems. 
The report concluded, optimistically, that these ‘questions raised are not so divisive as might at first 
appear’.759  
In response to the first of these questions, on the relative importance of individual and 
collective rights, the report argued for the interrelatedness of the two, and asserted the social nature 
of rights and their correlative duties: ‘Individual rights and collective rights are not in flat opposition. 
They are related. It should be the aim of the community to secure the welfare of all its members, the 
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aim of the individual to serve the general good. In both instances, rights involve responsibilities.’760 
On the second question, that of temporary suspension of certain rights, the group agreed ‘categorically 
that the limitation of human rights can never be justified when it is used as a device for oppression’, 
but allowed that further reflection was needed on the proposition that ‘in periods of fundamental 
economic and political change leading to a more just society there is an emphasis on those rights which 
are considered essential to promoting such change and in consequence a lesser emphasis on other 
rights’.761 These formulations seemed to make civil and political rights negotiable, although their 
abstractness made it difficult to ascertain what this would mean in practice. It was not difficult to 
envision a state claiming it was not engaged in ‘oppression’ but in collective liberation with the aim of 
‘a more just society’. Such tropes were part and parcel of the rhetoric of postcolonial dictatorships at 
the UN at this time, of which the CCIA could only have been aware.762 
On the question of whether to promote human rights in a ‘humanitarian’ or a ‘political’ 
manner, the participants agreed that any intervention for human rights, whether intended to be 
humanitarian or political, would lead to a political result – calling into question the distinction between 
the humanitarian and the political in the first place, while recasting ‘political’ as a quality to be 
embraced or at least accepted rather than avoided.763 Finally, on the fourth question, on whether all 
political systems ought to respect all human rights, the consultation stated simply that ‘though 
interpretations and emphases may vary’, all systems should respect the rights listed in the Universal 
Declaration: ‘We recognized that we were considering the order of priorities in specific situations, not 
setting alternatives in irreconcilable opposition.’764 (In a follow-up document of the CCIA, this last 
answer was highlighted as the key one on the issue of different approaches to human rights.765) The 
document presented no clear rationale, however, for why civil and political should stand in tension 
with other rights in the first place. The counterpoint to this assumption had been made in a 
contribution by Martin Ennals, the Secretary-General of Amnesty International, who stated that  
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‘[h]uman rights are not selective. (…) The mere attempt to set the two corpuses of rights in 
confrontation is in contradiction to the [Universal] Declaration and implies an insensitivity to the 
nature of what human rights are all about. (…) unless he [a starving man] has the right to speak 
freely and to organise, he may never be in a position to be able to ensure a steady diet and a protected 
house.’766 
Beyond these four positions, the report presented the list of six core rights presented above 
as common ground. It also argued that the WCC’s nature made it especially suited to the task of 
coming up with a pluralistic approach to human rights.767 The report confidently asserted that the 
WCC’s ecumenical practice over several decades and its internal diversity – religiously, economically, 
politically, culturally – ‘have made the WCC in the best sense of the word impartial, not identified with 
any particular culture or political system, and therefore able to move into critical international 
situations’.768 The CCIA thus saw the WCC as in the position to lead the global effort of the churches 
on human rights. 
The assertion of the WCC’s impartiality sat at odds, however, with the consultation’s 
understanding of human rights as political, and the Marxist and anti-colonial or anti-imperialist 
thinking that shaped much of its outcome. It would be misleading to suggest that the participants were 
aligned with the foreign policy of the socialist states of the Eastern bloc.769 Their sympathy towards 
socialism and antagonism towards capitalism were first and foremost products of Third World politics, 
especially in Latin America. The prevalence of the concept of ‘conscientization’, the creative 
articulation of new rights, and the emphasis on ‘liberation’ all reflected liberation theology (discussed 
in chapter 5).770 But liberation theology could hardly be painted as an ‘impartial’ approach, quite the 
opposite: it departed from the perspective of the poor and the oppressed, especially those in the global 
South. By framing the political agenda that it inferred from this approach as a question of human 
rights, the CCIA and its like-minded associates sought to win the WCC’s world-wide constituency 
over to their cause. 
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The consultation’s participants recognized, however, that in any given case, there would 
inevitably be disagreement over which course of action should or should not be taken. In line with 
liberation theology’s bottom-up, contextualist ethos, the report made clear that churches at the local 
and national levels would have to take the lead: ‘primary responsibility for the defense and promotion 
of human rights in relation to the actual situation in different parts of the world lies with local and 
national churches’.771 At the same time, it articulated priorities, such as promoting the ratification of 
the UN Covenants and engaging in ‘the great task of conscientizing the people’, while also helping 
victims of human rights violations access legal or other means of redress.772 The institutional resources 
of the WCC and especially the CCIA, meanwhile, would be devoted to activities such as gathering and 
disseminating information, issuing statements of protest and denunciation, and encouraging churches 
to educate their members on human rights.773 
The reports acknowledged that the churches would not in all cases be willing or able to obey 
the imperative to work for human rights. For instance, churches might not recognize ‘that in many 
cases they, the christians [sic], may be among the exploiters and oppressors’.774 Furthermore, ‘many 
churches have become integral parts of their nation-states’ power structures and do not apply that 
vision [of justice and dignity]. Other churches have come into paralyzing conflict and tension with 
Government leaders. In both instances church leaders sometimes feel prevented from speaking 
openly.’775 Thus, ‘while local bodies are more intimately acquainted with human rights situations (...), 
in many instances, “the closer one is to the realities, the less one is able to act”’.776 In such cases, the 
WCC would have to take upon itself the task of issuing statements ‘designed to diminish the negative 
effects of human rights situations’, although ‘with sensitivity where people are liable to suffer as a 
result of such intervention’.777 Whereas the phrase on church leaders feeling prevented from speaking 
openly applied, inter alia, to the churches in Eastern Europe, and seemed to invite WCC denunciation 
of human rights violations there, these latter qualifications pointed more towards ‘silent diplomacy’ 
than public protest. The two operative principles put forward here, the primacy of local agency and, 
in the absence of this, a weighing of options based on effectiveness and the wellbeing of the victims 
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in question, surfaced in discussions on Eastern Europe at Nairobi and beyond (see chapter 1). Little 
public criticism of religious freedom in the USSR was voiced, on the grounds that the churches 
themselves were not engaged in open resistance and denunciation would only be counterproductive. 
For all the importance of Third World perspectives at St. Pölten, it should not be overlooked 
that many Western contributions had core tenets in common with them. American delegates, among 
whom was a Native American, were disturbed by increasing evidence that their country fell short of 
its claim of being a ‘force for good’, especially in Latin America. They and many Western European 
participants agreed on the importance of considering structural causes and solutions to human rights 
violations, and the need for the West to help those in the Third World. For Europeans the legacy and 
guilt of colonialism – by no means a thing of the past, especially in Southern Africa – provided an 
important motive in this respect. At the same time, they could look to the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the prospective dissemination of its mechanisms abroad as a way for Europe to 
redeem itself.778 In a response to the consultation, the Portuguese participant and theologian A.J. 
Dimas Almeida drew heavily on the language of liberation theology.779 At the same time, Western 
European contributions were prone to fall into a charity-oriented paternalism based on ‘the duty of 
the well-to-do and the healthy to “bring rights” and provide the poor and the weak with the necessities 
of life’.780 And there was also criticism: the influential West German emeritus professor of public law 
Ulrich Scheuner, who had served as interim chairman of the CCIA from 1968 to 1969, insisted that 
in order to preserve a definite meaning, human rights ‘must retain a connection to individual forms of 
freedom’ – in which regard he praised Latin American advocacy of civil and political rights – and be 
restricted to apolitical ‘fundamental rights’. Scheuner feared that Third World participants were 
‘seeking to dissolve the term human rights into a universal demand for greater justice among the 
peoples’. Nevertheless, even Scheuner acknowledged that his conception of fundamental rights ‘grew 
out of the special historical and social conditions of the West’, that the ‘Western conception is 
changing too’, and that ‘social rights must be included, remembering that they have a different 
structure’ (a point that was not systematically discussed at the consultation).781  
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Eastern European participants’ contributions, by contrast, were often so doctrinaire – 
rehearsing textbook accounts of the socialist conception of human rights – that it seems implausible 
that they exerted a major influence. The Russian Orthodox papers included in the preparatory volumes 
showed how little room for maneuver Eastern churchmen had, or how little inclination to deviate 
from the party line.782 Eastern European contributions were suggestive, however, of the way in which 
socialist participants could seek alliances with Third World positions in order to undercut Western 
discourse on civil and political rights (consciously or not, this paralleled the tactics employed by 
socialist states in international diplomacy). The Polish jurist Bernard Jarzynka, for instance, quoted 
from the 1968 Tehran Proclamation, which drew from the ‘indivisible’ nature of the categories of 
rights the conclusion that ‘“the achievement of lasting progress in the implementation of human rights 
is dependent upon sound and effective national and international policies of economic and social 
development”’. As Jarzynka phrased it, ‘respect for economic and social rights is the precondition for 
the realization of other human rights’.783 Likewise, a statement by the Christian Peace Conference 
reasoned that social and economic rights had priority over ‘the secondary political rights’, because 
‘who is illiterate, hungry, without shelter and job cannot fully realize civil human rights’.784 The 
contribution by K. Pröhle, the General Secretary of the Ecumenical Council of Hungary and a 
participant in the consultation, spoke of the Third World, where ‘the great masses who are under 
privileged or who have no rights at all, are encouraged by the Declaration of Human Rights to change 
their situation by revolutionary means’, leading to ‘a new economic and social order’.785 Such attempts 
at pushing a conception of human rights weighted heavily towards socioeconomic concerns, whether 
opportunistic or genuine in motivation, could not prevent the consultation’s outcome from including 
sustained attention to individual civil and political rights. After all, the final list of six rights included a 
mixture of different kinds of rights. 
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The road from St. Pölten 
The Nairobi Assembly 
Whereas the St. Pölten consultation had been a small gathering of CCIA invitees and WCC 
staff members, with no formal power to set the ecumenical agenda, the 1975 Nairobi Assembly 
brought together the WCC’s 260 member churches. The Assembly’s location, though partly accidental 
– originally it had been planned for Jakarta – was symbolic, this being the first WCC Assembly to take 
place in Africa. It was also the first Assembly that Potter, the WCC’s first black General Secretary, 
presided over. Just over half of the WCC’s member churches were now non-Western, though they 
were still underrepresented: 38 per cent of delegates at the conference came from the Third World 
(up from 29 per cent at Uppsala, and 15 per cent at Amsterdam).786 
The Assembly discussed human rights as part of its Section V, entitled ‘Structures of Injustice 
and Struggles for Liberation’. The section’s report consisted of three subsections: human rights, 
sexism, and racism. This division was described as serving merely ‘practical purposes’, because 
‘[s]tructures of injustice and struggles of liberation cannot be separated from each other’, indicating a 
sense of interdependence that permeated the Assembly’s discussions. The subsection on human rights 
rooted ecumenical concern in ‘our conviction that God wills a society in which all can exercise full 
human rights’, because of man having been created in the image of God, and the life, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ, which bound Christians together.787 This built on the biblical basis for 
human rights established at St. Pölten, which had noted that ‘the emphasis of the Gospel is on the 
value of all human beings in the sight of God, on the atoning and redeeming work of Christ that has 
given to man his true dignity, on love as the motive for action, and on love of one’s neighbour as the 
practical expression of an active faith in Christ’.788 
Though the report’s framework noted that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the UN Covenants, as well as the recent Helsinki Final Act, ‘largely coincide with our current Christian 
understanding about what makes up a just society’, its recommendations on how to provide the right 
conditions for the implementation of human rights went much further than any standard or 
instrument of international law.789 The report warned of the temptation to only deal with ‘symptoms 
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rather than root causes’, with the latter taking the form of ‘unjust social structures, expressed through, 
e.g., economic exploitation, political manipulation, military power, class domination, psychological 
conditioning’, which ‘create the conditions under which human rights are denied’. Therefore, working 
for human rights ‘also means to work at the most basic level towards a society without unjust 
structures’.790 The WCC thus fused appeals to the dignity of the individual human being with a 
contentious interpretation of socio-political questions. 
The report noted that throughout, ‘self-determination by individuals, groups, and nations’ had 
to be balanced, preventing one from unduly encroaching on another.791 Its enumeration of six 
categories of rights entailed such a balancing act between individual and collective rights: (1) ‘The 
Right to Basic Guarantees for Life’ (specifically to work, food, health care, education), (2) ‘The Rights 
to Self-Determination and to Cultural Identity, and the Rights of Minorities’ (people’s ‘right freely to 
determine their political status and freely to pursue their economic, cultural, and social development’), 
(3) ‘The Right to Participate in Decision-Making within the Community’, (4) ‘The Right to Dissent’ 
(specifically to freedom of opinion, expression, peaceful assembly), (5) ‘The Right to Personal Dignity’ 
(including habeas corpus, the right to life, freedom from torture), and finally – demoted from being 
the first right on the ecumenical agenda to the last – (6) ‘The Right to Religious Freedom’ (the freedom 
to choose a religion and to manifest it through ‘worship, observance, practice, and teaching’, as well 
as ‘the right and duty of religious bodies to criticize the ruling powers’).792 These six rights or categories 
of rights provided the backbone of the WCC’s new conception of human rights. 
 
 
Theological and regional consultations and the NIEO 
How did the WCC’s new conception of human rights alter its subsequent practice? Only 
further research can answer this question in full, but a few tentative observations may be made. At the 
theological level, St. Pölten and Nairobi were significant for providing a biblical basis for human rights, 
which subsequent theological consultations and debates elaborated on. The ramifications of this 
differed widely depending on its reception by the WCC’s various member churches. Theological 
debate arguably played a much greater role in spreading awareness of the general notion of human 
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rights among the churches than it did in specifying their content. For example, from 1978 to 1980, 
the CCIA coordinated an ‘Interconfessional Study Project on the Theological Basis of Human Rights’. 
The World Alliance of Reformed Churches, the Lutheran World Federation, the Pontifical 
Commission Justice and Peace, the Preparatory Committee of the Pan Orthodox Council, the Baptist 
World Alliance, and the Anglican Consultative Council all participated. At a month-long gathering in 
Geneva, from 3 April to 3 May 1980, theologians from the denominations these organizations 
represented agreed, in Marc Reuver’s words,  
‘that a common Christian understanding exists in the basic doctrine that all theological statements 
on human rights derive from the Christian anthropology of the human person created in the image 
of God. Thus, all people irrespective of their skills and achievements have the same inviolable and 
inalienable dignity and a common hope: the human destiny of being made in the image of God is 
to be perfected by becoming like unto God.’793 
But the theological approaches underlying this abstract commitment continued to differ, departing 
from either ‘the creation of the human being’ (Roman Catholic), ‘the experience of God’s covenant 
with his people’ (Reformed), or ‘the event of the justification of sinners through the grace of God in 
Jesus Christ’ (Lutheran). As Reuver pointed out, these positions left unresolved questions such as the 
relationship between individual and collective rights: whereas the Lutheran approach insisted on the 
primacy of individual rights, the Reformed participants ascribed ‘equal importance’ to ‘individual and 
collective rights’.794 Thus, the meeting illustrated that a common Christian understanding of human 
rights could only be achieved at a high level of abstraction, leaving indeterminate which specific 
approach was commensurate with it. This remained a matter to be decided closer to the ground, where 
practice tended to outpace theology. Nevertheless, this and a range of other attempts at theologizing 
human rights were significant in that they indicated that the concept of human rights was in the 
process of being transformed from a means, as it had primarily been from the 1940s onward, into an 
end. 
With respect to the WCC’s policy, it is important to keep in mind that the Nairobi Assembly’s 
report on human rights straddled divergent positions. Its lack of a fully unified agenda went hand in 
hand with a diffusion of agency away from the CCIA and towards other WCC bodies, as well as 
                                                 
793 ‘An Interconfessional Study Project on the Theological Basis of Human Rights’, in Marc Reuver, ed., Human Rights: A 
Challenge to Theology (Rome: CCIA & IDOC International, 1983) 20-27, on 25. 
794 Reuver notes that these classifications (Roman Catholic, Reformed, Lutheran) applied only broadly speaking. Ibid., 25. 
210 
 
towards ecclesiastical organizations at the national and local levels.795 In the increasingly polycentric 
ecumenical landscape of the 1970s, such diffusion was embraced and even encouraged by the CCIA, 
which – in the spirit of Nairobi’s emphasis on ‘participation’ – stimulated the agency of local actors 
and acted as a global coordinator and clearinghouse, for instance by co-organizing regional 
consultations on human rights. The content of these regional consultations was an important marker 
of the development of ecumenical views on human rights in practice. 
Though the WCC in these years stressed collective rights, this should be understood as a 
repudiation of a narrow liberal conception of human rights rather than of individual civil and political 
rights as such. Had the outcome of St. Pölten and Nairobi been a compromise between collectivist 
Third World representatives and individualist First World representatives, one would have expected 
regional Third World consultations to focus entirely on collective rights. As chapter 5 has shown with 
regard to Latin America, however, this was not the case: civil and political rights featured prominently, 
even if they were set in a wider framework. The same applied to regional consultations in the other 
two main areas representing the WCC’s Third World constituency: Africa and Asia. Potter’s speech at 
the Assembly of the All-Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), held in Lusaka in 1974, illustrates 
the main thrust behind the WCC’s stance. As Efiong Utuk renders his speech,  
‘[w]hile he [Potter] agreed that Africans had suffered untold hardship at the hand of foreigners, 
Potter did not use it to excuse social irresponsibility. In his opinion, the colonial experience actually 
magnified African responsibility rather than lessened it. For this reason, he challenged Africans to 
see the other side of the coin: their own contribution to injustice and oppression. “We do well”, he 
emphatically declared, “to look at ourselves”’.’796 
In other words, the WCC was not content to merely point the finger at the global North: it encouraged 
churches in the South to adopt a critical stance towards their own societies and states. 
The AACC’s 16-22 February 1975 Human Rights Consultation in Khartoum, co-organized 
with the CCIA, addressed the causes of civil and political human rights violations in Africa in a similar 
spirit. The consultation’s 22 participants sought the causes of human rights violations in a listing of 
seven factors: 
‘- anachronistic customs in African culture 
- colonialism and apartheid 
- the feeling of insecurity among national leaders [sic] military rule  
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- disparities in opportunities for education and employment, which produce social injustices 
- the poverty gap in African societies 
- the widespread and permanent use of emergency powers, and 
- the unlimited prerogatives of national security forces.’797 
This listing only glancingly referred to external factors (though more of these may have been unstated, 
treated as given), and instead focused attention on the abuse of power by African governments, as 
well as the persistence of poverty and social injustice. A report presented to the consultation located 
the source of widespread violations of individual and especially group rights in the legacy of 
colonialism, especially in terms of economic structures, but it also criticized the ‘“leadership cult”’ by 
which African leaders monopolized and perpetuated power, in violation of democratic rights.798 The 
consultation recommended that the African churches engage in ‘training, awareness-building, protests, 
encouragement and support for those in society whose human rights are abused’.799 It was considered 
important in this respect that the African churches ‘become self-reliant’ so as to bolster the ‘credibility’ 
of their protests: foreign ties allowed African governments to accuse them of being foreign elements 
and agents of neocolonialism. Other measures included calling on governments to ratify the 
Organization of African Unity’s Convention on Refugees and the UN Covenants, and to establish a 
‘Human Rights Commission for Africa’ as well as an African version of the International Commission 
of Jurists, an ‘Association of African lawyers’.800 All in all, the report was striking for its emphasis on 
civil and political rights and endogenous causes for their violation. 
The Christian Conference of Asia (CCA)’s 14-16 June 1975 consultation in Hong Kong was 
smaller than its African counterpart, involving fifteen participants, from Japan, India, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea, as well as the CCA’s staff, which was based in Singapore, and 
the CCIA’s Ninan Koshy. Four countries were singled out as particularly problematic: the Philippines, 
India, Indonesia, and South Korea. In all of these countries, the main issue was political repression, 
particularly political imprisonment. In India, economic policies, especially the ‘“urban renewal 
programmes”’ were also considered a major issue, which made it stand somewhat apart from the other 
countries. The consultation noted that in Asia, support from the churches, including ecumenical 
bodies, in addressing these issues was not always forthcoming, due to their alignment with the 
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government. The CCA was thus asked to (and did) contact the National Councils of Churches in India 
and Indonesia, to move them to pressure the government.801 Also, in the period leading up to the 
consultation, the CCIA indicated that it felt ‘that Asia urgently needs an analogous outfit’ to the 
Human Rights Resources Office on Latin America, taking up St. Pölten’s call to develop further 
programs of support to local churches.802 No such proposal was discussed at the consultation, though, 
possibly because it would have overlapped with the CCA’s activities. Nevertheless, the consultation 
showed that issues like political imprisonment remained high on the ecumenical agenda even after the 
WCC’s embrace of collective rights. 
Another measure of the relationship between individual and collective rights in practice is the 
WCC’s attitude towards the NIEO, the mid-1970s diplomatic offensive by states from the global 
South which was then the most salient initiative in terms of collective rights.803 The WCC took a 
supportive stance toward the NIEO, which Nils Gilman has recently defined as an attempt to 
‘transform the governance of the global economy to redirect more of the benefits of transnational 
integration toward ‘‘the developing nations’’’.804 As Gilman writes, ‘[t]o reread all the speeches 
delivered on behalf of the NIEO is to be struck by the hopeful idea that the north could be reasoned 
into accepting the moral necessity of abandoning its privileged position in the geopolitical hierarchy.’805 
The WCC played its part in furthering this cause. Speaking at the Nairobi Assembly, Potter welcomed 
the NIEO, and warned: ‘We face the alternatives of co-operation in finding a new way of relating to 
each other as nations, or of confrontation leading to mutual destruction.’806 At its summer 1974 
meeting, the CCIA had already issued a statement on ‘The Economic Threat to Peace’, in which it 
stated that the UN ‘Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order’ 
‘indicates the way’ to deal with the ‘crisis’ the world was facing. The CCIA conceived of this crisis in 
terms of the finitude of world resources as well as social justice, not only between nations but also 
within them. The CCIA stressed that ‘“development” must be understood as progress towards a just 
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and humanly satisfying social system, appropriate to the needs and aspirations of each developing 
country, and not crudely as growth only in gross national product’.807  
Ecumenical leaders such as Niilus saw in the NIEO a possible answer to the problem of 
structural ‘root causes’ that figured so prominently in their deliberations on human rights. The St. 
Pölten consultation dealt with social, economic and cultural rights (under the heading of ‘the right to 
work’), writing on the question of root causes that:  
‘These [social, economic and cultural rights] can only become reality if a new international economic 
order is created based on equity, sovereignty, interdependence, common interest and cooperation 
among the nations – to correct inequalities and redress existing injustices; to eliminate the widening 
gap between the rich and the poor; and to make possible economic and social development in peace 
and justice.’808  
In a further 1975 reflection on ‘The New International Economic Order and the Churches’, the CCIA 
elaborated on the ‘Economic Threat to Peace’ statement, writing that the required ‘transformation’ 
went ‘beyond modification of existing international economic structures, which perpetuate under-
development and intensify the threat to peace, to the establishment of a new, just alternative system’.809 
The CCIA outlined the many issues at stake under the headings of ‘Economic structures’, 
‘International trade’, ‘Foreign Capital Investments and Cooperation’, ‘Transnational Corporations’, 
‘Income Redistribution’, ‘Development Strategy to Combat Poverty’, and, finally, the ‘Role of the 
churches’. As to this last point, the CCIA wrote that ‘[t]he churches and their agencies have an 
important task to become better informed and to help church people everywhere become more aware 
of and concerned about the requirements of a new international economic order.’810  
The NIEO was a state-centric initiative, however, undertaken by a coalition of states and 
aiming at improving the position of developing states vis-à-vis industrialized ones: its ‘unit of poverty 
was the state, not the individual’.811 Antony Anghie has argued that, as an initiative that focused on 
relations between nations rather than their domestic affairs, the NIEO clashed with the 
contemporaneous rise of human rights; the utopia of ‘development’ competed with that of ‘human 
rights’.812 And as Samuel Moyn has recently argued, ‘[f]rom the beginning, it was easy to see that, as a 
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movement of, by, and for states (or “peoples”), the NIEO made no provision for internal distribution 
or internal governance in any respect – including when it came to the whole gamut of basic rights’.813 
Roland Burke has stressed the hypocrisy this could lead to in the realm of UN human rights politics, 
as postcolonial dictatorships used the rhetoric of the NIEO as a way of justifying their disregard for 
individual rights.814 Bradley has written that in consequence, the NIEO’s  
‘claims were largely put to the side by most self-styled transnational human rights activists in the 
West over the decade [the 1970s], who were uncomfortable with the collectivist sensibilities and the 
privileging of economic over political and civil rights that underlay what was a competing vision of 
global human rights’.815 
The WCC was aware of the NIEO’s state-centric nature, as when the Central Committee’s 
1977 statement on the subject remarked, critically:  
‘It should be recognized that the NIEO is focused on power and economic relationships, on state 
actions at inter-state level and, therefore, it is incomplete. The very nature of participation at inter-state 
level does not answer the questions about the nature of participation within the nation-state.’816  
The CCIA’s annual report of the same year noted as one of the current issues on its agenda the 
‘[b]arriers to the establishment of a just economic order within and between nations’.817 Liberation 
theology’s ‘preferential option for the poor’ placed the church at odds with domestic inequality, pitting 
the community (or ‘the people’) against states which would entrench the privileges of the elite. In line 
with this, the Nairobi Assembly defined development as ‘a liberating process aimed at justice, self-
reliance and economic growth. It is essentially a people’s struggle in which the poor and the oppressed 
are and should be the active agents and immediate beneficiaries’.818 The WCC thus remained attentive 
to questions of distributive justice on the national level. 
In the years following the Nairobi Assembly, the CCIA put out major statements that reflected 
the continuing capaciousness of its human rights agenda: torture (1977), extrajudicial executions 
                                                 
813 Samuel Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2018) 117. 
814 Beyond the literature cited above, see Roland Burke, ‘“How Time Flies”: Celebrating the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in the 1960s’, The International History Review, 38, 3 (2016) 394-420; Roland Burke, ‘Competing for the Last 
Utopia?: The NIEO, Human Rights, and the World Conference for the International Women’s Year, Mexico City, June 
1975’, Humanity, 6, 1 (2015) 47-61; Roland Burke, ‘From Individual Rights to National Development: The First UN 
International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran, 1968’, Journal of World History, 19, 3 (2008) 275-296. 
815 Mark Philip Bradley, The World Reimagined: Americans and Human Rights in the Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016) 150. 
816 MRCC 1977, 43 (emphases in original). 
817 CCIA, The Churches in International Affairs: Reports 1974-1978 (Geneva: WCC, 1979) 50 (emphasis omitted). 
818 Quoted in Commission on the Churches’ Participation in Development, ‘CCPD Programme Thrusts’, May 1976 1, 
WCCA CCIA 428.04.18. 
215 
 
(1982), refugees and migrant workers (1983), death penalty (1990), indigenous people and land rights 
(1991), and violence against women (1992).819 At the same time, its programmatic emphasis on root 
causes and its concomitant stress on collective rights remained. In 1993, a CCIA review reaffirmed 
the WCC’s 1983 Vancouver Assembly’s statement that ‘human rights cannot be dealt with in isolation 
from the larger issues of peace, justice, militarism, disarmament and development’.820 In line with this, 
the CCIA observed that ‘[m]ost WCC programmes are designed to promote and bring about structural 
changes in favour of the poor and the oppressed’. The WCC’s member churches were thus 
‘encouraged to promote efforts that are geared to enlarge socio-economic, political and cultural rights 
of the people’. The review mentioned ‘specific human rights issues’ such as ‘torture, death penalty, 
extra-judicial killings etc.’ But while these were urgent and highly visible, the logic of root causes meant 
that they were ultimately epiphenomenal in relation to wider struggles.821 
Conclusions 
At St. Pölten and Nairobi, the WCC embraced a conception of human rights that differed 
sharply from that of the previous decades: it was capacious, liberationist, communitarian, and overtly 
political, as opposed to focused on religious freedom, secular, individualist, and depoliticized. 
Different interpretations have been offered as to how to understand this recasting of human rights. 
Karsten Lehmann has argued that these years saw a process of ‘mainstreaming’ the concept of human 
rights within the WCC, whereby human rights were adopted as a ‘common denominator’ of WCC 
activities.822 Indeed, different departments and commissions of the WCC could (partly) reframe their 
work in terms of human rights.823 Yet it is important to recognize that what might look like a human 
rights issue from a human rights point of view did not necessarily do so from the viewpoint of the 
issue, say development, itself. Further research is needed to determine the substantive influence of the 
WCC’s human rights agenda on its wider programs. 
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In his analysis of these years, Albers has argued that the process of redefining human rights 
served to bring ecumenists from the North and South to ‘see eye to eye’ by speaking a shared language. 
As to the tension between individual and collective rights, he has argued that human rights and ‘the 
question of anticolonialism did not stand in opposition’ to each other, but ‘blended together in the 
overarching desire to establish a better world’.824 Though not in relation to human rights specifically, 
Annegreth Schilling has similarly argued that the WCC’s interaction with Christians from Latin 
America served to create an intermediary ‘third space (…) where theological and cultural differences 
were articulated and negotiated’.825 
The above account confirms these observations but gives greater attention to the tensions 
inherent in the new ecumenical human rights agenda. Framing collective and structural issues in terms 
of human rights served as an effective strategy for placing Third World concerns on the WCC’s agenda 
and inviting ecumenists from the global North to engage with them. But the political issues at stake, 
ranging from international trade agreements and development aid to military spending and 
environmental degradation, rather than blending together, remained as contentious as ever. Epps’ 
remarks in the lead-up to St. Pölten illustrate how the CCIA saw in the concept of human rights a 
vehicle which enjoyed widespread legitimacy, yet at the same time sought to expand its meaning. The 
concept could only be stretched so far, however: casting political issues in terms of human rights did 
not obviate the need to persuade more conservative churches to support causes like the NIEO. The 
concept of human rights thus invited sympathy and solidarity but could not easily accommodate the 
ecumenical leadership’s politico-theological visions of liberation. 
How was the WCC’s approach situated in relation to other, contemporaneous conceptions of 
human rights? Burke has written that in the 1970s there were ‘two poles’ in human rights advocacy, 
one of which was exemplified by Amnesty, the other by the ‘New Internationalism’, exemplified by 
the NIEO.826 The WCC can be understood as charting a course between these two poles, while leaning 
towards the latter. Unlike Amnesty, it stressed social, economic, and collective rights; in contrast to 
Amnesty’s universalism, it pressed for a contextual ethics, rooted in liberation theology; and while 
Amnesty scrupulously observed its political ‘impartiality’, the CCIA tended towards a left-wing and 
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Third World-oriented political agenda. Yet the CCIA had in common with Amnesty its transnational 
character as a non-governmental organization, and this was key in distinguishing its views from those 
of the NIEO. In other respects, most obviously its focus on North-South relations and its emphasis 
on collective rights, but also in its tendency towards cultural relativism, the CCIA gravitated towards 
the NIEO, as its solidarity with the global South predisposed it to. The CCIA’s continued advocacy 
of individual civil and political rights and its function as a hub among Third World churches opposed 
to repression showed that it did not identify with authoritarian governance.827 But given its emphasis 
on ‘root causes’, the WCC’s agenda during the 1970s represented a much more politically radical view 
than that associated with the ‘breakthrough’ of minimalist human rights.828 
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Conclusions 
The ecumenical movement, human rights, and religious freedom from the 
1940s onward 
From the 1940s to the 1970s, the human rights engagement of the World Council of Churches 
(WCC) changed drastically. From the 1940s, its Commission of the Churches on International Affairs 
(CCIA), which also represented the International Missionary Council (IMC), functioned as an 
important hub in a global network of ecumenical Christians – predominantly Protestants – who 
advocated, above all, for religious freedom when they or their coreligionists came under threat. While 
the WCC’s human rights agenda expanded piecemeal from the mid-1960s onward, especially in 
response to the issue of racism, it was only during the 1970s that the WCC developed a new and 
expansive approach to human rights. The new ecumenical conception of human rights prominently 
included not only civil and political but also social, economic, and collective rights, and was informed 
by liberation theology in its emphasis on changing unjust social structures, both within and between 
the countries of the global North and South. 
This story contributes to filling a lacuna in the historiography on human rights from the 1940s 
to the 1970s, which has mainly focused on, broadly speaking, secular liberals and conservative 
Catholics. Insofar as Protestants have received attention, the literature has tended to focus on the 
United States. This dissertation, by contrast, brings squarely into view the transnational Protestant 
human rights engagement of the WCC. As the most important embodiment of the ecumenical 
movement, with a constituency of many millions – in 1954, ‘170 millions of our fellow Christians in 
the 163 member churches’829 – and the participation of many prominent church- and laypeople, the 
WCC represented the ideals of an influential part of the Protestant elites of postwar Western Europe 
and North America. The fact that the CCIA also represented the IMC, which was integrated into the 
WCC in 1961, meant that the churches were connected closely to the global missionary movement. 
By the 1970s, the WCC’s prominence entered a decline which was not to be reversed, yet it still 
functioned as a key forum in which its increasingly geographically, denominationally, and ethnically 
diverse membership articulated and negotiated different perspectives. And though the WCC was 
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marked by an emphasis on dialogue and deliberation, through the influence of its members and 
through its own programs, it continued to exert influence on a range of political situations, such as 
resistance to military dictatorships in Latin America and the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. 
The WCC’s development thus offers a unique window into Protestant engagement with human rights 
in the postwar era of Cold War and decolonization. 
Previous accounts of ecumenical activities in the realm of human rights have focused on its 
work at the United Nations, seen by the WCC as its secular counterpart.830 The starting point of this 
dissertation has been the well-known achievement of the CCIA’s Director, the American Lutheran 
theologian Rev. O. Frederick Nolde, in close collaboration with Charles Malik, the Lebanese 
Ambassador to the United States and to the United Nations, as well as a commissioner of the CCIA, 
in shaping Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The ‘Declaration on 
Religious Liberty’ adopted by the WCC and the IMC a few months earlier likewise reflected Nolde’s 
work. This in turn mainly represented the outcome of American church and missionary deliberations 
during World War II, which integrated religious freedom into the novel framework of human rights 
(whereas earlier ecumenical statements on religious freedom, at Oxford in 1937 and Madras in 1938, 
had not yet done so). While the CCIA’s work at the United Nations continued after 1948, it was 
primarily concerned with safeguarding an expansive interpretation of Article 18 and related rights. 
During the 1960s, a declaration and even a convention on ‘religious intolerance’ was envisioned, which 
could have seen an ecumenical intervention of comparable significance to that of 1948, but no such 
instruments materialized. Meanwhile, though Nolde in particular remained committed to the 
development of UN human rights instruments more broadly, this process stalled in the early 1950s 
and would only be revived from the late 1960s on. Thus, though there remains room for further 
research on the CCIA’s activities at the UN in the 1950s and 1960s (and indeed beyond), this 
dissertation argues that during these years, ecumenical activities below the intergovernmental level 
were much more significant. 
Whereas the literature on the ecumenical movement has tended to identify sources of support 
for ‘human rights’ in general, I have stressed the extent to which the CCIA was focused on religious 
freedom in particular. The WCC’s support of human rights was in large part restricted to the 
development of UN instruments, above all the ‘International Bill of Rights’, but even in this area, the 
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CCIA was focused on those provisions that related to religious freedom. Member churches of the 
WCC could embrace human rights for different reasons, and the American churches especially seem 
to have integrated it into their social thought.831 But the WCC did not itself develop a clearly-defined 
stance on human rights, no doubt owing in part to the wide variety of opinion that existed on the 
concept among its membership. Even the framing of religious freedom as a human right had its 
skeptics, but the twin instruments of the Universal Declaration and the ecumenical ‘Declaration on 
Religious Liberty’ of 1948 gave the CCIA a strong mandate to advocate religious freedom in these 
terms. Nolde’s more general belief in human rights notwithstanding, this meant that the CCIA’s 
concern for human rights was in practice primarily focused on religious freedom. This fact greatly 
qualifies the extent to which we can speak of a Christian human rights ‘revolution’ in the 1940s.832 
As scholars have pointed out, the fact that Christians supported the framework of human 
rights at all was significant: by articulating their core concern of religious freedom in universal 
language, ecumenical Protestants proved themselves willing and sometimes even eager to strike broad 
alliances with those outside the ecumenical movement, including the nonreligious.833 The WCC thus 
broke with past attempts to gain recognition of the rights of churches qua churches, or privileges for 
Christian missionaries in colonized territories.834 As the 1948 ‘Declaration’ stated, the ecumenical 
movement vowed to seek no privileges not accorded to others. Moreover, the integration of religious 
freedom into the framework of human rights marked a major departure in that Christians had long 
tended to view the concept with suspicion or outright hostility, considering it a product of the French 
Revolution and nineteenth-century socialism.835  
Yet the universalization of ecumenical ideals through the language of human rights did not 
mean that formulations like Article 18 were shorn of their underlying agenda, as Linde Lindkvist’s 
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work has demonstrated.836 The promotion of religious freedom was meant to safeguard the role of 
the church in society and the freedom of missionaries to evangelize. While Article 18 represented a 
secularization of religious freedom, at the same time it embodied distinctly Christian priorities. And 
while the 1948 ‘Declaration’, which the CCIA and its associates deployed alongside the language of 
the Universal Declaration, was shaped by the American churches’ turn to human rights, it nevertheless 
represented an explicitly Christian conception of religious freedom. Reframing religious freedom as a 
human right should thus be understood as a rethinking of Christian mission, but by no means as its 
abandonment. 
As the first part of this dissertation illustrates, the CCIA’s advocacy of religious freedom as a 
human right should be understood primarily as a way of responding to concrete church and missionary 
concerns. While the literature on the WCC has focused almost exclusively on the role of (Soviet) 
communism as its chief opponent, chapters 2 and 3 show how Islam and political Roman Catholicism 
also figured as major opponents. Chapters 1 to 3 all bear out the extent to which the language of 
human rights served as a secular instrument in efforts to protect Protestant believers and missionaries 
from discrimination or even ‘totalitarian’ domination – with the overriding goal of safeguarding the 
ability of the church to manifest itself in society and to evangelize. The CCIA and its associates brought 
the Universal Declaration’s Article 18 to bear as an impartial standard, but without much attention to 
the broader range of human rights it was part of. In fact, given the sensitivity of many of the 
interventions involved, it would have been almost inconceivable for the CCIA to engage in more wide-
ranging criticism of the countries it was targeting: to demand of the Soviet Union or fascist Spain to 
not only recognize religious freedom but to cease violating civil and political rights at large would have 
quickly undone any attempt at exerting influence. The ecclesiastical diplomacy of the CCIA was 
premised on its narrow focus on religious freedom and related rights, a term which meant that other 
rights, such as freedom of expression or association, were referenced, but only in relation to religious 
freedom. 
The CCIA’s embrace of the framework of human rights also did not exclude other 
articulations of religious freedom. Article 18 served as one instrument among others: the WCC’s 
Amsterdam ‘Declaration’ and, later on, its 1961 New Delhi ‘Statement’, both of which expressed an 
explicitly Christian and ecumenical conception of religious freedom, continued to play an important 
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role. Such articulations represented ecumenical convictions more fully than Article 18, despite the 
influence that ecumenical lobbying had exerted on the latter’s content. But the secular language of 
Article 18, and related rights, allowed the CCIA and its contacts to deploy it as an impartial and juridical 
standard – most strikingly so in the case of Nigeria and Indonesia (chapter 2), where they put it forward 
as a model for constitutional provisions. Since the governments that the CCIA had the most 
immediate access to – the American and the British – had both made human rights a prominent part 
of their wartime and postwar rhetoric, it offered a way of spurring them to action. And most 
importantly, perhaps, by invoking a secular, universal formulation of religious freedom, the CCIA was 
able to preempt accusations that it was merely advocating privileges for Christians. Human rights thus 
entered the ecumenical arsenal primarily as a secular tool, yet with significant implications for the 
relationship between church and society. By adopting secular language and building common ground 
with non-Christian actors, the CCIA straddled the secular and the religious, blurring the boundary 
between the two. 
In different circumstances, ecumenical advocacy played out in different ways. As chapter 1 
shows, while the WCC in the late 1940s joined in denunciations of the Sovietization of Eastern 
Europe, especially with regard to the violations of religious freedom this entailed, it soon toned down 
its criticism. As WCC membership of the Russian Orthodox Church and the All-Union Council of 
Evangelical Christians-Baptists became viable, Visser ‘t Hooft and others sought to promote dialogue, 
which included critical notes – drawing on the expansive conception of religious freedom articulated 
in Article 18 – but not at the price of upsetting the enlargement of the ecumenical fellowship. When, 
from the mid-1960s onward, Soviet Christians started to voice dissent and call for international 
support, the WCC responded in a few cases. But what changed in the 1970s was not so much the 
WCC’s approach as its context, as human rights activism around Soviet religious and political dissent 
galvanized a transnational movement. The WCC, for reasons including its ecclesiastical nature, the 
belief that ‘silent diplomacy’ would do more good than public denunciation, and the CCIA’s newfound 
commitment to the Third World and questions of social justice, did not adapt to this development, 
leaving the WCC out of step with the 1970s ‘breakthrough’ of human rights, of which support of 
Soviet dissidents was a major element. 
As chapter 2 shows, the ecumenical response to decolonization in majority Muslim countries 
such as (Northern) Nigeria and Indonesia made more purposeful use of Article 18 and ecumenical 
formulations of religious freedom, since it had a clear objective: to insert their language into 
postcolonial constitutions. While criticism of empire was an important aspect of ecumenical thought, 
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American Protestants tended to be stronger in their views than British and continental Europeans. 
WCC statements on self-determination were thus relatively cautious, refraining from full-throated 
endorsement of the right to self-determination. Apprehensive of what would come after 
decolonization, especially in areas with Muslim majorities, the ecumenical movement’s activities in 
terms of human rights instead focused on protecting Christian minorities and securing missionaries’ 
freedom to evangelize. In both Indonesia and Nigeria, the ecumenical formulations of the 1940s and 
the Universal Declaration’s Article 18 played a key role in the ensuing lobbying, which (at least initially) 
seemed to bear fruit. Ecumenists such as J.C. Hoekendijk and Kenneth G. Grubb used a combination 
of the universal language of human rights and their influence with the relevant governments as 
Christian leaders to advocate for the ecumenical conception of religious freedom. They sought to 
disentangle Christianity from empire, but at the same time to preserve Christianity, including 
missionary property and the freedom to evangelize, in postcolonial societies.  
After World War II, anticommunism and the rise of Christian Democracy across Western 
Europe brought about new Protestant-Catholic coalitions. The WCC did not fit these dynamics easily: 
the WCC’s nature as a vehicle for Christian unity impelled it to seek dialogue with an eye to expanding 
the ecumenical fellowship, but it was deeply troubled by the ‘dominant’, even ‘totalitarian’, and 
militantly anticommunist nature of political Roman Catholicism. The case of Spain (chapter 3) 
highlights the tension that remained between Protestants and Catholics in the postwar decades. 
Franco’s ‘National-Catholic’ Spain, an ‘ideal’ Catholic state in the Vatican’s eyes, represented political 
Catholicism at its very worst, and thus became a focal point for ecumenical advocacy. On the 
international plane, the CCIA invoked the language of human rights to draw American and British 
diplomatic pressure, while on the domestic level, Spanish Protestants tended to avoid international 
references, for fear of being branded anti-Spanish. But beyond these remedial measures, ecumenical 
efforts at countering Catholic universalism, encapsulated in the doctrine that ‘error has no rights’, had 
to go further than legalistic interventions. Attempts at dialogue with the Spanish government as well 
as the Vatican (whereas the Spanish Church hierarchy’s intransigence precluded such attempts) were 
aimed at bringing about a more far-reaching change in mentality, in which the Catholic Church’s 
position as Spain’s established church could be made compatible with respect for the country’s 
Protestant minority. Such a change would ultimately emanate from the Second Vatican Council, to 
which the ecumenical movement indirectly contributed. Though this reorientation of Catholic 
thinking went well beyond the specific issue of religious freedom, this concept played a key role in the 
Council’s outcome and subsequent influence (not least in Latin America, where it would stimulate the 
224 
 
rise of liberation theology), setting progressive Catholics on a course toward increasing engagement 
with human rights. 
While these chapters show the ecumenical movement’s focus on religious freedom, the WCC’s 
engagement was expansive in terms of its transnational reach. Not limited to the realm of 
intergovernmental politics, nor to the scale of small nongovernmental organizations orbiting the UN, 
the ecumenical movement mobilized Christian leaders in a wide range of locales. This distinguished 
it, for instance, from a secular organization like the International League for the Rights of Man, which 
served as a conduit for a wide range of groups to voice complaints at the UN, but which did not 
possess the resources to undertake effective action beyond this forum.837 The officers of the CCIA 
sought to directly influence governments of countries where religious freedom was curtailed; they 
secured interventions by third governments (especially the American and the British); they engaged in 
dialogue with religious leaders; and they provided advice and support to the churchmen and 
missionaries in question. The prevalence of these activities suggests that the CCIA played an important 
role in disseminating the ecumenical conception of religious freedom as a human right among church 
leaders and missionaries worldwide. Further studies, making greater use of the sources produced by 
the CCIA’s national-level interlocutors, could show in greater detail how local or national traditions 
of thinking about religious freedom were affected – or not – by this encounter. 
 
The new ecumenical approach to human rights in the 1970s and beyond 
Histories of the WCC have long characterized the years around 1968 as a pivot between its 
first two decades, dominated by politically cautious Western Protestants, and subsequent decades 
wherein Third World churches and Orthodox ecumenists (as well as contacts with the Roman Catholic 
Church) played an increasing role and the WCC became more politically outspoken.838 A generational 
shift, symbolized by the departure of the ‘founding fathers’ such as the WCC’s first General Secretary, 
W.A. Visser ‘t Hooft, played an important role.839 Katharina Kunter and Annegreth Schilling’s account 
                                                 
837 See Jan Eckel, ‘The International League for the Rights of Man, Amnesty International, and the Changing Fate of 
Human Rights Activism from the 1940s through the 1970s’, Humanity, 4, 2 (2013) 183-214, on 185-192. 
838 For a critical evaluation of the importance of the Uppsala Assembly of that year, see Annegreth Schilling, ‘1968 und 
die Ökumene: Die Volversammlung des ÖRK in Uppsala als Beginn einer neuen Ära?’, in Kunter and Schilling, eds., 
Globalisierung der Kirchen, 89-119. 
839 The phrase is from Andrew Chandler, ‘The Founding Fathers and the New Vision: The World Council of Churches, 
1948-1958’, in Kunter and Schilling, eds., Globalisierung der Kirchen, 78-88. 
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of the development of the WCC in the 1960s and 1970s has challenged the suddenness of this shift, 
taking as their period the years from 1955 to 1973 (building on Arthur Marwick’s thesis of the ‘long 
Sixties’). During this period, they contend, the WCC underwent a process of ‘globalization’ and 
‘politicization’, whereby it came to be guided by a ‘global conscience’.840 Changes in the WCC’s 
constituency, the political orientation of its members, and their theological leanings, all contributed to 
this shift, as did external developments: Kunter and Schilling rightly place the WCC’s development in 
the context of the Cold War as a global phenomenon that shaped the trajectory of many decolonizing 
and developing nations, and was thus by no means restricted to competition between East and West. 
They compare the WCC’s newfound emphasis on Third World perspectives and interests with the 
rise of the Non-Aligned Movement in the UN, where Third World states exercised numerical 
dominance from the 1960s on and focused attention on global North-South relations.841  
With respect to human rights, however, the WCC’s agenda only gradually widened from the 
mid-1960s, especially on questions of race, before undergoing drastic change in the first half of the 
1970s. The CCIA’s relative autonomy until 1968, along with the established position of its Anglo-
American leaders, Nolde and Grubb, followed by the sudden change in personnel and especially the 
appointment of Leopoldo J. Niilus as Director, along with Dwain C. Epps as Study Secretary, helps 
to account for this. Thus, while the ground had been prepared over the preceding decade or even 
longer, it was the agency of the CCIA’s new leadership that was decisive in setting in motion the 
development of the WCC’s new conception of human rights. The Marxist-inflected and anti-
imperialist frame in which the CCIA’s leadership placed its new ‘integral’ approach to human rights 
led to the inclusion of not only social and economic but also collective rights, introducing a tension 
with individual rights that remained unresolved. Meanwhile, on a theological level, human rights could 
now be put forward as a core element of ecumenical social ethics, rather than the secularized and more 
narrowly legalistic version of the 1940s.842 Decreasing its focus on the UN, the CCIA sought instead 
to act as a body stimulating and coordinating activities between different parts of the WCC, churches, 
and secular nongovernmental organizations. In the process, it moved away from attempting to 
disseminate a universal conception of human rights and instead embraced a certain degree of 
                                                 
840 Katharina Kunter and Annegreth Schilling, ‘“Der Christ fürchtet den Umbruch nicht”: Der Ökumenische Rat der 
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Globalisierung der Kirchen, 21-74, on 65. On context for this subject see also Brian Stanley, Christianity in the Twentieth Century: 
A World History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), which was published too late to be used in this dissertation. 
841 Kunter and Schilling, ‘“Der Christ”’, 62. 
842 Cf. Albers, ‘Der ÖRK und die Menschenrechte’, 205. 
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relativism as to the content of human rights, at least with respect to implementation (as opposed to 
norms), on the premise that churches would know best the needs of their communities. 
Chapter 4, which traces the relationship between ecumenical discourses of antiracism and 
human rights, shows that while the American churches blended the two in the 1940s, the CCIA did 
not follow this lead. Though the WCC’s declarations on racism featured occasional references to 
human rights, its reticence to undertake anything beyond such general statements meant that the 
connection remained of little importance. With respect to the case of South Africa, moreover, human 
rights language was peripheral not only because of the ecumenical desire for reconciliation, but also 
because among the WCC’s South African interlocutors, the concept of human rights was regarded as 
dangerously ‘liberal’. The American civil rights movement of the mid-1960s, to the extent that it 
invoked human rights, along with developments at the UN, pushed the CCIA to connect antiracism 
with its human rights agenda. But by 1969, when the WCC’s Programme to Combat Racism (PCR) 
was established, the CCIA’s still liberal, UN-focused approach was overtaken by the PCR’s direct 
support to liberation movements, to whom pleas to observe ‘minimum standards’ were hopelessly 
inadequate. Human rights would therefore play no more than an auxiliary role in the WCC’s efforts 
to end apartheid and other situations of racial injustice. The PCR, however, did inform and stimulate 
the WCC’s development of a more radical and transnational approach to human rights, especially 
through its emphasis on aiding liberation movements on their own terms. 
It was the response to the rise of military dictatorships in Latin America, more than anything 
else, that shaped the WCC’s new approach to human rights (chapter 5). The influx of Latin Americans, 
many of them formerly associated with Church and Society in Latin America [Iglesia y Sociedad en 
América Latina, ISAL] into WCC leadership positions and the appeal of their perspective to the WCC’s 
Western membership, combined with the global surge in human rights activism in response to the 
1973 coup in Chile, invited vigorous ecumenical action. The CCIA and the WCC more generally 
served as an important hub connecting Christians across the continent as they sought to develop an 
effective response to repression. The WCC facilitated convergence between liberation theology and 
human rights, changing both in the process: as liberation theologians overcame some of their 
suspicions and took human rights up as a tool or even as a principle, the ecumenical conception of 
human rights was reconfigured to serve the goal of liberation. This involved not only attention to a 
wide range of rights – in itself already a drastic departure from ecumenical practice of the prior decades 
– but also deploying it in the process of ‘conscientization’, both within Latin America and in the West. 
Rather than merely as legal instruments, human rights thus came to serve as a moral language, to be 
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‘vernacularized’ as required by communities suffering repression and marginalization.843 In the WCC’s 
usage, human rights served to draw attention to the human suffering caused by state repression, but 
– in contrast to the activism of Amnesty International – the CCIA emphatically sought to not lose 
what it saw as the structural causes of this repression from view. 
From 1971 to 1975, the CCIA generalized this structural view into a new ecumenical 
conception of human rights, which included not only civil and political but also social, economic, and 
collective rights. A series of meetings put Third World perspectives center stage; Western participants 
either supported, acquiesced, or resisted this, for various reasons, while Eastern European participants 
were supportive but did not exert much substantive influence. The process that culminated in the 
1974 St. Pölten consultation on ‘Human Rights and Christian Responsibility’ opened up space within 
which different viewpoints could be articulated. The consultation’s reports, embraced by the 1975 
Nairobi Assembly, emphasized churches’ ability to see what their communities required, initiating a 
tendency towards pluralism and a decentralization of the CCIA’s role. The WCC’s approach in the 
1970s saw limits to a conception of universality as impartiality, and instead tended towards a politics 
of pluralism and difference (albeit still in the framework of a universal ecumenical community). The 
development of the WCC’s conception of human rights in the 1970s can thus be seen as a victory for 
the ‘revolutionary tradition’ in the ecumenical movement, which saw the acknowledgment of 
fundamental differences as essential to authentic unity: process mattered more than the achievement 
of a consensus outcome.844 Christian Albers has assessed the process as allowing ecumenists from the 
global North and South to ‘see eye to eye’ by speaking a shared language. As to the tension between 
individual and collective rights, he has argued that human rights and ‘the question of anticolonialism 
did not stand in opposition’ to each other, but ‘blended together in the overarching desire to establish 
a better world’.845 Though not in relation to human rights specifically, Annegreth Schilling has similarly 
argued that the WCC’s interaction with Christians from Latin America served to create an intermediary 
‘third space (…) where theological and cultural differences were articulated and negotiated’.846  
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Further research is needed on the reception of the WCC’s new human rights agenda among 
its member churches, but it seems clear that it percolated through the ecumenical movement. The 
WCC thus stimulated Christians to participate in a variety of ways in the social movements that rose 
to prominence in the years following ‘1968’. Moreover, the influence of the WCC’s radical approach 
to human rights extended well beyond its member churches. As James C. Kennedy notes, many 
ecumenically-minded Protestants during these years were attracted by secular organizations, such as 
Amnesty International, which ‘could fire the moral imagination of active Protestants as much as any 
church-related body’.847 The WCC’s activities in the realm of human rights helped to pave the way for 
Christians (including those who lapsed, in these years of de-churching) to join Amnesty, an 
organization which in many ways embodied a secularized Christianity.848 Such developments can be 
understood as part of what David Hollinger, in the American context, has described as the rise of 
‘post-Protestantism’, by which ecumenical Protestants’ encounter with and increasing openness 
towards diversity served for many as a ‘halfway house’ to secularism.849 At the same time, as Reynolds 
has argued with respect to the 1950s and 1960s, this did not mean that those who remained within 
ecumenical organizations such as the WCC simply capitulated to secularism. Rather, they sought to 
act as mediators between political and theological concepts.850 The theological efforts to establish 
Christian underpinnings for human rights mentioned in chapter 6 illustrate this: ecumenists sought to 
integrate human rights into their theological thinking and vice versa. 
The WCC’s function as a site where Christians articulated and negotiated their differences did 
not, however, keep the organization from pursuing a distinct political agenda – far from it. The new 
human rights agenda articulated under the auspices of the CCIA tied together humanitarian (or 
depoliticized) and political elements, while emphasizing the causal connection between the two. 
Human rights, with issues such as torture featuring most prominently, thus worked as the thin end of 
a wedge, by which the political agenda of the churches was to be widened into one that addressed 
questions of social justice, especially pertaining to the global South. Assumed in this new conception 
of human rights was that the churches were called to act against injustice. Christians were encouraged 
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to listen to the voices of the oppressed on their own terms and take action to overcome ‘unjust 
structures’. Through the WCC’s direct support of church organizations resisting repression in Latin 
America, or its support to liberation movements in Southern Africa, or for calls for a New 
International Economic Order, the WCC’s Western constituency – still represented by a majority of 
delegates at its conferences – was engaged in a Christian form of what has been referred to (often 
derisively, though this is not how the term is intended here) as ‘Third Worldism’.851 Though church 
activism was rather more sedate than the revolutionary models of the time – Cuba, China, North 
Vietnam – the WCC’s embrace of a theology of revolution and then liberation converged with socialist 
ideals (which some leaders, such as Julio de Santa Ana and Emilio Castro, explicitly embraced, while 
distancing themselves from state socialism along Soviet lines852). 
There were limits to how far congregations were willing to follow the WCC’s new course, 
however, and these limits became more sharply pronounced as the radicalism of the years after 1968 
faded. The humanitarian appeal of emblematic violations such as torture, which could count on 
widespread support, did not necessarily led to acceptance of more contentious political positions, such 
as those to do with international economic structures, or of a politically outspoken role for the 
churches in the first place. In other words, framing social justice in terms of human rights was no 
panacea for galvanizing support across the WCC’s membership. As Kunter has noted, the turn to an 
understanding of Christian mission as social justice alienated many more conservative Western 
participants in the ecumenical movement.853 Others have pointed out the growing gap between 
ecumenical leaders and their congregants in the United States in particular, where evangelicalism 
experienced a lasting surge while ecumenical Protestantism lost its authority.854 James Kennedy has 
argued that the WCC’s inability ‘to maintain a “transcendent” spiritual authority in the midst of 
growing rifts over the place of churches in international civil society’ was one reason for a decline in 
its importance during from these years onward.855 Cold War tensions, evidenced most clearly in 
chapter 1, as well as North-South tensions, illustrated in chapter 6, brought such rifts into the 
foreground. Moreover, as Kennedy argues, ongoing secularization and, more importantly still, the 
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process of ‘congregationalization’, which led Christians to bypass the WCC in favour of ‘more diffuse 
international networks’, further reduced the salience of the WCC.856  
To those for whom the WCC’s approach went too far, an organization like Amnesty, which 
appealed to many precisely because of its sharply circumscribed approach to human rights, offered an 
alternative.857 The WCC’s agonistic approach to human rights and social justice, which was of a more 
politically determined and demanding nature, could not but lead part of its constituency to reject it. 
The cautionary note sounded by José Zalaquett – a key contact in Chile after the coup, but now a 
leading figure in Amnesty – in 1981 illustrated this problem well, from the viewpoint of a liberal, 
consensus-oriented conception of human rights: ‘The key problem is that the human rights movement 
by definition tends towards the enforcement of a consensus, and hence can enter the conflicts 
involved in the arduous process of enlarging the consensus only at the risk of negating itself.’858 The 
CCIA in the 1970s was aware of this tension, but it was determined to press ahead anyway, because it 
accepted conflict as inherent in the process of authentic Christian witness, understood as ‘costly 
discipleship’.  
The CCIA’s attempt at expanding the concept of human rights to include social, economic, 
and collective rights speaks to a wider question about the nature of human rights in the 1970s. As 
Mark Engler has written, ‘[a]lthough the assertion of a broad range of system-oriented, second and 
third-generation rights is an innovative strategy for challenging the limits of traditional liberal 
conceptions of human rights, it remains uncertain whether the category of “rights” can bear the 
burden of this move’.859 Even the CCIA in the latter half of the 1970s seemed ambivalent on this 
conceptual issue, given the relative scarcity of appeals to social, economic, and collective rights, though 
this may in part be explained by the lack of means of enforcing such rights and the limited moral 
traction they enjoyed among a wider (Western) public. A major problem faced by all actors promoting 
social, economic and collective rights at this time was these rights’ association with authoritarianism. 
As Burke’s work on the United Nations around the 1970s has shown, in practice, the politics of 
collective rights, such as those of the NIEO, were all too often entangled with postcolonial 
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dictatorships.860 Burke has thus written that in the 1970s there were ‘two poles’ in human rights 
advocacy, one of which was exemplified by Amnesty, the other by the ‘New Internationalism’, 
exemplified by calls for a ‘New International Economic Order’ (NIEO). In Burke’s view, the latter 
‘drifted to grand impersonal structures and high abstractions, all of which were to enhance sovereign 
power to “do good” (a questionable proposition, given the authoritarianism of its chief proponents) 
and to create the conditions under which human rights would be realized’.861 The WCC can be 
understood as charting a course between these two poles: it sought to address the structural causes of 
injustice while steering clear of the NIEO’s authoritarian tendencies. But given its emphasis on the 
‘root causes’ of human rights violations, the WCC’s agenda during the 1970s represented a much more 
politically radical view than that associated with the ‘breakthrough’ of minimalist human rights.862 The 
history of the WCC’s human rights engagement thus highlights the diversity of human rights discourse 
in the 1970s, while at the same it raises the question of how or to what extent human rights could be 
reshaped into a tool for social justice.863 
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